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vAbstract
The economic outcomes realized by a society are a function of the institutions put
in place, the incentives they create, and the behavior of agents in the face of those
incentives. Selecting the appropriate institutions for a given economy is particularly
important in the domain of public economics, where individual incentives are often
inconsistent with efficiency. Three major concerns in institutional design are ad-
dressed. First, do agents select the equilibrium strategies at which efficient allocations
obtain? Second, does the repeated game nature of a long-lived institution impact
behavior? Third, what degree of coercion is necessary for a planner to guarantee that
the allocation selected by a mechanism can be enforced? Answering these questions
helps to understand which institutions are most appropriate in various environments.
In Chapter 2, five public goods mechanisms are experimentally tested in a repeated
game environment. Behavior is well approximated by a model in which agents best re-
spond to an average of recently observed data. This model provides various sufficient
conditions a mechanism must satisfy for play to converge to an efficient equilibrium.
In Chapter 3, it is assumed that the designer of a one-shot mechanism must allow
agents a ‘no trade’ option in which they are free to contribute nothing but enjoy
the public good produced by others’ contributions. It is shown that a large set of
vi
economies exist in which there is some agent at every allocation who prefers this
option. Even in economies where this is not true, it becomes true as the economy is
replicated, making it impossible to implement any allocation except the endowment
in large economies.
In the final chapter, a model of group reputations is developed to explain why moral
hazard problems are significant in some laboratory experiments and less significant
in others. If firms believe that either all workers are selfish or all workers are recip-
rocal, then selfish workers may have an incentive to develop a ‘group reputation’ of
being reciprocal for a fixed number of periods in order to extract higher wages. As
predicted, only in those experiments in which this incentive is sufficiently large is the
moral hazard problem mitigated.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The economic outcomes realized by a society are a function of the institutions put
in place, the incentives they create, and the behavior of agents in the face of those
incentives. In situations where a social planner or government agency has both a
notion of desirable outcomes and an ability to put in place certain institutions, it is
imperative that the planner understand the interactions between these three elements.
Economic theory has provided a solid foundation for this understanding, but it is
necessarily constrained by a need for tractability. As a consequence, economic models
make various specific assumptions about both the ability of the planner to select
institutions and the response of agents to the incentives those institutions create.
In order to move this theoretical research toward the domain of application, it is
necessary to understand the robustness and the realism of these assumptions.
In economic environments where goods can be made excludable and where the
agent that consumes a good is the only one who receives benefit, it is well-known
that under very general assumptions, establishing and maintaining property rights is
sufficient to guarantee that the selfish private exchange of goods can lead to efficient
2allocations for the entire society.1 In such situations, the benevolent social planner
need not consider complex mechanisms for the achievement of socially efficient out-
comes; enforcing the rights of individuals to own and trade property is sufficient.
This theoretical result is particularly appealing because its assumptions about indi-
vidual behavior and information are minimal and it does not require that the planner
actively engage in the reallocation of property. Although the theory still grapples
with exactly how prices form and how economies adjust from their initial state to
an efficient allocation, it is clear that under the simplest of behavioral assumptions,
agents will still arrive at these optimal outcomes.
Unfortunately, such desirable results do not obtain when the consumption and
production choices of one agent have an impact on the welfare of another. The provi-
sion of a pure public good is a particularly stark example where all agents necessarily
consume a single good, so the production of one agent necessarily impacts the benefits
of others. Property rights alone are then insufficient for the realization of efficient
outcomes because each agent has an incentive to let the others fund a given level
of the public good. Samuelson [90] formally demonstrates how individual incentives
lead agents to select allocations different from the socially efficient allocation so that
generically, an efficient allocation cannot be an equilibrium state of the economy.
In such situations, more complex institutions are needed to realize the desired out-
comes. Samuelson conjectures that no decentralized institution can be effective when
agents have the ability to misrepresent their preferences. Fueled by debates about
1It will be assumed throughout that the social planner’s goal is efficiency, as formalized by the
notion of Pareto optimality. A similar methodology could be used to study institutions, incentives,
and behavior under alternative desiderada and many of the results herein would still apply.
3the viability of a socialist system, various authors have worked to identify and study
decentralized institutions and to determine whether or not Samuelson’s conjecture is
universally true.
Early research focused on models of economic adjustment that are guaranteed to
move the economy to a welfare-maximizing state, without concern for individuals’
incentives to reveal their preferences truthfully.2 An adjustment process is said to
be Pareto satisfactory if it selects a unique Pareto optimal outcome and if every
Pareto optimal outcome can be attained from some initial state. Thus, the classic
welfare theorems for private goods economies prove that the perfectly competitive
mechanism is Pareto satisfactory. At this point, authors were primarily concerned
with the amount of information that a Pareto satisfactory mechanism must acquire
from its agents in order to operate under the assumption that agents would always
be willing to provide truthfully such information when asked of them.
As the mechanism design literature progressed, authors became increasingly con-
cerned with the assumption of truthful revelation.3 The additional requirement of
incentive compatibility was imposed on mechanisms, stating that the vector of infor-
mational messages sent by each agent be a Nash equilibrium strategy profile of the
‘message-sending game’. This led to the key negative result of the literature: there
does not exist an incentive compatible, Pareto satisfactory mechanism where truthful
revelation of one’s preferences is an equilibrium behavior. Groves & Ledyard [43]
demonstrated that this impossibility result could be circumvented by using abstract
2See Hurwicz [48] or Hurwicz [50] for a review of this development.
3This concern about incentives dates back at least as far as Samuelson [90].
4message spaces (rather than asking for agents’ preference profiles directly) and assum-
ing that agents will always select Nash equilibrium messages of the one-shot game
defined by the mechanism. Indeed, every Nash equilibrium message profile of this
proposed mechanism maps to a Pareto optimal outcome of the economy without any
a priori information about the characteristics of the economy. Maskin [67] then pro-
vided a general theorem characterizing the desiderata (including Pareto optimality,
for example) that can successfully be implemented in this way. These results show
that when the Nash equilibrium assumption is used, Samuelson’s concerns about the
incentives to misrepresent one’s preferences can be successfully avoided.
The first step in taking these theoretical solutions to real world problems is de-
termining the conditions under which agents will behave according to the Nash equi-
librium prediction. If a mechanism is proposed whose Nash equilibrium outcomes
are guaranteed to be Pareto optimal, it is of use in real world settings only if Nash
equilibrium is an accurate predictor of behavior. Previous experimental research on
behavior in games clearly indicates that the Nash equilibrium concept is highly pre-
dictive in some situations and terribly inaccurate in others. It is generally true that in
market-like trading interactions, the selfish utility maximizing model performs quite
well, while in situations where one’s strategies directly and obviously affect others’
payoffs, behavior often deviates from the selfish prediction in a way consistent with
models of fairness, inequality aversion, or reputation building. It is therefore difficult
to extrapolate from these observations a prediction about behavior in mechanisms for
the provision of a public good, and it certainly appears plausible that the existence of
5a public good in the economy will lead players to deviate from the Nash prediction.
A second necessary extension of the theoretical work is to consider situations
where the mechanism is repeated periodically. Institutions are often long-lived and
agents’ behavior may not be identical through time. Players may learn more about the
preferences of others. They may attempt to build reputations. They might use past
information to predict what others will do in an upcoming iteration. They may expect
that others will use current announcements to shape their play in later periods and will
thus be motivated to deviate in the present to positively affect the future. Repetition
of a one-shot game opens the door to a much larger set of equilibrium predictions
and off-equilibrium motivations, raising questions about the validity of the original
solution in such a setting. It may be that repetition will ‘undo’ certain mechanisms
by generating unexpected inefficiencies through dynamic behavior, while improving
the outcomes of some inefficient mechanisms through the selection of repeated game
equilibria that Pareto dominate the one-shot prediction.
These two concerns are summarized by two empirical questions: Will agents play
the Nash equilibrium prediction, and will repetition of the mechanism alter behavior?
Chapters 2 and 4 experimentally consider these two questions in the domains of public
goods provision and contracting under moral hazard, respectively. The first of these
chapters identifies a particular ‘best response’ learning model of behavior that is fairly
consistent with actual play of a repeated mechanism. This model not only provides
insight about which particular mechanisms will converge to their equilibrium points,
but also provides sufficient conditions for a mechanism to guarantee that equilibrium
6outcomes will eventually obtain. The latter chapter examines a situation in which
repeated game behavior may improve the outcomes of a mechanism through rational
reputation-building in the presence of stereotyping behavior. Specifically, employees
may select levels of effort that are socially optimal for long periods of time because
they believe their employer will erroneously categorize them (and, through stereotyp-
ing, their co-workers) as ‘reciprocal’ players who irrationally respond to higher wages
with increased effort. The employer, believing that its workers may be reciprocal, will
attempt to motivate these workers with higher pay and in fact, will receive higher
effort in response for all but the final period, even if all of the workers are in fact
selfish-minded individuals. Thus, in an institution where selfish behavior is generally
thought to cause highly inefficient outcomes, the repeated nature of the interaction
can lead to significant welfare gains for all parties involved.
Finally, the standard model of mechanism design assumes that the social planner
needs only to identify desirable allocations in order for such outcomes to be realized.
This paradigm implicitly assumes that the planner is equipped with some ability to
enact the chosen allocations through a credible and undesirable action, should some
agents not comply with the allocation. This action may take the form of explicit
penalties for deviating, such as fines or imprisonment, or even the seizure of the
agents’ endowments and the forceful reallocation of assets. It may also take the
form of an alternative allocation that any deviating agent would prefer less than the
one suggested. In the example of providing a public good, it may be credible for
the planner to provide no public good if even one agent deviates from the chosen
7allocation. Here, any allocation preferred by every agent to their initial endowment
can be credibly enforced by this possibility. On the other extreme, if the planner
has no credible outside option, agents can freely ignore the suggested allocation and
voluntarily provide any level of the public good they prefer – an outcome that is
generically different from optimality.
Chapter 3 examines an intermediate case where the central planner cannot credibly
commit to cancel all production of the public good if a single agent deviates, but does
have the ability to decline the contribution of an individual if that contribution is not
consistent with the chosen allocation. In other words, if the central planner requests
a certain amount of money from an agent to be put into production of the public
good, and that agent responds by sending a different amount of money, the planner
can credibly ‘tear up the check’ and produce only the level of public good that can
be achieved with all others’ contributions. In such a situation, the planner is unable
to guarantee that there exists an allocation that is mutually agreeable by all agents,
and therefore, must expect that there will be situations in which one or more agents
will have an incentive to not comply with the proposed allocation. Even worse, it is
shown that as an economy becomes large, it is guaranteed that at least one individual
will always prefer noncompliance. Thus, the ability to identify desirable allocations
through a mechanism is hardly sufficient for those allocations to obtain when the
planner has this level of enforcement available.
8Chapter 2
Learning Dynamics for Mechanism
Design
As mentioned in Chapter 1, many mechanisms have been identified whose equilib-
ria generate efficient allocations in economies with pure public goods.1 In general,
mechanisms that require stronger equilibrium concepts are more restricted in their
ability to select desirable outcomes. Theoretical results are unclear about how these
trade-offs should be resolved in practice. For example, consider an environment where
agents have little to no information about each others’ preferences and the level of
a certain public good is to be re-evaluated at regular intervals. If a social planner
were asked to choose a particular mechanism in this setting, which would she prefer?
Are dominant strategy equilibria necessary in this environment? Will mechanisms
with stable Nash equilibria converge quickly to an efficient outcome, even though
preferences are private information?
In the current chapter, five public goods mechanisms with various equilibrium
1Chapter 2 is reprinted with minor modifications from a Journal of Economic Theory forthcom-
ing article by Paul J. Healy entitled ‘Learning dynamics for mechanism design: An experimental
comparison of public goods mechanisms’, Copyright 2005, with permission from Elsevier.
9properties are experimentally tested in a repeated game setting.2 Specifically, the
Voluntary Contribution, Proportional Tax, Groves-Ledyard, Walker, and Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanisms are all compared in an identical laboratory environment.3
The goal of this research is to compare behavior across mechanisms and identify a
simple learning dynamic that approximates actual behavior and correctly predicts
when actions will converge to the efficient equilibria. Armed with this information,
the social planner will then be able to select a mechanism whose desirable equilibrium
properties should be realized in practice.
Previous experimental studies have concluded that learning dynamics play an im-
portant role in the repeated play of a mechanism. Two general observations suggest
that behavior may be consistent with a learning model based on some form of best
response play. First, convergence is observed only in game forms known to be super-
modular, where best response play predicts convergence. Second, tests of dominant
strategy mechanisms suggest that agents tend to play weakly dominated strategies
that are best responses to previously observed strategy choices.4 Motivated by these
observations, the current chapter develops a simple model of best response play and
finds that its predictions well approximate observed subject behavior.
The key six results of this chapter are as follows:
1. Subject behavior is well approximated by a model in which agents best respond
2This is, to the author’s knowledge, the largest set of public goods mechanisms to be tested
side-by-side to date.
3The cVCG mechanism refers to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism in cases where the level
of the public good is selected from a continuum. In contrast, the Pivot mechanism refers to the
VCG mechanism when the public project choice is binary. The details of all five mechanisms appear
in Section 2.4.
4An overview of previous results is provided in Section 2.1, as well as in a survey by Chen [19].
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to the average strategy choice over the last few periods. This model is shown
to be significantly more accurate than the stage game equilibrium prediction.
2. Half of all decisions in the cVCG mechanism are at the demand-revealing domi-
nant strategy point, while the remainder cluster around weakly dominated best
response strategies that are payoff-equivalent to the dominant strategy predic-
tion.
3. Behavior converges close to equilibrium in the Groves-Ledyard and Voluntary
Contribution mechanisms.
4. Behavior does not systematically converge in the Proportional Tax and Walker
mechanisms.
5. Because of the stability results, the cVCG mechanism is found to be the most
efficient. The instability in the Walker mechanism often leads to payoffs below
that of the initial endowment.
6. Finally, most strategy profiles observed to be stable or asymptotically stable
are approximately equilibrium strategy profiles.
Note that the model presented in result 1 successfully predicts results 2 through
6. This indicates that the model is a reasonable and tractable tool for predicting
subject behavior and convergence properties of public goods mechanisms.
A brief overview of the previous experimental literature is given in the next sec-
tion. The learning model and its testable implications are then introduced in Section
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2.2. Details of the experimental design are outlined in Section 2.3 and a complete de-
scription of each mechanism in use is given in Section 2.4. Results and data analysis
appear in Section 2.5, and Section 2.6 offers concluding remarks.
2.1 Previous Experiments
This section briefly summarizes previous experimental results on public goods mech-
anisms. One theme spanning these results is that behavior is, at least qualitatively,
consistent with a model of best response play. This observation partially motivates
the construction of the particular class of best response models in the following sec-
tion.
The earliest studies of public goods provision have focused on the Voluntary Con-
tribution mechanism. A wide variety of specifications and treatment variables have
been examined, and this line of research continues to generate interesting results
about preferences and behavior. A comprehensive summary of this literature is pro-
vided by Ledyard [61], who concludes that “in the initial stages of finitely repeated
trials, subjects generally provide contributions halfway between the Pareto-efficient
level and the free riding level,” and that “contributions decline with repetition.” For
example, in an early paper by Isaac, McCue & Plott [51], payoffs drop from 50% of
the maximum in the first period to 9% by the fifth period. Strategies quickly converge
toward the free-riding dominant strategy through repetition.
In the decades since the theoretical development of public goods mechanisms de-
signed to solve the ‘free-rider’ problem, experimental tests have focused primarily on
12
Nash mechanisms. Several studies, mostly due to Yan Chen, explore properties of the
Groves-Ledyard mechanism. For example, Chen & Plott [21] study the effect of the
punishment parameter and find that strategies converge rapidly to equilibrium for
large parameter values – an observation consistent with known convergence results
for best response dynamics in supermodular games. The authors conclude that a best
response model that uses information from all previous periods is more accurate than
one in which agents best respond to only the previous period.5 Chen & Tang [22]
compare the Groves-Ledyard mechanism to the Walker mechanism and find that the
Groves-Ledyard mechanism is significantly more efficient, apparently due to dynam-
ically unstable behavior in the Walker mechanism. This instability is both observed
in subject behavior and predicted by best response dynamic models.
The first well-controlled laboratory test of the dominant strategy Pivot mechanism
(the VCG mechanism with a binary public choice) is run by Attiyeh, Franciosi & Isaac
[4]. Subjects are given positive or negative values for a proposed project and must
submit a message indicating their demand. Although revealing one’s demand is a
(weak) dominant strategy, only ten percent of observations are consistent with this
prediction, with thirteen of twenty subjects never revealing their true value.
Kawagoe & Mori [55] extend the Attiyeh et al. result by comparing the above
treatment to one in which subjects are given a payoff table. The effect of having
players choose from the table is significant, as demand revelation increases to 47%.
Since the equilibrium is a weak dominant strategy in the sense that all agents have
5This model, due to Carlson [13] and Auster [5], is a best response model (defined in Section 2.2)
in which predictions equal the simple average (not the empirical frequency) of all previous periods.
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other strategies that are best responses to the equilibrium, the authors argue that
subjects have difficulty discovering the undominated property of truth-telling because
non-revelation strategies may also be best responses.
Most recently, Cason et al. [14] compare the Pivot and cVCG mechanisms with
two players and show that deviations from truthful revelation, when they occur, tend
to result in weakly dominated Nash equilibria. Specifically, assume the first subject
in the Pivot mechanism announces her value truthfully. If the good is produced when
the second player announces truthfully, it is also produced when he overstates his
value. Thus, there exists a wide range of false announcements that can be equilibrium
strategies for player two, even though they are weakly dominated by truth-telling. In
the cVCG mechanism with only one preference parameter, on the other hand, agents
have a strict dominant strategy to reveal truthfully. In the experiment, only half of
the observed subject pairs play the dominant strategy equilibrium in the Pivot mech-
anism, while 81 percent reveal truthfully in the cVCG mechanism. Behaviorally, this
explanation is consistent with an evolutive model where agents select payoff maxi-
mizing strategies rather than an eductive model where agents solve for the equilibria
of the game.
The results of these previous studies indicate that dynamically stable Nash equilib-
ria and strict dominant strategies are good predictors of behavior, but unstable equi-
libria generate unstable behavior and weakly dominated best responses may draw
players away from dominant strategy equilibria. These observations are consistent
with a history-dependent best response model. The goal of the current chapter is to
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refine this conjecture and identify a tractable model that, if not a perfect description
of behavior, can at least predict the convergence properties of a mechanism in the
repeated environment.
2.2 Setup and Environment
The general environment in use is as follows:
A set of agents is given by I = {1, . . . , n}. Each has preferences for consumption
of a private good x = (x1, . . . , xn) and a single public good y that can be represented
by the differentiable function ui (y, xi;θi), where θi ∈ Θi indicates the ‘type’ of agent
i ∈ I. Specifically, θi is a vector of utility parameters held by agent i. Each Θi
is assumed to be convex and Θ = ×ni=1Θi. Unless stated otherwise, preferences are
assumed throughout to be quasilinear, so that ui (xi, y;θi) = vi (y;θi) + xi where
vi (y;θ) is strictly concave in y.
A public goods allocation is an (n+ 1)-tuple of the form (y, x1, . . . , xn). No public
good exists initially, although a linear technology can be used to build y ≥ 0 units of
the public good at a cost of κy units of the private good. Given an initial endowment
of the private good ωi, consumption of the private good is given by xi = ωi − τi
for each i, where τi represents a transfer payment paid by agent i. Therefore, the
public goods allocation is equivalently expressed as (y, τ1, . . . τn). A vector of transfer
payments is feasible if
∑
i τi ≥ κy and budget balanced if the constraint is met with
equality.6
6Individual budget constraints are not imposed in the following analysis, so that τi may be larger
than ωi.
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A mechanism is represented as a game form, indexed by g, in which agents choose
a message mg,i from a strategy space Mg,i that is assumed here to be convex. The
vector of all messages is denoted mg ∈Mg = ×ni=1Mg,i. When there is no confusion,
the g subscript will be dropped. For a given agent i and a vector of messages
m−i = (m1, . . . ,mi−1,mi+1, . . . ,mn), a best response message for agent i is that which
maximizes i’s utility under the assumption that the other agents send messages m−i.
The set of best responses to m−i in mechanism g is denoted Bg,i (m−i;θi). Define
Bg (m,θ) = ×ni=1Bg,i (m−i;θi) to be the set of message profiles that are best responses
to the profile m. Any fixed point of the best response profile mapping is a Nash
equilibrium strategy profile of the game. Formally, any equilibrium strategy profile,
denoted m∗ (θ) = (m∗1 (θ) , . . . ,m
∗
n (θ)), satisfies
m∗ (θ) ∈ B (m∗ (θ) ,θ)
Note that this solution concept requires each player’s equilibrium strategy to be a
function of the other players’ types if m∗i varies with θj for j 6= i. If the equilibrium
message does not depend on the types of other agents, the Nash equilibrium is in
dominant strategies. The set of Nash equilibria for a given type profile and game is
given by Eg (θ).
The vector of received messages m in mechanism g maps to a unique outcome of
the form (yg (m) , τg (m)), where yg : Mg → R+ determines the level of the public
good chosen and τg : Mg → Rn determines the vector of transfer payments of the
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private good to be paid by each agent.7 The strategy space (inputs) and outcome
function (outputs) completely characterize the mechanism. All mechanisms consid-
ered here are feasible and some are budget balanced.
The objective of the mechanism designer is to implement a social choice corre-
spondence F : Θ³ R+×Rn with certain desirable properties. Let
(
yF (θ) , τF (θ)
) ∈
F (θ) represent a particular public goods allocation satisfying the properties for pref-
erence parameters θ. In the public goods environment, the appropriate social choice
correspondence for a utilitarian planner is the mapping P (θ) that picks the set of
Pareto optimal allocations
(
yP (θ) , τP (θ)
)
satisfying
yP (θ) ∈ argmax
y∈R+
[
n∑
i=1
vi (y;θi)− c (y)
]
and such that τP (θ) is budget balanced. A mechanism g implements F if, for every
θ ∈ Θ, the outcome function selects allocations in F (θ) at every equilibrium message
m∗ (θ). If g implements P (θ), then it is said to be efficient. If yg (m∗ (θ)) = yP (θ)
for some
(
yP (θ) , τP (θ)
) ∈ P (θ) and τg (m∗ (θ)) is feasible but not budget balanced,
then the mechanism is only outcome efficient. The surplus transfer payments in this
case are assumed to be wasted and yield no value to any agent in the economy.
2.2.1 A Best Response Model of Behavior
A history-based best response learning model assumes that each agent i forms predic-
tions about the strategies others will use in period t based on the observed strategies
7Set-valued mechanisms may be defined, but implementation in this context is assumed to require
the selection of a unique outcome.
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of the other players in periods 1 through t − 1, denoted m1−i through mt−1−i . Agent
i’s prediction about the strategy to be played by agent j in period t is represented
by the function ψij
(
m1j , . . . ,m
t−1
j
) ∈ Mj, which maps each possible history of agent
j into a unique pure strategy for every j 6= i.8 Agent i is then assumed to select a
best response to his predictions. Letting ψ : Mt−1 → M represent the vector of
predictions generated from the history of play up to period t, the strategy profile
occurring in period t will be an element of B (ψ (m1, . . . ,mt−1) ,θ). If ψij is undefined
for some j 6= i, then let the best response model predict any strategy that is a best
response to some mj. In short, best response learning models assume that players
are utility maximizers, but that their predictions are myopic and may be inaccurate.
WhenM is a convex set in Rn, a k-period average best response dynamic assumes
that
ψij
({
msj
}t−1
s=1
)
= m¯t,kj =
1
k
t−1∑
s=t−k
msj (2.1)
for all i, j ∈ I when t > k, and ψij = ∅ when t ≤ k. Let m¯t,k =
(
m¯t,kj
)n
j=1
. In this
model, agents best respond to the prediction that the average message of the previous
k periods will be played in the current period. Note that ψij ∈Mj by the convexity
of Mj.
Behaviorally, the k-period average model implies that agents best respond to an
estimate of the current trend in the messages of other agents. Here, the estimate
of trend is given by a simple moving average filter. Other filters may be used to
8Most dynamic models (such as fictitious play) are based on mixed strategy predictions over a
finite strategy space. The best response models suggested here generate pure strategy predictions
over a continuous strategy space.
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determine the current trend in m−i, such as exponential smoothing or time-weighted
moving averages. Although these various trend models will produce slightly different
results, the implication of such models is that agents form unique, pure-strategy
predictions about the decisions of others using previous observations that are not
highly sensitive to period-by-period fluctuations in the history of play.
One simple fact immediate from the definition of the k-period dynamic is that
strictly dominated strategies will not be observed. This provides the first testable
proposition.
Proposition 2.1 In the k-period best response dynamic, no strictly dominated strat-
egy is observed in any period t > k.
Given that this dynamic is suggested as a model capable of predicting convergence
in public goods mechanisms, it is of interest to study the limiting behavior of this
process. The following propositions and corollaries establish the relationship between
the k-period average best response model and Nash equilibrium. Note that several of
these theoretical results will be verified empirically in Section 2.5.
Proposition 2.2 If a strategy is observed in k+1 consecutive periods of the k-period
average best response dynamic, then it is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2 immediately implies the following important corollary:
Corollary 2.3 All rest points of the k-period best response dynamic are Nash equi-
libria.
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The following proposition shows that convergence implies that the limit point is
a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2.4 Given some θ ∈ Θ, let {mt}∞t=1 be a sequence of strategy profiles
consistent with the k-period average best response dynamic that converges to a profile
q ∈ M. If the best response correspondence B (·,θ) is upper hemi-continuous at q
and non-empty on M, then q is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile at θ.
This follows from the fact that
{
m¯t,k
}∞
t=1
must converge to q, so
{B (m¯t,k,θ)}∞
t=1
converges to a set containing q.
Corollary 2.5 Given some θ ∈ Θ, let {mt}∞t=1 be consistent with the k-period av-
erage best response dynamic that converges to a profile q ∈ M. If yg, τg, and each
ui (·;θi) are continuous and single-valued, then q is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile
at θ.
This corollary is a simple application of the Theorem of the Maximum, which
guarantees that the best response correspondence is upper hemi-continuous and non-
empty under the given conditions. The notion of asymptotic stability requires that
the dynamic path from all initial points in some neighborhood of q converge to q.
By Proposition 2.4, this is clearly sufficient for q to be a Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 2.6 If, for some θ ∈ Θ, q ∈ M is asymptotically stable according to the
k-period average best response dynamic and B is upper hemi-continuous and non-
empty, then q is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile at θ.
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One might conjecture that the dynamic is more stable (in a global sense) under
larger values of k. However, simple games can be constructed in which cycles can
occur under a particular value of k, but globally stable obtains for the k−1 and k+1
dynamics.9 It is natural to then ask what properties of a game are sufficient for global
stability to obtain for all values of k. In the class of supermodular games (Topkis
[96],) the monotonicity of the best response correspondence guarantees global stability
of the 1-period best response dynamic. The following proposition demonstrates that
this result extends to the k-period dynamic.
Proposition 2.7 In a supermodular game, if, for some θ ∈ Θ, {mt}∞1 is consis-
tent with a k-period average best response dynamic, then lim infmt ≥ E (θ) and
lim supmt ≤ E (θ), where E (θ) and E (θ) are the smallest and largest pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium profiles at θ.
Corollary 2.8 If a supermodular game has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
then the k-period average best response dynamic is globally asymptotically stable.
The proof of Proposition 2.7 appears in the chapter appendix (Section 2.7.)10
This result is of particular significance because it is consistent with the claim of Chen
[18] and Chen & Gazzale [20] that supermodularity is sufficient for convergence in a
variety of environments tested in the laboratory.
9Simply pick a 2-player game with Mi = [0, 1] and where the best response function for each
player equals 0 on some very small neighborhood around (k − 1) /k and equals 1 everywhere else.
Start the dynamic with each player playing 0 for the first k periods. Cycles then emerge that jump
in and out of the unique equilibrium ad infinitum. See also Bear [7].
10As an alternative method of proof, it can be established that any sequence {mt}∞1 consistent
with the k-period dynamic must satisfy the adaptive dynamics conditions of Milgrom & Roberts
[71]. Proposition 2.7 then follows from Theorem 8 of that paper.
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There are also two sets of ‘dominant diagonal’ conditions under which the 1-period
dynamic is known to be globally stable. In both cases, this stability result can be
shown to extend to all k-period dynamic models. The first is due to Gabay & Moulin
[38], and is summarized in the following proposition:11
Proposition 2.9 Assume that M = [0,+∞)n, and for some θ ∈ Θ, each ui is twice
continuously differentiable and, for every m ∈M, ui satisfies
Pseudo-concavity: ∂ui
∂mi
(m,θi) · (mi −m′i) ≥ 0⇒ ui (m,θi) ≥ ui ((m′i,m−i) ,θi),
Coercivity: limmi→+∞
∣∣∣ ∂ui∂mi (m,θi)∣∣∣ = +∞, and
Strict Diagonal Dominance:
∣∣∣∂2ui∂m2i (m,θi)∣∣∣ >∑j 6=i ∣∣∣ ∂2ui∂mi∂mj (m,θi)∣∣∣.
There exists a unique Nash equilibrium m∗ (θ) of the mechanism and every sequence
{mt}∞1 consistent with a k-period best response dynamic converges to m∗ (θ).
The second, more direct condition for stability of the 1-period model requires
that the best response correspondence be a single-valued, linear function of the form
B (m,θ) = A (θ) m+h (θ), where h (θ) ∈ Rn and A (θ) = [aij (θ)]ni,j=1 is a real ma-
trix for which there exists a strictly positive n-vector d such that di >
∑n
j=1 dj |aij (θ)|
for i = 1, . . . , n. When A (θ) is non-negative, this positive dominant diagonal condi-
tion is both necessary and sufficient for global stability (see Murata [75, Chapter 3] for
details.) Using the distributed lag methods of Bear [6] and [7], this same condition is
easily shown to be necessary and sufficient for global convergence of any best response
11See the chapter appendix for a proof. A similar result was previously established by Rosen [86]
using the diagonal strict concavity condition on utilities.
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dynamic whose predictions are weighted averages of past observations, including the
k-period dynamics.
Note that the global stability properties of the k-period dynamic are similar to
properties of other well-known learning models. Consider, for example, the fictitious
play dynamic, which is best suited for games with small, finite strategy spaces. As
with the k-period model, fictitious play has stable Nash equilibrium points (Brown
[11]) and is globally stable in supermodular games (Milgrom & Roberts [72, Theorem
8],) but is also capable of off-equilibrium limit cycles (Shapley [93].)
2.3 Experimental Design
The five public goods mechanisms under consideration were tested in a laboratory
environment using human subjects. All experiments were run at the California Insti-
tute of Technology during the 2002-03 academic year using undergraduates recruited
via E-mail. Most subjects had participated in economics experiments, though none
had experience with the particular game forms in the current study. Four sessions
were run with each mechanism for a total of twenty sessions.12 Each session consisted
of five subjects interacting through computer terminals. Subjects only participated
in one session in which they played a single mechanism fifty times against the same
four cohorts. Each iteration of the mechanism is referred to as a period. Multiple
sessions were run simultaneously so that more than five subjects would be in the lab
12Four additional sessions with the cVCG mechanism were run, but had to be discarded due to a
software failure. These data are very similar to the reported sessions and feature a slightly higher
frequency of demand revelation.
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at the same time. Each subject knew she was grouped with four others, but could not
discern which individuals were in her group.13 Instructions were given to the subjects
at the beginning of the experiment and read aloud by the experimenter. Participants
were then given time to ask any clarifying questions.14
Before the experiment, subjects were given their preference parameters and initial
endowments privately on a slip of paper. An incomplete information environment
was used because the interest of this study is to identify mechanisms whose efficiency
properties are robust to the assumptions of complete information. If the learning
process of agents converges rapidly to a mechanism’s efficient equilibrium, then a
social planner need not worry about the informational assumptions of the equilibrium
concept.
After receiving their private information, subjects logged into the game from their
computer terminal using an Internet browser program. The software interface includes
two useful tools for the subjects to use at any time. First, a history window is available
that displays the results of all past periods. Subjects can see all previous outcomes,
including the message they sent, taxes paid, public good levels, and profits. The entire
vector of messages submitted by the other agents in previous periods is not shown;
only the relevant variables used in calculating the tax, value and payoff functions are
provided. Subjects can open this window at any time and are also shown the same
information at the conclusion of each period. The second tool, called the ‘What-If
13In one cVCG session, only one group of subjects was in the laboratory at the same time. The
subjects were well separated to prevent communication or other out-of-experiment effects.
14Instructions and data are available at http://kakutani.caltech.edu/pj. Subjects were not de-
ceived in any way during this experiment.
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Scenario Analyzer,’ allows subjects to enter hypothetical messages into a calculator-
like program to view what levels of y (m), τi (m) and profit would result. Each subject
is shown only her own hypothetical tax, value, and profits so that subjects cannot
deduce the preference parameters of other subjects. Instead of a practice period,
subjects were given five minutes to experiment with the “What-If Scenario Analyzer”
and ask questions.
The benefit of the ‘What-If Scenario Analyzer’ is that it enables subjects to per-
form searches over the strategy space before selecting their strategies. In this sense,
it is similar to giving subjects a complete payoff table, although the current tool pro-
vides more feedback than payoffs alone. The interest of this study is to understand
the learning dynamics involved as subjects resolve the uncertainty about the strate-
gies of others. With inexperienced subjects, this process may be confounded with
subjects figuring out how strategies map to outcomes. By experimenting with the
‘What-If’ tool before the experiment, the subjects become well informed about the
game they are playing, but may be unsure what strategies others will be using. This
reduces the potential confound in the observed dynamics.
Once the experiment begins, subjects enter their message (twice for confirmation)
into the computer each period. The feedback at the end of the period is identical to
the history information described above. Total earnings are kept at the bottom of
the screen at all times, along with the current period number and the total number
of periods in the game. Subjects’ earnings were tallied in ‘francs’ and converted to
dollars at the end of the experiment. Conversion rates from francs to actual dollar
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Player: 1 2 3 4 5
ai 1 8 2 6 4
bi 34 116 40 68 44
ωi 200 140 260 250 290
Table 2.1: Preference parameters θi = (ai, bi) and ωi used in all sessions.
earnings varied by mechanism between 650 to 800 francs per dollar so that typical
subjects would earn forty to fifty cents for each of their fifty decisions, plus a $5
show-up fee. Sessions typically lasted from 90 minutes to two hours.
Each subject in a session was assigned a unique player type, differing only by their
utility parameters and endowments. The same five player types were used in every
session. Quasilinear preferences were induced with concave quadratic values for the
public good given by vi (y;θi) = −aiy2 + biy and an initial endowment of the private
good, ωi. The vector θi = (ai, bi) and the endowment ωi are positive for all i ∈ I.
The quasilinear, quadratic structure of the preferences is common knowledge across all
subjects, although the vectors of individual coefficients θi = (ai, bi) and endowment
ωi are private information. The chosen player type profile θ = (θ1, . . . ,θ5) and
endowments are identical across all periods, sessions and mechanisms. These values
are given in Table 2.1.
The marginal cost of the public good is chosen to be constant at κ = 100 in
every session. As will be shown in the next section, these parameter values have
been chosen to provide distinct predictions between various mechanisms. Given the
quasilinear preferences, the Pareto optimal level of the public good is uniquely solved
by yP (θ) = 4.8095. From an experimental design standpoint, a non-focal value
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Mechanism Outcome Functions Strategy Space
Voluntary y (m) =
∑
imi Mi = [0, 6]
Contribution τi (m) = κmi
Proportional y (m) =
∑
imi Mi = [0, 6]
Tax τi (m) = κy (m) /n
Groves- y (m) =
∑
imi Mi = [−4, 6]
Ledyard τi (m) =
κy(m)
n
+ γ
2
(
n−1
n
(mi − µi)2 − σ2i
)
µi =
1
n−1
∑
j 6=imj σ
2
i =
1
n−2
∑
j 6=i (mj − µi)2
Walker y (m) =
∑
imi Mi = [−10, 15]
τi (m) =
(
κ
n
+m(i−1)modn −m(i+1)modn
)
y (m)
cVCG y(θˆ) = argmaxy≥0
(∑
i vi(y; θˆi)− κy
)
Mi = Θi
τi(θˆ) =
κy(θˆ)
n
−∑j 6=i (vj(y(θˆ); θˆj)− κy(θˆ)n ) = R2
+maxz≥0
∑
j 6=i
(
vj(z; θˆj)− κzn
)
Table 2.2: The five mechanisms tested.
for the Pareto optimum is preferred so that public good levels observed at or near
Pareto optimal levels cannot alternatively be explained by subjects choosing integer
strategies, for example.
2.4 The Mechanisms
The following section describes each of the five mechanisms in detail. The outcome
functions and strategy spaces are presented in Table 2.2. A reader familiar with the
details of public goods mechanisms may skip the discussion of the Voluntary Con-
tribution, Proportional Tax, Groves-Ledyard, and Walker mechanisms, although the
cVCG mechanism in use here has interesting properties that are critical in under-
standing the results presented below.
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2.4.1 Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
In this simple mechanism, each player i announces mi, the number of units of the
public good to be added to the total. The sum of the contributions represents the
realized level of the public good, and the tax paid by agent i is the cost of her
contribution to the public good. In this mechanism, each agent has a ‘Robinson
Crusoe’ ideal point, denoted y˜i, representing the amount of public good she would
contribute in the absence of contributions by others. The best response function for
each agent is then given by
Bi (m−i;θi) = y˜i −
∑
j 6=i
mj. (2.2)
In the quadratic environment, y˜i = (bi − κ) /2ai. Using the parameters of the
experiment, the vector of Robinson Crusoe ideal points is
y˜ =
(
−33, 1, −15, −22
3
, −7
)
.
Since player 2 is the only agent for which y˜i > 0, he is the only player who does not
have a dominant strategy of contributing zero. The unique Nash equilibrium of this
game is therefore m∗ (θ) = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0), which results in a suboptimally low level of
the public good. Under the k-period dynamic, this equilibrium must obtain by period
2k + 1. Note the if the message space were unbounded, then no equilibrium would
exist and the k-period model would diverge.
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2.4.2 Proportional Tax Mechanism
The Proportional Tax mechanism is an alternative to the Voluntary Contribution
mechanism in which each agent must pay an equal share of the total cost. Under this
scheme, agents’ Robinson Crusoe ideal points are given by y˜i = (bi − κ/n) /2ai, which
is necessarily larger than under the Voluntary Contribution mechanism. Specifically,
y˜ = (7, 6, 5, 4, 3) .
This mechanism has the same message space and best response function as the Vol-
untary Contribution mechanism (eq. 2.2), but no agents have a dominant strategy
in this mechanism since y˜ À 0. The unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is the
corner strategy profile m∗ (θ) = (6, 0, 0, 0, 0), which results in a suboptimally large
level of the public good.15 Note that although no agent has a dominant strategy,
players 3, 4, and 5 are only willing to contribute when the total contributions of all
others is well below their ideal points.
The Proportional Tax mechanism is also of interest because it provides the foun-
dation of both the Groves-Ledyard and the Walker mechanisms. One can show that if
the Proportional Tax mechanism had an interior Nash equilibrium, it would select an
optimal level of the public good. The problem is that, generically, interior equilibria
do not exist. The Groves-Ledyard and Walker mechanisms are essentially variants
of the Proportional Tax mechanism with an additional ‘penalty’ term in the transfer
15IfM =R, then no equilibrium would exist. If the upper bound of the message space were chosen
to be greater than 7, then the equilibrium would be (7, 0, 0, 0, 0).
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function chosen to guarantee the existence of an interior equilibrium point.
2.4.3 Groves-Ledyard Mechanism
The mechanism of Groves & Ledyard [43] was the first constructed whose Nash equi-
libria yield fully efficient outcomes. The mechanism requires all agents pay an equal
share of the cost plus a penalty term based on deviations from the average of the
others’ contributions and on the variance of those contributions. Each agent’s unique
best response message in the quadratic, quasilinear environment is given by
Bi (m−i;θi) = bi − κ/n
2ai + γ
n−1
n
+
(
γ/n− 2ai
2ai + γ
n−1
n
)∑
j 6=i
mj.
In the experimental environment, this mechanism has a unique pure strategy of
m∗ (θ) = (1.0057, 1.1524, 0.9695, 0.8648, 0.8171) ,
which results in y (m∗ (θ)) = 4.8095 = yP (θ).16 The message space Mi = [−4, 6],
which is identical to that used by Chen & Plott [21] and Chen & Tang [22], is suffi-
ciently wide so that the equilibrium is not near a corner of the strategy space.
One nice property of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism is that it can possess the
global stability properties of Propositions 2.7 and 2.9. In the quadratic environment,
the equilibrium is supermodular if γ > 2nmaxi (ai) and satisfies the positive domi-
nant diagonal condition if γ > [(n− 2) / (n− 1)]nmaxi (ai). Using the experiment
16Note that the equilibrium strategy profile has less variance for larger values of γ. Here, γ is
chosen to be large for stability reasons.
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parameters, these conditions are γ > 80 and γ > 30, respectively. Since γ = 100 is
used in the experiment, both sufficient conditions for stability are satisfied. Therefore,
all k-period best response dynamics are globally stable in this setting.
2.4.4 Walker Mechanism
One important theoretical drawback of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism is that it
may select some efficient allocations that do not Pareto dominate the initial endow-
ment. Partially in response to this issue, Walker [100] developed a ‘paired difference’
mechanism that implements Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium. Since Lindahl
allocations are guaranteed to Pareto dominate the initial endowment and tax each
agent based on their marginal willingness to pay, Walker’s mechanism appears to
provide the most desirable solution to the free-rider problem.
In the quadratic environment, the unique best response function is given by
Bi (m−i;θi) =
bi −
(
κ/n+m(i−i)modn −m(i+1)modn
)
2ai
−
∑
j 6=i
mj.
Solving for the equilibrium with the given parameters,
m∗ (θ) = (12.276, −1.438, −6.771, −2.200, 2.943) ,
which gives the Lindahl allocation of y = 4.8095 and
τ = (117.26, 187.8, 99.855, 49.469, 26.567)
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To accommodate the disperse equilibrium messages, the message space is expanded
to Mi = [−10, 15] for each i ∈ I.
Although this mechanism implements Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium,
its equilibria are known to have instability problems. In the quadratic environment,
the 1-period best response dynamic can be represented by the system of difference
equations mt = Amt−1 + h, where the row sums of A all equal − (n− 1). This
matrix is irreducible and non-positive, so by Harriff et al. [45, Corollary 1], its
dominant eigenvalue must then equal − (n− 1), which is greater than 1 in absolute
value. Thus, Cournot best response is unstable under any parameter choice θ.17
Chen & Tang [22] also argue that the cost of small deviations from equilibrium in
the Walker mechanism are lower than in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, making the
former less robust to experimentation.
2.4.5 Continuous VCG (cVCG) Mechanism
The cVCG mechanism represents a particular selection from the class of dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanisms developed independently by Vickrey [99],
Clarke [24], and Groves [42]. In these direct mechanisms (where Mi = Θi), truth-
telling weakly dominates all other strategies. However, given any m−i, there exist
messages mi 6= θi such that mi ∈ Bi (m−i;θi). As will be demonstrated, with two
preference parameters, all points on a particular line in the strategy space that inter-
17If A were non-negative, instability of the one-period model would be sufficient (and necessary)
for instability in the k-period model. This result does not extend to the case of non-positive matricies.
However, for the experiment parameters, the k-period model is unstable for all values of k in the
range under consideration, and it is conjectured that no value of k will guarantee stability in this
environment. See Harriff et al. [45, p. 359] for the relevant theorems and counter-examples.
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sects the ‘truth-telling’ strategy are best responses to m−i. Consequently, a best re-
sponse learning model predicts that agents select messages from the best response line
that are not necessarily the truth-telling equilibrium. Given that the dominant strat-
egy equilibrium is a zero-dimensional set, the best response set is one-dimensional,
and the strategy space is two-dimensional, it is easy to distinguish between equilib-
rium, best response, and random (or, unexplained) strategy choices.
In the cVCG mechanism, Mi = Θi, which equals R2+ in the experiment, and
any message mi can be equivalently expressed as an announced parameter value
θˆi = (aˆi, bˆi). Agents are free to misrepresent preferences by announcing θˆi 6= θi. The
outcome function takes the vector of announced parameter values θˆ and solves for the
Pareto optimal level of the public good on the assumption that θˆ is the true vector
of preference parameters.
Each agent’s tax is comprised of three parts: an equal share of the cost of produc-
tion, a reward equal to the net utility of all other agents assuming their preference
announcements are truth-telling, and a penalty equal to the maximum possible net
utility of all others under their given preference announcement. The third term nec-
essarily dominates the second, so the sum of transfers is always weakly greater than
the cost of the project.18
This mechanism is constructed so that each agent i prefers an announcement θˆi
that yields a Pareto optimal level of the public good under the assumption that θˆ−i =
θ−i. To see this directly, note that the first-order condition for utility maximization
18This mechanism is known to be budget-balanced in the quadratic environment when all agents
have the same slope parameter. This is not true in the current environment.
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with quadratic preferences is that
dy
dθˆi
([
bi +
∑
j 6=i
bˆj − κ
]
− y(θˆ)
[
2
(
ai +
∑
j 6=i
aˆj
)])
= 0.
Since dy/dθˆi 6= 0 for all θˆi ∈ Θi and all i ∈ I, utility maximization is achieved by
setting the term in parentheses to zero through manipulation of y(θˆ). The necessary
and sufficient condition for maximization is therefore
y(θˆi, θˆ−i) =
bi +
∑
j 6=i bˆj − κ
2
(
ai +
∑
j 6=i aˆj
) = y(θi, θˆ−i). (2.3)
Thus, any announcement by player i that results in the same level of the public good
as would have obtained under truth-telling is necessarily a best response.
Since θˆi = θi satisfies (2.3) for all θˆ−i, truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Given
a particular value of θˆ−i, however, there exists a range of θˆi 6= θi that satisfy condition
(2.3). This set of values is given by the best response correspondence
Bi
(
θˆ−i;θi
)
=
{
(aˆi, bˆi) ∈ Θi :
(
bˆi − bi
)
= 2 (aˆi − ai) y(θi, θˆ−i)
}
. (2.4)
Clearly, the manifold of best responses to θˆ−i is a line through i that must contain
θi. The slope of this line depends on θˆ−i, so the best response line rotates about
θi as θˆ−i varies.19 If an agent holds a prediction that places non-zero probability on
multiple values of θˆ−i, then the dominant strategy point becomes the unique best
19Note that θˆi affects agent i’s utility only through the value of y(θˆi, θˆ−i), so indifference curves
in agent i’s strategy space correspond to level curves of the y(·, θˆ−i) function. The set Bi(θˆ−i;θi) is
therefore the level set of i’s most preferred quantity of the public good, given θˆ−i.
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response.
It is important to reiterate the fact that the set of Nash equilibria of this mech-
anism extends beyond the dominant strategy equilibrium. As a simple example, if
n− 1 agents submit θˆi = θi while the nth agent announces θˆn ∈ Bn (θ−n;θn) \ {θn},
then a Nash equilibrium with a weakly dominated strategy has obtained. Since
y(θˆn,θ−n) = y (θ) = yP (θ), this equilibrium is also outcome efficient.
Although this mechanism is known to be inefficient due to its lack of budget bal-
ance, the size of the predicted inefficiency varies with the parameter choices. The
results obtained in the laboratory may be sensitive to the choice of preference para-
meters. In the current experiment, equilibrium efficiency is over 99%. The discussion
in Section 2.5.8 will highlight the significance of this (or any) fixed parameter choice
in analyzing the results.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Calibrating the Parameter k
Using the observed data, best response model predictions for each period t > k are
generated for k ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and compared to the observed message. To focus
further analysis of the best response models, the value of k that minimizes the mean
absolute deviation between the best response prediction and the data is selected from
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k ∈ {1, . . . , 10}. Define k∗ to be the parameter that minimizes
5∑
g,i=1
4∑
s=1
1
51− tmin
50∑
t=tmin
(
inf
mˆi∈Bg,i(m¯t,kg,s,−i;θi)
∥∥mtg,s,i − mˆi∥∥
)
,
where g represents each of the five mechanisms under consideration, s indexes the
4 identical sessions of each mechanism, and ‖·‖ is the standard Euclidean norm.20
Since the first k periods of each model are used to seed the initial beliefs, they must
be excluded from analysis. Consequently, tmin must be strictly larger than k. In
four of the five mechanisms, Bg,i(m¯t,kg,s,−i;θi) is unique and Mg,i ⊆ R1, so the term in
parentheses reduces to a simple absolute difference. In the cVCG mechanism, this
term represents the orthogonal distance from the observed message to the appropriate
best response line.
Table 2.3 reports the average deviation for various values of k and tmin. Note
that for every value of k considered, the average score decreases in tmin, indicating
that the models are less accurate in early periods than in later periods. Therefore,
comparisons between models should only be made for fixed values of tmin.
Given that messages are serially dependant and the nature of this dependence
20A ‘scoring rule’ such as the quadratic scoring rule characterized by Selten [92] would be more
appropriate if the behavioral models generated probabilistic predictions of play. With deterministic
behavioral models and a continuum strategy space, the scoring rule simply counts the number of
observations that exactly match the prediction. In the Walker mechanism, for example, 47,025
individual predictions are generated across the 10 models and only one of them is exactly correct.
Since the strategy space is endowed with a distance metric, a notion of error based on that metric
is used rather than a measure of error in the space of (degenerate) probability distributions. This
is similar in spirit to the notion of error in econometric models, where mean squared deviation is
most often used because it is tractable and can be interpreted as an estimate of variance. These
considerations do not apply here, and the mean absolute deviation measure is more robust to outliers.
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First time period used in calculating average minimum deviation (tmin)
k 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 1.407 1.394 1.284 1.151 1.104 1.088 1.072 1.054 1.054 1.049
2 - 1.240 1.135 0.991 0.967 0.949 0.932 0.922 0.913 0.910
3 - - 1.097 0.963 0.940 0.925 0.904 0.888 0.883 0.875
4 - - - 0.952 0.932 0.915 0.898 0.877 0.866 0.861
5 - - - - 0.924 0.911 0.895 0.876 0.860 0.853
6 - - - - - 0.911 0.897 0.881 0.868 0.854
7 - - - - - - 0.899 0.884 0.873 0.863
8 - - - - - - - 0.884 0.874 0.864
9 - - - - - - - - 0.879 0.870
10 - - - - - - - - - 0.875
Table 2.3: Calculated average quadratic score for various k-period best response mod-
els. Boldfaced entries represent, for each value of tmin, the smallest average quadratic
score among the 10 models tested. Note that the measure cannot be calculated for
k ≥ tmin since k periods are used to “seed” the model.
is unknown, no appropriate notion of significance is applicable to this analysis.21
The objective of this subsection is to make further analyses tractable by selecting a
single value k∗ to represent the class of k-period best response models. Therefore,
statistical significance of the difference in quality of fit between best response models
is unimportant in this context; choosing the minimum-deviation model is sufficient.
Result 2.1 Among the k-period best response models with k ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, the 5-
period model is estimated to be the most accurate.
Support. The result follows immediately from inspection of the average deviation
measures in Table 2.3. The measures are strictly decreasing in k for all tmin ≤ 5 (for
21Serial dependence is clear from inspection of correlograms. Several models of serial dependence
were estimated, including various time trend regressions, GARCH models, and a variety of stochastic
differential equations. None of these procedures fit the data well or generated an uncorrelated error
structure.
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which the k = 5 model cannot be calculated). For every tmin ≥ 6, k = 5 minimizes
the average score, with one minor exception.22
Other types of best response models were also considered. For example, a more
general k-period model that includes a discount factor so that more recent observa-
tions receive greater weighting slightly outperforms the undiscounted k = 5 model,
but the increase in accuracy is marginal, considering the added parameter. Empirical
analysis of the best response models will henceforth be limited to the undiscounted
5-period model. 23
2.5.2 Best Response in non-VCG Mechanisms
Due to the substantial difference between the structure of the first four mechanisms
and that of the cVCG mechanism, results pertaining to the latter will be considered
separately.
Given that each of these public goods mechanisms was developed under the as-
sumption that agents play Nash equilibrium strategies, the static Nash equilibrium
serves as a key benchmark against which the best response models may be tested,
even though the experimental environment is one of incomplete information. This
is particularly true for the Groves-Ledyard and Walker mechanisms, where the Nash
equilibrium is the only point at which efficient outcomes obtain. If a dynamic best
response model is found to provide significant improvement in predictive power over
22Table 2.3 was also generated using a squared deviation metric. In this case, k = 8 yields slightly
smaller error measures than k = 5 when tmin = 8 or 10, but k = 5 is more often the minimizer.
23Complete analysis was performed on all models in k ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, and results for k ≥ 2 are
similar to the case of k = 5. As is apparent from Table 2.3, the k = 1 model is notably less accurate
than the others because the smoothing achieved by the k ≥ 2 models provides a better fit.
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Nash equilibrium, then mechanism design theory is improved by insisting that mech-
anisms converge quickly under this dynamic.
2.5.3 Comparison of Best Response and Equilibrium Models
The goal of this section is to determine whether the error of the best response model
is significantly smaller than the error of the Nash equilibrium prediction. Standard
parametric tests are inappropriate for this data because a one-sample runs test for
randomness indicates that neither time series of errors is randomly drawn from a
zero-median distribution, and tests for correlation indicate that the errors are serially
dependent.24 This non-stationarity implies that statistics aggregated across time
may be easily misinterpreted.25 For example, the average prediction error across all
periods does not estimate the expected error in any one period; analysis of the average
must be considered specific to the length of the experiment.26 For these reasons,
empirical analysis is performed on each player type in each period individually, with
data aggregated only across the four sessions of each mechanism. The results of these
period-by-period tests cannot be aggregated across time.
The prediction error of each model averaged across the four sessions is presented in
24The runs test indicates that the best response model errors for 16 of the 20 total player types are
not evenly scattered about zero at a significance level of 5%. Each of the 4 player types with model
errors apparently randomly drawn from a zero-median distribution were from different mechanisms,
indicating that the assumption of mean-zero random errors for all player types in any one mechanism
is likely invalid. The errors of the equilibrium model were not evenly scattered about zero for 19 of
20 player types at the 5% significance level. Tests of first-order correlation indicate that the errors
are serially correlated for all 20 player types in both models.
25The dependence also implies that neither model fully captures the true dynamics of subject
behavior in repeated games.
26This is a point occassionally forgotten in past analyses of time series data in experiments, leading
to results that likely depend on the somewhat arbitrary choice of experiment length.
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Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
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Figure 2.1: Average model error for the 5-period best response model and Nash
equilibrium models in the Voluntary Contribution mechanism.
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Figures 2.1 through 2.4. Around each data point is a 95% confidence interval generated
by the bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping method.27 These graphs begin
to illustrate the superiority of the best response model over the Nash equilibrium
model. While the two predictions are often very similar, there are certain player types
for whom the equilibrium model systematically under- or over-predicts the observed
strategies. The best response model appears both more accurate and more precise
than the equilibrium model whenever differences between the two are observed.
The statistical analysis is aimed at testing the null hypothesis
H0 : E
[∣∣mti −m∗i (θ)∣∣] ≤ E [∣∣∣mti − Bi (m¯t,k−i ;θi)∣∣∣] (2.5)
for each player type i and period t > k, where the expectation is taken across the four
sessions of each mechanism. A non-parametric permutation test for a difference in
means between the two model errors is performed in each period for each player type
in each mechanism. Each test was based on a simulated distribution of 2,000 draws,
more than enough to minimize the variation in estimated p-values due to random
sampling.
The power of the permutation test depends on this difference between the predic-
tions of the two models. If the two models have very similar predictions, the outcome
of the test will not yield strong posteriors about the truth of the alternative hypo-
thesis. In the following analysis, tests will only be run when there is enough power to
27Two thousand draws are used in each period for each player type in each mechanism, which is
more than enough to eliminate any bootstrap sampling error. See Efron & Tibshirani [28] for details
on the bootstrapping method and related statistical tests.
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Proportional Taxation Mechanism
5−period BR model deviations Nash equilibrium model deviations
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Figure 2.2: Average model error for the 5-period best response model and Nash
equilibrium models in the Proportional Taxation mechanism.
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Groves−Ledyard Mechanism
5−period BR model deviations Nash equilibrium model deviations
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Figure 2.3: Average model error for the 5-period best response model and Nash
equilibrium models in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism.
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Walker Mechanism
5−period BR model deviations Nash equilibrium model deviations
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Figure 2.4: Average model error for the 5-period best response model and Nash
equilibrium models in the Walker mechanism.
conclude that P [HA True | Reject H0] ≥ 90%. Assuming diffuse priors on the truth
of HA and a standard significance level of 5%, this is equivalent to requiring a test
power of at least 45%. Without this level of power, it is likely that a rejection of H0
is due to random sampling rather than an actual difference in model errors. If one
additionally required that P [HA True | Do Not Reject H0] ≤ 10%, a power of 89.4%
would be needed.
In order to identify what difference between model predictions is necessary to
guarantee a test power of 45%, a simulation of the permutation test is performed for
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various differences between model predictions. Specifically, four independent, nor-
mally distributed random messages (w1, . . . , w4) are generated with mean µa and
variance σ2w. These represent four observations of a particular player type in a par-
ticular period. This is repeated 100 times and the permutation test is performed in
each repetition on the hypotheses H˜0 : E [|w − µb|] ≤ E [|w − µa|], where µa and µb
represent the predictions of two different models, the first of which is correct in the
sense that it predicts the true mean of the data. An estimate of the power of the per-
mutation test is given by the percentage of simulated tests that correctly reject H˜0.
The simulation is repeated for various values of (µa − µb) and σ2w, and the estimated
power of the test is plotted as a function of (µa − µb) /σw in Figure 2.5.28 From this
graph, it is clear that the distance between the two predictions should be at least 1.75
standard deviations of the data in order to keep the probability of incorrect rejections
of H0 to under 10%.
Figures 2.6 through 2.9 display the p-value of the permutation test for each player
type in each period, along with the estimated power of each test (from Figure 2.5),
and for those tests with power greater than 45%, whether or not the test rejects the
null hypothesis at the 5% and 10% significance levels.
Result 2.2 The 5-period best response model is overall a more accurate model than
the Nash equilibrium model for the non-VCG mechanisms.
Support. In the Voluntary Contribution mechanism (Figure 2.6), players 1, 3, 4,
and 5 have a strict dominant strategy, so the power of the test is zero for these
28It should be noted that if the mean of the data were µw 6= µa and µw > µa > µb, then the test
would have more power. If µa > µw ≥ (µa + µb) /2, the test would have less power.
45
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(µ
a
−µb)/σx
Es
tim
at
ed
 T
es
t P
ow
er
0
0.67
0.8
0.86
0.89
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.95
Pr
ob
. H
0 
Fa
ls
e 
G
iv
en
 R
eje
ct 
H 0
Figure 2.5: Simulated power of the permutation test given in Equation for various
differences in model predictions as a ratio of the data’s standard deviation.
player types. Although the p-values for player 2 never indicate a rejection of the
null hypothesis, the power of the test is always below 40%, rendering its conclusions
ambiguous. In the Proportional Tax mechanism (Figure 2.7,) players 3, 4, and 5 have
little incentive to contribute, given the contributions of others so that the free-riding
equilibrium strategy is most often a best response. For players 1 and 2, best response
is occasionally far from equilibrium, providing enough power for the permutation
tests to be conclusive. For player 1, all 16 tests with sufficient power reject the null
hypothesis at the 10% level, and 15 of 16 reject at the 5% level. Player 2’s results are
similar, although the data revert toward equilibrium in the final periods (see Figure
2.2 as well.) The rapid convergence of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism (Figure 2.8)
to equilibrium, which is accompanied by the convergence of best response predictions
to equilibrium, reduces the power of the test in most periods. The ten tests with
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Figure 2.6: p-values and estimated power for the permutation tests in the Voluntary
Contribution mechanism. Stars, Xs, and Os represent test results for those tests
with a power of at least 0.45. Star represents rejection of H0 at the 5% level, X
represents rejection at the 10% level, and O represents no rejection of H0. Note that
this mechanism has no test with power ≥ 45%.
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Proportional Taxation Mechanism
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Figure 2.7: p-values and estimated power for the permutation tests in the Proportional
Tax mechanism. Stars, Xs, and Os represent test results for those tests with a power
of at least 0.45. Star represents rejection of H0 at the 5% level, X represents rejection
at the 10% level, and O represents no rejection of H0.
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Groves−Ledyard Mechanism
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Figure 2.8: p-values and estimated power for the permutation tests in the Groves-
Ledyard mechanism. Stars, Xs, and Os represent test results for those tests with a
power of at least 0.45. Star represents rejection of H0 at the 5% level, X represents
rejection at the 10% level, and O represents no rejection of H0.
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Walker Mechanism
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Figure 2.9: p-values and estimated power for the permutation tests in the Walker
mechanism. Stars, Xs, and Os represent test results for those tests with a power of
at least 0.45. Star represents rejection of H0 at the 5% level, X represents rejection
at the 10% level, and O represents no rejection of H0.
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sufficient power (out of 175 possible) do favor the Nash equilibrium model, though
the test power being well below 89.4% in all ten tests prevents conclusive rejection
of HA. The Walker mechanism (Figure 2.9) provides the most testing power due to
the lack of convergence of the data. Of the 41 tests due to player 3, only two fail to
reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level, while 37 tests reject H0 at the 5% level.
Of the 37 tests due to player 5, eight fail to reject H0 at the 10% level, while 12 tests
reject H0 at the 10% level and 17 tests reject at the 5% level. The p-values of all
37 tests are below 0.20. These rejections are scattered evenly throughout the session,
indicating no particular pattern over time. Of the other three player types, players
1 and 2 have low p-values on average, with five rejections of H0 and only one failure
to reject. Player 4 shows mixed support overall, and in the few tests with sufficient
power, shows fairly strong support for equilibrium behavior. This can also be seen in
Figure 2.4.
The significance of this result lies in its implications for implementation in a
repeated interaction setting, where the assumption that agents play the stage game
equilibrium is less accurate than a simple best response behavioral assumption. Mech-
anisms constructed under the assumption of equilibrium behavior may fail to imple-
ment the desired outcome due to instability in the behavioral process. Although
the best response model does not provide a complete description of human behavior,
a mechanism designer who assumes this simple dynamic will be able to more ‘accu-
rately implement the desired outcomes than a designer who assumes static equilibrium
behavior.
51
2.5.4 Best Response in the cVCG Mechanism
In this direct mechanism, agents announce both aˆi and bˆi. The decisions of subjects
can be grouped into three categories: ‘full’ revelation (aˆi = ai and bˆi = bi, which is
the dominant strategy), ‘partial’ revelation (aˆi = ai or bˆi = bi), and no revelation.
The equilibrium model predicts that all messages will be of the first type. The best
response model predicts that all three types of messages are possible, but messages
that aren’t fully revealing must lie along the best response surface. The following sub-
sections look at (a) what percentage of messages are fully revealing, and (b) whether
non-revealing messages are scattered randomly or are centered around the line of best
responses.
2.5.5 Frequency of Revelation
Previous experimental tests of dominant strategy mechanisms with a weak dominant
strategy indicate that around half of all subjects play their dominant strategy. Table
2.4 indicates that this result holds true in the current study. Rates of both full and
partial revelation in the cVCG mechanism are reported. Note a message that varies
from truth-telling by any amount is encoded as non-revealing.
Result 2.3 Truthful revelation in the cVCG mechanism is observed in the majority
of decisions. This frequency increases in the final periods.
Support. Refer to Table 2.4. On average, 54% of all observed messages are full
revelation strategies, with the frequency increasing to 59% in the final 10 periods.
Average partial revelation rises from 64% to 72% over the last 10 periods. Half of
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the twenty subjects fully reveal in at least nine of the last ten periods, and twelve at
least partially reveal. Three subjects never choose full revelation, and an additional
three subjects reveal fully only twice. Every subject reveals partially at least twice
over the course of the experiment.
Analysis of individual data also reveals that in 98% of the cases where a subject
only partially reveals, it is the bˆi term that is misrepresented. This is likely due to
the fact that altering the linear term has a more transparent effect on payoffs than
the quadratic term.
2.5.6 Misrevelation & Weakly Dominated Best Responses
Recall from Section 2.4.5 that given θˆ−i, agent i has a line of best responses through
θi that are payoff equivalent to truth-telling. The slope of this line depends on θˆ−i,
so the best response line is sensitive to a player’s prediction about the strategies
of the others. Since the k-period best response model provides a point prediction
of θˆ−i, it is easily testable in this framework. In particular, the model cannot be
rejected if misrevelation messages are centered around the particular best response
line suggested by the k-period average prediction.
A convenient method for analyzing the data is to convert each two-dimensional
message (aˆti, bˆ
t
i) into polar coordinates (φˆ
t
i, rˆ
t
i) with the origin at the truthful revelation
point (ai, bi). Here, φˆ
t
i represents the angle from (ai, bi) to (aˆ
t
i, bˆ
t
i) and rˆ
t
i represents
the distance between these points. Fully revealing observations are not included in
this analysis since they are consistent with both best response and equilibrium play.
54
  500
  1000
30
210
60
240
90
270
120
300
150
330
180 0
  50
  100
30
210
60
240
90
270
120
300
150
330
180 0
Figure 2.10: Polar-coordinate representation of the cVCG data with the origin at the
truth-telling point and the horizontal axis corresponding to the 5-period best response
surface. Two different scalings of the same graph are presented.
For each period t > k and player i, the k-period best response model identifies
a particular angle φBi
(
θ¯t,k−i ;θi
)
such that any announcement θˆti with φˆ
t
i = φ
B
i is a
best response to the average of the previous k values of θˆ−i. Figure 2.10 graphs
(φˆti − φBi , rˆti) in polar coordinates, where φBi is the angle generated from the 5-period
model. In this figure, the origin (rˆti = 0) represents a full revelation announcement
and the horizontal axis (φˆti − φBi ) represents a message consistent with the 5-period
best response model. If subjects play the dominant strategy equilibrium, the data
should scatter evenly around the origin. If subjects follow the 5-period best response
model, the data should scatter around the horizontal axis.
Unfortunately, the removal of all full-revelation observations reduces the average
sample size to less than two observations per period – not enough to perform a sta-
tistical test. Qualitatively, the evidence strongly supports the 5-period best response
model. Half of all non-equilibrium observations are within 1.3 degrees of the best
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response line and 81% are within 10 degrees of the prediction. This analysis includes
all partial revelation observations for which φˆti is necessarily a multiple of pi/2. Af-
ter removing these observations, just over half of the remaining data are within 0.83
degrees of the best response prediction, and 79% are within 10 degrees.
Figure 2.11 shows the time-series representations of rˆti and φˆ
t
i − φBi
(
θ¯t,k−i ;θi
)
for
each player type in the cVCG mechanism. The 95% confidence intervals are again
formed by the bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping method with 2,000 draws.
The average distance from truth-telling is frequently large, highly variable, and does
not converge toward zero for three of the five player types. The graphs of φˆti −
φBi (θ¯
t
−i;θi) across time show that the off-equilibrium data are centered at or near the
best response prediction, with more stability in later periods. Again, small sample
sizes prevent clean statistical analyses.
The tendency for the angular deviation to be slightly positive by about six degrees
(visible in both figures) arises from the partial revelation observations. Around 87%
of the best response lines are between 83◦ and 85◦, while 20% of all off-equilibrium
observations are partial revelation strategies located at 90◦.
2.5.7 Testing Theoretical Predictions of the Model
In Section 2.2, various theoretical properties of the k-period average best response
model are derived. Each of these may be tested empirically to confirm that the
important implications of this behavioral assumption are observed in the laboratory.
In the cVCG mechanism, the best response line for each player is characterized by
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Figure 2.11: Time series of average distance from equilibrium and angular deviation
from the best response line for each player type in the cVCG mechanism with 95%
confidence intervals.
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equation (2.4). Given θˆ−i, each of these is a single equation of two variables, so the
set of Nash equilibria of the game is the set of solutions to a system of n equations
with 2n variables. Clearly, there exists a large number of such solutions. An observed
strategy profile θˆ is an ε-equilibrium if, for each i ∈ I, the loss in utility between
announcing θi and θˆi is less than ε. This does not necessarily indicate that θˆi is close
to θi since θˆi may be a neighborhood of Bi
(
θˆ−i;θi
)
that is far from θi.
Result 2.4 Weakly dominated ε-Nash equilibria are observed, while the dominant
strategy equilibrium is not.
Support. Setting ε = 1, 30.5% of observed strategy profiles in the cVCG mechanism
are weakly dominated ε-Nash equilibria.29 At ε = 5, 67% of the profiles are ε-
equilibria. Across the last 12 periods, ε-equilibria are observed 93.8% of the time for
ε = 5. In the first session, subjects play a particular ε-equilibrium (for ε = 1/2) in
each of the final 19 periods. In none of the 200 repetitions of the cVCG mechanism
is the truth-telling dominant strategy equilibrium observed.
Beyond providing further support for a best response model of behavior, this
result has greater implications: it suggests that elimination of weakly dominated
strategies leads to the elimination of certain Nash equilibria that are observed in
the laboratory. This equilibrium selection technique is consequently inappropriate
as a realistic equilibrium selection algorithm. The following result indicates that
elimination of strictly dominated strategies is consistent with observed behavior:
29Agents typically earn over 300 francs per period, so ε = 1 represents a deviation from optimality
of less than 0.33%.
58
Result 2.5 (Proposition 2.1) Messages quickly converge to, and do not significantly
deviate from, strictly dominant strategies in any period t > 5.
Support. Players 1, 3, 4, and 5 in the Voluntary Contribution mechanism are the
only players with strictly dominant strategies. From Figure 2.1, it is clear that these
players quickly converge to their equilibrium strategies. The bootstrapped confidence
intervals must lie in the strategy space. Of the 180 confidence interval lower bounds
after period five, only 15 are different from zero, and only one is greater than 0.1. In
the last nine periods, the upper bound of the intervals are all no greater than 0.25,
and no greater than 0.1 in the last four periods.
The following results indicate that convergence to, or repetition of, a message
profile are often indicative of a Nash equilibrium, as predicted by the best response
model of behavior.
Result 2.6 (Proposition 2.2) If a strategy profile is observed in 6 consecutive periods,
then it is most likely a Nash equilibrium.
Support. In the non-cVCG mechanisms, there are 754 messages mti such that m
t
i =
mt−1i = · · · = mt−5i . Of those, 74.8% are Nash equilibrium messages. 80. 1% of such
messages are within 1 unit of Nash equilibrium. In the cVCG mechanism, 45% of the
375 such messages are ε-equilibria with ε = 1. Setting ε = 5 increases the frequency
to 82.1%.
Result 2.7 (Proposition 2.4) If a sequence of strategy profiles converges to a point
q, then q is most likely a Nash equilibrium strategy profile.
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Support. Of the 20 groups across the 5 mechanisms, only one played the same strat-
egy profile in all of the last 10 periods, indicating convergence to a particular strategy
profile; the first session of the cVCG mechanism converged to an ε-equilibrium (for
ε ≥ 1/2) in all of the final 19 periods. One group in the Proportional Tax mecha-
nism played a particular non-equilibrium strategy in 15 of the final 25 periods, while
another group played the Nash equilibrium profile in 7 of the final 10 periods.
Finally, Propositions 2.7 and 2.9 are confirmed empirically by the convergence of
the data to equilibrium in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, which is supermodular
and satisfies the dominant diagonal condition for the given parameters.
Overall, the above results indicate that the dynamic properties of observed beha-
vior are generally in line with the theoretical properties of the k-period best response
dynamic. The k-period dynamic is apparently a reasonably accurate yet tractable
model for predicting repeated game behavior and convergence in these settings.
2.5.8 Efficiency & Public Good Levels
The ability to compare data across a fairly large number of mechanisms leads to
the natural question of which mechanisms generate the most efficient outcomes. In
fact, this study provides a unique opportunity to do so since no other experiment to
date has tested as many processes side-by-side. It should be understood, however, that
any experimental result may be very sensitive to changes in parameters. For example,
it may be the case that if the efficiency of the dominant strategy equilibrium of the
cVCG mechanism were lower, then subjects would play it less often, possibly reducing
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Figure 2.12: The average level of public good and realized efficiency for each mecha-
nism in each period along with 95% confidence intervals. PO represents the Pareto
Optimal level of the public good (4.8095) and IR represents the efficiency of the initial
endowments (71.18%.)
realized efficiencies even lower. With this note of caution, the average public good
level and realized efficiency are presented in Figure 2.12 along with 95% bootstrap
confidence intervals.
Result 2.8 For the given parameters, the average public good levels are closest to
the Pareto optimal level in the cVCG mechanism, followed by the Groves-Ledyard
mechanism. Overall efficiency in these two mechanism is also higher than the oth-
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ers, with the Walker mechanism often resulting in efficiency below that of the initial
endowment.
Support. The average public good level is not significantly different from the Pareto
optimum (yP = 4.8095) in 43 of the 50 periods for the cVCG mechanism, and 35
of 50 periods in both the Groves-Ledyard and Walker mechanisms. However, the
realized public good level in the Walker mechanism is highly variable. The average
public good level in the cVCG mechanism is not significantly different from the Pareto
optimum in 22 of the final 25 periods, whereas the same is true in only 15 of the final 25
periods for the Groves-Ledyard mechanism. As predicted, the Voluntary Contribution
mechanism significantly under-provides, and the Proportional Tax mechanism over-
provides the public good. The cVCG mechanism is the most efficient, followed by
the Groves-Ledyard mechanism. The average efficiency of the Walker mechanism is
not significantly greater than the efficiency of the initial endowments (71.18%) in
38 of the 50 periods, and is significantly lower in four periods. This trend does not
disappear across time.
Recall from Section 2.4.5 that there exists a large set of Nash equilibria of this
mechanism that are necessarily outcome efficient, so the high level of efficiency realized
by the cVCG mechanism is due to best response behavior and not preference revela-
tion. Also, the fact that the Walker mechanism often realizes efficiencies at or below
the initial endowment is particularly surprising, given that it is the only outcome-
efficient mechanism tested whose equilibrium guarantees outcomes that Pareto dom-
inate the endowment.
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2.5.9 Open Questions
The fundamental difficulty of testing the efficiency of mechanisms in the laboratory
lies in their sensitivity to parameter choice. Past research has focused on chang-
ing punishment parameters of the mechanisms, but it is unknown how behavior dif-
fers when preferences are varied within a mechanism. In particular, the role of the
incentive-efficiency trade-off in guiding behavior is not known.
The current set of experiments makes use of the ‘What-If Scenario Analyzer’ tool
that enables subjects to calculate hypothetical payoffs. This tool is provided as an
alternative to the payoff tables often provided in experiments. The effect of this tool
on dynamic behavior is not well understood. The version of the software in use for this
study does not store data about what hypothetical scenarios subjects considered; only
actual decisions are tracked. The possibility of studying hypothetical explorations is
an exciting extension to this research that may provide additional understanding
about the learning dynamics in use.
On the theoretical front, much work remains with respect to dynamics in public
goods mechanisms. The literature is far behind that of market dynamics for pri-
vate goods, where stability has been extensively analyzed for several decades. Kim
[56] shows that mechanisms for Nash implementing Lindahl allocations must be lo-
cally unstable for some environment. However, restricting attention to quasilinear
environments, a dynamically stable game form is introduced that implements the
Lindahl correspondence. Similarly, de Tranqualye [27] and Vega-Redondo [98] intro-
duce mechanisms that converge to the Lindahl allocation under Cournot best response
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behavior. Some mechanisms such as that studied by Smith [94] use convergence of
tatonnemont-like dynamics as a stopping rule in each period of the mechanism. How-
ever, there have been only limited attempts to seriously consider dynamic issues in
the theoretical mechanism design literature.
2.6 Conclusion
Motivated by the observation that many of the results of previous experimental studies
are consistent with a simple best response dynamic model, this chapter experimentally
compares five different public goods mechanisms in order to test this conjecture. In
particular, dynamically stable and unstable Nash mechanisms are compared along
with a weak dominant strategy mechanism whose best response properties provide
an opportunity to distinguish between best response and equilibrium behavior. This
latter mechanism, though tested in simpler forms in previous experiments, has never
been tested in the laboratory with more than one preference parameter.
The results of these experiments support the best response behavioral conjecture,
particularly as an alternative to the static equilibrium hypothesis. Strategies converge
to Nash equilibria that are asymptotic attractors in a best response dynamic and
diverge from equilibria that are not. In the weak dominant strategy mechanism,
behavior tends to track a rotating best response line through the strategy space,
implying that subjects who do not understand the undominated properties of truthful
revelation instead seek a best response strategy, resulting in convergence to weakly
dominated Nash equilibria. This result implies that elimination of weakly dominated
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strategies is an inappropriate tool for game theoretic analysis.
Although outcomes and efficiency are sensitive to parameters, the continuous VCG
mechanism performs well in both categories, as does the Groves-Ledyard mechanism.
The Walker mechanism, due to its instability, generates efficiencies often below that
of the initial endowment.
The implications for mechanism design are straightforward. Most theorists have
ignored dynamic stability in designing mechanisms. The significant contribution of
this chapter is that it bridges the behavioral hypotheses that have existed separately
in dominant strategy and Nash equilibrium mechanism experiments. The finding
that a 5-period average best response dynamic is a reasonably accurate behavioral
model in all of these settings implies not only that dynamic behavior should be
considered in theoretical research, but it also provides some guidance as to which
behavioral models are appropriate. In particular, Nash implementation mechanisms
should satisfy dynamic stability and dominant strategy mechanisms should satisfy the
strict dominance property if either is to be considered for real-world use in a repeated
interaction setting.
2.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.7. Let m = infM and m = supM. Define B (m,θ) =
inf B (m,θ) and B (m,θ) = supB (m,θ) as the infimal and supremal best responses
to a given message profile m. Since the game is supermodular, m and m are finite
elements of M, and B and B are elements of B for all m and θ. Furthermore, B
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and B are non-decreasing functions ofm and there exists a smallest Nash equilibrium
E (θ) and a largest Nash equilibrium E (θ).
Consider the sequence {mt}∞1 wheremt =m for t = 1, . . . , k andmt = B
(
m¯t,k,θ
)
for t > k. In order to establish by induction that the sequence is monotone increasing,
assume thatmt ≥ms for some t > k and all s < t. This is certainly true for t = k+1.
Sincemt ≥mt−k, then m¯t+1 ≥ m¯t. By monotonicity of B, it must be thatmt+1 ≥mt.
This implies thatmt+1 ≥ms for all s < t. By induction, it is established that {mt}∞1
is a monotone increasing sequence. Since m is finite, {mt}∞1 must converge to some
point m∗ ∈M. By Proposition 2.4, m∗ is a Nash equilibrium profile.
Assume that for some t > k, ms ≤ E (θ) for all s ≤ t, which is true for t = k + 1.
Then m¯t ≤ E (θ) and, by monotonicity of B, mt ≤ B (E (θ) ,θ) ≤ E (θ). This implies
that ms ≤ E (θ) for all s ≤ t + 1. Therefore, the sequence {mt}∞1 is bounded above
by E (θ).
Since {mt}∞1 converges to some equilibrium point, it must be that limmt = E (θ).
Similar induction arguments establish that the sequence {mt}∞1 of k-period average
best responses starting from m must converge to E (θ).
Now consider any arbitrary sequence {mt}∞1 . If ms ≤ms ≤ms for all s less than
some t > k, then by monotonicity of B and B, it must be that mt ≤mt ≤mt. Since
this hypothesis is true for t = k + 1, induction implies that mt ≤ mt ≤ mt for all t.
These bounds establish the result in the limit.
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Proof of Proposition 2.9. Recall thatMi = [0,∞) and, for each θ in some Θ0 ⊂ Θ,
lim
mi→+∞
∣∣∣∣ ∂ui∂mi (m)
∣∣∣∣ = +∞
and [∂2ui/∂mi∂mj]
n
i,j=1 satisfies diagonal dominance on a set Θ0 ⊆ Θ.
Fix θ ∈ Θ0. Gabay & Moulin [38, Theorem 4.1] show that there must exist
an unique Nash equilibrium m∗ (θ) and that diagonal dominance implies B (m,θ) is
single-valued and strictly non-expansive in the sup-norm, so that for all m,m′ ∈M,
‖B (m,θ)− B (m′,θ)‖∞ < ‖m−m′‖∞ , (2.6)
where ‖m‖∞ = supi |mi|. If {mt}∞1 is consistent with the k-period dynamic, then by
(2.6),
∥∥mt −m∗ (θ)∥∥∞ < ∥∥m¯t −m∗ (θ)∥∥∞
=
∥∥∥∥∥1k
k∑
s=1
(
mt−s −m∗ (θ))∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ 1
k
k∑
s=1
∥∥mt−s −m∗ (θ)∥∥∞
≤ sup
1≤s≤k
∥∥mt−s −m∗ (θ)∥∥∞
for every t > k. If
lim
t→∞
sup
1≤s≤k
∥∥mt−s −m∗ (θ)∥∥∞ = 0, (2.7)
then convergence of {mt}∞1 to m∗ (θ) is established.
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Take any q ∈ Mk ⊆ Rnk. For any such q, there exists a unique sequence {mt}∞1
consistent with the k-period dynamic such that
(
m1, . . . ,mk
)
= q. Define G (q,θ) =(
mk+1, . . . ,m2k
)
to be the next k terms of the k-period dynamic, all of which can be
uniquely determined given q and θ. Iterated application of G generates a sequence
{qr}∞1 where q1 = q and qr+1 = G (qr,θ). Define q∗ (θ) = (m∗ (θ) , . . . ,m∗ (θ)) and
note that q∗ (θ) is a fixed point of G (·,θ). Condition (2.7) can now be rewritten as
limr→∞ ‖qr − q∗ (θ)‖∞ = 0.
The following demonstrates that G is strictly non-expansive. Pick any points q =(
m1, . . . ,mk
)
and qˆ =
(
mˆ1, . . . , mˆk
)
. If G (q,θ) =
(
mk+1, . . . ,m2k
)
and G (qˆ,θ) =(
mˆk+1, . . . , mˆ2k
)
, then by (2.6),
∥∥mk+1 − mˆk+1∥∥∞ <
∥∥∥∥∥1k
k∑
s=1
(ms − mˆs)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ 1
k
∞∑
s=1
‖ms − mˆs‖∞
≤ sup
1≤s≤k
‖ms − mˆs‖∞ .
Similarly, ∥∥mk+2 − mˆk+2∥∥∞ < sup
2≤s≤k+1
‖ms − mˆs‖∞ .
By replacing
∥∥mk+1 − mˆk+1∥∥∞ in the argument of the supremum with
sup
1≤s≤k
‖ms − mˆs‖∞ ,
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the inequality becomes
∥∥mk+2 − mˆk+2∥∥∞ < max{ sup
2≤s≤k
‖ms − mˆs‖∞ , sup
1≤s≤k
‖ms − mˆs‖∞
}
= sup
1≤s≤k
‖ms − mˆs‖∞ .
Applying this reasoning to
∥∥mk+t − mˆk+t∥∥∞ for all t = 2, . . . , k gives
∥∥mk+t − mˆk+t∥∥∞ < sup
1≤s≤k
‖ms − mˆs‖∞ ∀t = 1, . . . , k,
or
sup
1≤s≤k
∥∥mk+s − mˆk+s∥∥∞ < sup
1≤s≤k
‖ms − mˆs‖∞ .
This is equivalent to
‖G (q,θ)−G (qˆ,θ)‖∞ < ‖q− qˆ‖∞ ,
so G (·,θ) is strictly non-expansive for each θ ∈ Θ0 and for all q, qˆ ∈ Mk. By
an application of Edelstein’s Theorem (see Ortega & Rheinbolt [78, p. 404],) the
sequence {qr}∞1 must converge to q∗ (θ).30 This implies that (2.7) holds, completing
the proof.
30Edelstein’s Theorem requires compactness. In this case, the set{
m ∈M : ‖m−m∗ (θ)‖∞ ≤
∥∥m1 −m∗ (θ)∥∥∞}
is compact for each {mt}∞1 and, by (2.6), all subsequent elements of the sequence lie in this compact
set. By restricting attention to this set, Edelstein’s Theorem applies.
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Chapter 3
Equilibrium Participation in Public
Goods Allocations
The previous chapter addressed certain concerns in mechanism design related to the
assumption of equilibrium behavior and the robustness of predictions in repeated
interaction scenarios. The current chapter takes a different tack, focusing instead on
the enforceability of the outcomes selected by a particular mechanism. The key issues
related to enforceability are the credible options of the social planner and the available
options of the players. In economies with private goods, Hurwicz [48] assumes that the
mechanism designer must allow the agents a ‘no-trade’ option, which leads naturally
to the individual rationality constraint that agents must prefer the chosen allocation
to their initial endowment. With public goods, exercising a no-trade option may
allow an agent to consume some level of the public good produced by those who
participate. Thus, Green & Laffont [41, p. 121] argue that individual rationality
is instead founded on the ethical belief that each agent has a natural right to her
endowment and the welfare its consumption would generate.
The current chapter reconsiders the mechanism design problem with public goods
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when the mechanism designer must allow a no-trade option. The resulting constraint
– called equilibrium participation – requires the mechanism to select an outcome such
that every agent prefers to contribute their requested transfer payment rather than
withhold it. If an agent withholds her transfer payment, then the level of the public
good is reduced to that which can be feasibly produced with the remaining transfers.
In order to induce all agents to choose participation over non-participation, a
mechanism can satisfy equilibrium participation by making those agents with the
strongest free-riding incentive responsible for the largest share of the production in-
puts. This is demonstrated in example 3.5 of Section 3.2.4. However, if several
agents have strong free-riding incentives, they cannot all be made responsible for the
lion’s share of production. This problem is exacerbated in larger economies. This is
the intuition behind the two main results of this chapter: (1) there are many finite
economies in which only the endowment satisfies equilibrium participation, and (2)
as any classical public goods economy is replicated, the set of outcomes satisfying
equilibrium participation converges to the endowment.
The negative results of this chapter imply that coercion is absolutely necessary for
mechanisms to successfully implement desirable outcomes. If an agent opts out of the
mechanism outcome, some punishment system must be in place so that the dissenting
agent cannot free ride on the production of others. This can be obtained explicitly
through fines and sanctions, or implicitly by threatening to produce nothing if any
agent defects. If explicit coercion is unavailable and implicit threats incredible, then
mechanism design cannot avoid the standard free-rider problem.
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The next section reviews the relevant literature. The notation and key definition
of the chapter are provided in Section 3.2. General properties of the set of allocations
satisfying equilibrium participation are explored in Section 3.3, followed by an analysis
of the constraint in classical, quasi-concave economies with convex technology in
Section 3.4. The main result on convergence to the endowment in large economies
is proven in Section 3.5. Concluding comments and open questions are discussed in
Section 3.6.
3.1 Relation to Previous Literature
Several authors have tried with limited success to define a notion of the core that
is appropriate in a public goods economy. Such definitions must make assumptions
about the behavior of non-dissenting coalitions when some coalition blocks an al-
location. In the original definition by Foley [36], only the dissenting coalition may
produce the public good; non-dissenters withdraw their contributions to production.
This maximizes the threat to dissenters and many allocations remain in the core.1
[82] assumes that non-dissenting agents select levels of production that are ‘rational’
for themselves (under various meanings) and finds that the subsequent definition of
the core may be empty.
Champsaur, Roberts & Rosenthal [15] define the ϕ-core as the allocations that
remain unblocked when blocking coalitions are given the power to tax the remaining
agents an amount up to ϕ, which depends on the proposed blocking allocation. If ϕ
1[74] shows that Foley’s core does not converge to the set of Lindahl equilibria in large economies.
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were a function of the original allocation, then this notion of blocking (for single-agent
coalitions) could encompass the definition of equilibrium participation. Though the
results for both definitions are similarly negative, they are logically independent.
Saijo [89] analyzes the mechanism design problem when the utility of autarkic
production is used as a welfare lower bound instead of the utility of the endowment.
His notion of autarkic individual rationality requires each agent’s final utility level
to be weakly greater than that which the agent could achieve in isolation with his
endowment and access to the production technology. Whereas Ledyard & Roberts
[62] demonstrate that the standard notion of individual rationality is incompatible
with incentive compatibility among the class of Pareto optimal mechanisms, Saijo [89]
shows that autarkic individual rationality is incompatible with incentive compatibility
for all mechanisms, optimal or not.
Other authors have proposed various models of the outside options of agents in a
mechanism design setting. The most general of these is Jackson & Palfrey [53], where
an unspecified function maps from any given outcome to another (possibly identical)
outcome. The necessary and sufficient conditions of Maskin [67] are then extended
in a simple way to accommodate this ‘reversion function.’ This approach unifies
several existing attempts to model renegotiation and participation in the outcomes
of mechanisms in private goods settings, such as Ma, Moore & Turnbull [64], Maskin
& Moore [68], and Jackson & Palfrey [52]. It also encompasses pubic goods models
with an exogenous status quo outcome or mechanism, as in Perez-Nievas [81].
The issue of enforceability has been addressed in the literature on Bayesian mech-
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anism design (where agents have a non-degenerate common knowledge prior belief
over the set of possible preference profiles) through the means of an external ‘budget
breaker’ who receives a large transfer from the agents when undesirable performance
is observed. This concept was introduced by Holmstrom [47] as a way for managers
to incentivize teams of agents. Eswaran & Kotwal [31] argue that such schemes cre-
ate a strong incentive for the budget breaker to bribe a single agent to deviate. For
example, consider a situation where a central planner uses Walker’s [100] mechanism
to determine the level of some public good. Assume that if some agent submits a
transfer smaller than that required by the mechanism outcome, then the planner can
credibly commit to giving all received transfers to some disinterested third party,
rather than putting those funds into production or refunding them to the agents. If
this third party receives some benefit from these transfers, then she has an incentive
to bribe one agent in the economy to withhold his transfer. If agents in the economy
expect that this budget breaker will offer such a bribe, then the mechanism outcome
cannot be supported as an equilibrium because the agents will rationally expect that
some agent will be bribed. In the current chapter, it is assumed that the use of such
budget breakers is not admissable, either because no dissinterested agent can be found
or because the incentive to bribe is sufficiently large so as to make this an ineffective
enforcement device.2
Finally, it is worth noting that concepts such as dominant strategy incentive com-
patibility and ex-post equilibrium do not encompass the definition of equilibrium
2Alternatively, it could be assumed that the planner has a strong preference for efficiency, so that
the use of a budget breaker is simply not credible off the equilibrium path.
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participation. Although these concepts do require that the mechanism outcome be
preferred by each individual to all other outcomes in the range of the mechanism,
there is no guarantee that the allocation obtaining after an agent opts out is in the
mechanism’s range. Indeed, most ‘standard’ public goods mechanisms (such as the
Groves-Ledyard, Walker, and cVCG mechanisms presented in Section 2.4) do not
include the opt-out points in their range. Therefore, the fact that an allocation is se-
lected as part of an equilibrium decision does not preclude the possibility that agents
will later prefer to free-ride on the contributions of others.
3.2 Notation & Definitions
This chapter uses the following notational conventions:3
R The real line: (−∞,∞)
R+ The non-negative real line: [0,∞)
Rn, Rn+ The n-fold Cartesian products of R and R+, respectively
3.2.1 Environments
Consider the following environment with one private good and one public good:
3If x and x′ are in Rn, then x ≥ x′ ⇔ xi ≥ x′i for all i, x > x′ ⇔ x ≥ x′ and xi > x′i for some i,
and xÀ x′ ⇔ xi > x′i for all i.
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I ≥ 2 The number of individuals
I = {1, . . . , I} The set of individuals, indexed by i
x ∈ RI+ An allocation of the private good; x = (x1, . . . , xI)
y ∈ R+ A level of the public good
z = (x; y) ∈ RI+1+ An allocation
Z ⊂RI+1+ The set of all possible allocations
ω ∈ Z The initial endowment: ωi > 0 for i ∈ I, ωI+1 = 0
t = ω − x The transfers paid by the agents. T =∑i ti, T−i =∑j 6=i tj
ºi The complete, transitive preference relation of i on Z × Z
Âi The strict preference relation of i
ui : Z →R Utility representation of ºi
Y ⊆R2 The set of production possibilities: Y∩R2+ = {(0, 0)}
ϕ ∈ Y & ϕ′ ≤ ϕ ⇒ ϕ′ ∈ Y (comprehensive), Y closed
F : R+ → R+ The production function: F (T ) = sup {y : (−T, y) ∈ Y}
c : F (R+)→ R+ The cost function: c (y) = inf {T ≥ 0 : (−T, y) ∈ Y}
e =
({ºi}i∈I ,Y , ω) An economy with I agents
EI The set of all economies with I agents
Given an economy e, let Z (e) ⊆ Z be the set of feasible allocations of the form
z = ω + (−t; y), where
y ≥ 0
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and t ∈ RI satisfies
t 5 ω,
T ≥ 0,
and
(−T ; y) ∈ Y .
A feasible allocation (x; y) is balanced if y = F (T ).
The following assumptions are used at various points in the chapter:
A1 (Monotonicity) If (x′i, y
′) ≥ (xi, y), then (x′; y′) ºi (x; y).
A2 (Convexity) If z′ ºi z, then αz′ + (1− α) z ºi z for all α ∈ (0, 1).
A3 (Continuity) For every z ∈ Z (e), {z′ ∈ Z (e) : z′ ºi z} and {z′ ∈ Z (e) : z′ ¹i z}
are closed.
A4 (Increasing marginal cost) Y is convex.
A5 (Differentiable utility) Preferencesºi can be represented by a differentiable utility
function ui.
A6 (Differentiable cost) The function F is differentiable.
Denote the set of ‘classical’ economies satisfying A1 through A4 by ECI . Let EDI
denote the set of differentiable economies satisfying A1 through A6. Note that under
A4 and A6, c′ (y) = 1/F ′ (T ).
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3.2.2 Mechanisms
The following defines a mechanism and its possible outcomes:
Si The set of strategies of i: S =
∏
I Si
τ : S →RI Transfer function
η : S →R+ Outcome function
Γ = (S, η, τ) A mechanism
µΓ (e) Equilibrium correspondence mapping Γ and e into subsets of S
OµΓ (e) = {(x; y) ∈ Z : [∃s ∈ µΓ (e)] x = ω − τ (s) & y = η (s)}
O¯µΓ (e) = {(x; y) ∈ OµΓ (e) : y = F (
∑
i (ωi − xi))}
The sets OµΓ (e) and O¯µΓ (e) represent the set of outcomes and balanced outcomes,
respectively, of an economy e.
Definition 3.1 Γ is decisive under µ if, for all e ∈ EI , OµΓ (e) 6= ∅.
Definition 3.2 Γ is feasible under µ if it is decisive under µ and, for all e ∈ EI ,
OµΓ (e) ⊆ Z (e).
Definition 3.3 Γ is balanced under µ if it is feasible under µ and, for all e ∈ EI ,
OµΓ (e) = O¯µΓ (e).
The set of Pareto optimal allocations for e is given by
PO (e) = {z ∈ Z (e) : [ 6 ∃z′ ∈ Z (e)] z′ Â z} .
Definition 3.4 Γ is efficient under µ if it is decisive under µ and, for all e ∈ EI ,
OµΓ (e) ⊆ PO (e).
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If preferences are strictly monotonic, efficient mechanisms must be balanced.
3.2.3 Implementation
In general, if G is a social choice correspondence (SCC) mapping each economy e to a
subset of the feasible allocations Z (e), then Γ implements G under µ ifOµΓ (e) ⊆ G (e)
for every e and Γ fully implements G under µ if OµΓ (e) = G (e) for every e. For
example, if IRi (e) = {(x; y) ∈ Z (e) : (x; y) ºi (ω; 0)}, then IR (e) =
⋂
I IRi (e)
is the SCC that selects all points in the economy that are weakly preferred to the
endowment by all individuals. If Γ implements IR (e) under µ, then all agents are
made weakly better off by participating in Γ and playing a strategy in µΓ (e).
Hurwicz [48] and Ledyard & Roberts [62] have shown that no mechanism imple-
ments PO (e)∩ IR (e) in dominant strategies for private or public goods economies,
respectively. Hurwicz [49] shows that if a mechanism implements PO (e)∩IR (e) in
Nash equilibrium, then OµΓ (e) is the set of Walrasian (or Lindahl) allocations.
3.2.4 The Participation Decision
Consider a situation in which agents in economy e participate in a mechanism Γ that
is balanced and efficient under µ and receive the outcome (ω − τ ; η) ∈ OµΓ (e). If
each agent i has the freedom to either contribute τi or exercise a ‘no-trade’ option
by withholding τi, then the mechanism outcome induces an I-player, two-strategy
game. Assume that the final public goods level is the maximum feasible, given the
contributions received. If all agents prefer to contribute τi over exercising their no-
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trade option, then full participation is a Nash equilibrium of the induced participation
game and the allocation (ω − τ ; η) will be fully realized.
Clearly, there may exist a conflict between the goal of the social planner and the
opt-out incentives of the agents. This is clearly seen by the following example:
Example 3.5 Let I = {1, 2}. Define
u1 (x1, y) = x1 + 21y − 2y2
and
u2 (x2, y) = x2 + 77y − 9y2.
Fix ωi = 50 for each i and let F (T ) = T/10.
In this example, PO (e) = {(x; y) : y = 4 & t1 + t2 = 40}. At the optima, the
marginal rate of substitution is 5 for both agents, so the consumers’ Lindahl prices
are equal. Suppose an efficient mechanism under µ selects the Lindahl solution τ =
(20, 20) and η = 4. The induced participation game is given in panel (a) of Figure
3.1. Clearly, agent 1 has an incentive to withhold her requested transfer, resulting in
a suboptimal outcome of y = 2 in equilibrium.
Now consider another efficient mechanism under µ that selects η = 4 and τ =
(30, 10). In the induced participation game, shown in panel (b) of Figure 3.1, it is an
equilibrium for both agents to participate. Agent 1 no longer has an incentive to opt
out because her contribution is responsible for a larger share of the production.
Although this redistribution of production ‘responsibility’ is an effective trick to
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t1 \ t2 20 0
20 82, 194 64, 168
0 84, 148 50, 50
t1 \ t2 10 0
30 72, 204 65, 200
0 69, 108 50, 50
(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: The induced participation game for Example 3.5 from (a) the equal-price
Lindahl allocation, and (b) an unequal-price optimal allocation.
offset free-riding incentives, feasibility constraints limit how many agents can have
their tax burden sufficiently increased. Furthermore, some agents may prefer to al-
ways defect, regardless how much of the burden they must bear. These difficulties
are key to the negative results of the chapter.
Consider the more general case of two players and a constant marginal cost. If an
allocation z is proposed such that ti > 0 for each i and F (T ) > 0, then the allocation
that obtains when agent 1 opts out is given by
z(−1) =
(
(ω1, x2) ; y
(−1)) ,
where
y(−1) = F (t2) .
The opt-out point z(−2) is similarly defined. Panel (a) of Figure 3.2 provides a graph-
ical example of these points in the Kolm triangle diagram (Kolm [58]; see Thomson
[95] for a detailed exposition.) For the proposal z to satisfy equilibrium participation,
both agents must prefer z to their ‘opt-out’ points z(−i), as in the figure.
In the case where t1 < 0 while t2 > 0, then y
(−2) = 0 since negative quantities
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O1 O2
ω
Z 
Z(−1) 
Z(−2) 
u1 
u2 
O1 O2
ω = Z(−2)
Z Z
(−1)
 
(a) (b)
Figure 3.2: (a) The point z ºi z(−i) for each i ∈ 1, 2, so it satisfies equilibrium
participation. (b) The points z(−i) when t1 is negative.
of the public good are not admissible. However, y(−1) = y since agent 1 is not asked
to contribute any private good. In this case, it is assumed that the negative transfer
rejected by agent 1 is either redistributed among the other agents or destroyed, rather
than affecting the level of the public good.4 Under A1, agent 1 will always prefer
participation when t1 < 0 and agent 2 will prefer participation only if (x; y) ∈ IR2 (e).
The case of a negative transfer is demonstrated graphically in panel (b) of Figure 3.2.
Generalizing the concepts of the two-player example provides the key definition
of this chapter.
Definition 3.6 For any I = 1, 2, . . . and any economy e ∈ EI , a feasible allocation
(x; y) ∈ Z (e) such that x = ω− t satisfies equilibrium participation for agent i (EPi)
if and only if
(x; y) ºi
(
x(−i); y(−i)
)
,
4Whether the transfer is redistributed or destroyed will not affect the i’s participation decision
since ºi depends only on xi and y.
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where
x
(−i)
i = ωi,
y(−i) =

F (T−i) if ti ≥ 0, T−i ≥ 0, and y ≥ F (T−i)
0 if T−i < 0
y otherwise
, (3.1)
and (
x(−i); y(−i)
) ∈ Z (e) .
The allocation (x; y) ∈ Z (e) satisfies equilibrium participation (EP) if and only
if it satisfies EPi for all i ∈ I.
There are four possible cases in this definition. When ti ≥ 0, T−i ≥ 0, and
y ≥ F (T−i), removing agent i’s transfer necessarily reduces production, but not to
zero. If T−i < 0, then ti > 0 and removing i’s transfer results in y(−i) = 0. If ti < 0
or y < F (T−i), then y can be produced in the absence of i’s transfer, so y(−i) = y.
For any economy e ∈ EI , let
EP i (e) = {z ∈ Z (e) : z satisfies EPi} ,
and define
EP (e)=
⋂
i∈I
EP i (e) .
Referring back to the example of Figure 3.2, z ∈ EP (e) in panel (a), but in panel
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O1 O2
ω
u1 
Figure 3.3: The set of balanced allocations satisfying equilibrium participation for
agent 1.
(b), z 6∈ EP1 (e), so z 6∈ EP (e).
3.3 Properties of EP (e)
The shaded region of Figure 3.3 demonstrates a typical equilibrium participation set
for agent 1 in a two-agent classical economy. Note that EP (e) is closed and has a
continuous boundary, but need not be convex. Clearly, EP (e) is non-empty for every
e ∈ EI and every I since (ω; 0) ∈ EP (e).
As an alternative to equilibrium participation, consider an environment in which
agents can freely choose ti ∈ [0, ωi], resulting in y = F (T ). The set of Nash equilib-
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rium allocations is given by
NE (e) =

(x∗; y∗) ∈ Z (e) : x∗ ≤ ω and
[∀i ∈ I] [∀t′i ≥ 0] (x∗i , y∗) ºi
(
ωi − t′i, F
(
T ∗−i + t
′
i
))
 .
The notion of equilibrium participation is now shown to be more stringent than the
standard notion of individual rationality, but less restrictive than the Nash equilib-
rium requirement.
Proposition 3.7 Under monotone increasing preferences (A3), all allocations satis-
fying equilibrium participation also satisfy individual rationality (EP (e) ⊆ IR (e).)
Proof. Consider a point (x; y) such that (xi, y) ºi
(
ωi, y
(−i)) for all i ∈ I. Note
that y(−i) ≥ 0 for each i, so A3 implies that (ωi, y(−i)) ºi (ωi, 0). By transitivity,
(xi, y) ºi (ωi, 0) for every i, proving the result.
Proposition 3.8 All Nash equilibria of the voluntary contributions game satisfy equi-
librium participation (NE (e) ⊆ EP (e).)
Proof. From any Nash equilibrium point, the ‘opt-out’ allocation for agent i in
the participation game is simply
(
ωi, F
(
T ∗−i
))
. Since the definition requires that
(x∗i , y
∗) ºi
(
ωi, F
(
T ∗−i
))
for all i by considering t′i = 0, the point (x
∗; y∗) must satisfy
equilibrium participation.
In mechanism design with public goods, the most common goal is to implement
PO (e). There exist several mechanisms whose Nash equilibria are guaranteed to
be Pareto optimal when utility is transferable. However, if the outcomes of these
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mechanism fail to satisfy equilibrium participation, then their desirable properties
are of little use in environments where agents cannot be coerced to submit their
transfers. The following class of examples shows the potential difficulty of finding
points in PO (e) ∩ EP (e).
Example 3.9 Let I ≥ 2. Define ui (xi, y) = vi (y) + xi, where each vi (y) is contin-
uous and differentiable. Assume F (T ) = T/κ, and let v′i (y) < κ for all i ∈ I and
y ≥ 0. Assume that there is a unique yo > 0 such that ∑i v′i (y) > κ for y < yo and∑
i v
′
i (y) < κ for y > y
o. Finally, assume that
∑
j 6=i ωj < κy
o for each i ∈ I.5
In this example, no agent is willing to unilaterally fund any amount of the public
good at any level and therefore refuses to contribute in any participation game. To
see this, pick any allocation (x; y) 6= (ω; 0), so t 6= 0. If all agents participate in this
allocation, then each agent i receives
ui (xi, y) = vi (y) + ωi − ti.
If i withholds her transfer, she receives
ui
(
x
(−i)
i , y
(−i)
)
= vi
(
y(−i)
)
+ ωi.
There must be some agent i with ti > 0. If y = 0 or T−i ≤ 0, then y(−i) = 0 and EPi is
5One such example is κ = 1 and
vi (y) =
{
3
2I y if y ≤ 1
1
2I y +
1
I if y ≥ 1
for each i. Here, yo = 1. The point of non-differentiability in vi is of no consequence.
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not satisfied. If y > 0 and T−i > 0, but y ≤ F (T−i) then y(−i) = y and EPi again fails.
Therefore, consider the case where y > 0, T−i > 0, and y > F (T−i), so y(−i) = F (T−i).
By withholding, agent i saves ti = κ
(
y − y(−i)) in transfer payments. Her loss in value
due to the reduction in public goods production is vi (y)− vi
(
y(−i)
)
=
∫ y
y(−i) v
′
i (s) ds,
which is less than κ
(
y − y(−i)) since v′i (y) < κ for all y. Therefore, she will prefer to
withhold her transfer regardless of ti and the allocation will not satisfy equilibrium
participation for agent i. In this economy, no allocation can satisfy EPi for every
i, so EP (e) is simply the endowment. This class of examples proves the following
proposition:
Proposition 3.10 For every I ≥ 2, there exists economies e in ECI such that no
allocation except the endowment satisfies equilibrium participation (EP (e) = {ω}).
The following shows that the notion of voluntary participation implicit in the
definition of EP may preclude any optimal allocation from obtaining.
Proposition 3.11 For every I ≥ 2, there exists economies e in ECI in which no allo-
cation z ∈ Z (e) can be selected such that the equilibrium of the resulting participation
game is Pareto optimal.
The proof of this result is simple. Any Pareto optimal allocation in the above
class of examples must choose yo > 0, from which any agent will defect. Furthermore,
optimal allocations cannot obtain after an agent defects; if any one agent is consuming
xi = ωi, then
∑
j 6=i ωj < κy
o guarantees that yo cannot be feasibly produced by the
remaining agents.
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Note that example 3.9 does not represent a knife-edge case. A wide range of
economies fits its assumptions and a number of similar examples can be constructed.
The key factor is marginal utilities must be smaller than marginal costs at all levels
of y.
Since Proposition 3.11 indicates that EP is inconsistent with Pareto optimality, it
is natural to ask whether there can exist any non-trivial mechanisms that satisfy this
constraint.6 In other words, is there a mechanism and a µ that implements EP (e)
in µ? The results of Gibbard [40], Satterthwaite [91], K. Roberts [85] and Zhou [102]
indicate that dominant strategy implementation of EP (e) is futile, even in classical
economies. More positive results may be obtained when µ is weakened to the Nash
equilibrium concept; it is simple to show that EP (e) satisfies Maskin’s definition of
monotonicity (see Maskin [67], giving the following result7):
Proposition 3.12 The set of allocations satisfying equilibrium participation (EP (e))
can be non-trivially implemented in Nash equilibrium when I ≥ 3.
The proof of this proposition for full implementation relies on Maskin’s mechanism
which is not a particularly ‘natural’ game form. Proposition 3.8 shows that EP (e)
can be implemented by the voluntary contribution mechanism since NE (e) ⊆ EP (e).
However, this mechanism does not fully implement EP (e). Note that in economies
like those of Example 3.5, EP (e) = {ω}, making implementation of EP (e) trivial.
6A non-trivial mechanism is defined as one that selects something other than the initial endow-
ment in at least one environment.
7The other sufficient condition, ‘no-veto power,’ is trivially satisfied in economic environments
such as this one.
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3.4 Quasi-Concave Economies
3.4.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
The additional structure gained by adding assumptions A1 through A6 allows for the
derivation of separate necessary and sufficient conditions for an allocation to satisfy
equilibrium participation. Although these conditions are not tight, they require only
‘local’ information about the gradients of utilities and derivative of the production
function.
Proposition 3.13 For any economy in EDI , if equilibrium participation is satisfied
at a point (x; y) = (ω + t; y), then
∂ui (ωi;F (T−i)) /∂y
∂ui (ωi;F (T−i)) /∂xi
≥ c′ (y(−i)) (3.2)
for all i ∈ I such that ti, T−i ≥ 0 and y ≥ F (T−i).
A similar condition is now shown to be sufficient for a point to satisfy equilibrium
participation. Whereas the necessary condition compares the marginal rate of sub-
stitution to marginal costs at the drop-out point, the sufficient condition compares
these quantities at the proposed allocation:
Proposition 3.14 For any economy in EDI , if a point (x; y) = (ω + t; y) satisfies
∂ui (x; y) /∂y
∂ui (x; y) /∂xi
≥ c′ (y) (3.3)
89
for all i such that ti,T−i ≥ 0 and y ≥ F (T−i) and
uj (x; y) ≥ uj (ω; 0) (3.4)
for all j such that T−j < 0, then equilibrium participation is satisfied at (x; y).
Unlike the necessary condition, equation (3.4) implies that information about
the utilities of some agents at both the suggested allocation and the endowment is
needed. This may be undesirable from the standpoint of mechanism design since
additional information is necessary to determine that the condition is met.8 The
following condition shows how equation (3.4) could be replaced by a stronger version
of equation (3.3) to give a single condition sufficient for all agents that uses only
information about preferences and costs at the selected allocation.
Proposition 3.15 For any economy in EDI , if a point (x; y) = (ω + t; y) satisfies
∂ui (x; y) /∂y
∂ui (x; y) /∂xi
≥ ti
F (T )
(3.5)
for all i, then equilibrium participation is satisfied at (x; y).
Figure 3.4 demonstrates the interpretation of these conditions. The quantity
(∂ui/∂y) / (∂ui/∂xi) is the slope of the gradient of ui, while c
′ is the slope of the
normal to the production possibilities frontier. In the figure, F is reflected around
the y-axis and horizontally shifted so that its graph represents the production pos-
8Of course, there could exist mechanisms whose outcomes satisfy Equilibrium Participation with-
out satisfying this sufficient condition.
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Figure 3.4: An example with quasi-concave utilities and convex production sets. z is
Pareto optimal, z∗ is i’s most-preferred feasible allocation, and z(−i) is i’s drop-out
point. z(−i) satisfies the sufficient condition for EP. z∗ and z′ satisfy the sufficient
condition.
sibilities set for agent i, given the endowments. If agent i withholds ti, then the
allocation z(−i) results. In this case, i will prefer the Pareto optimal point z to z(−i).
The necessary condition for equilibrium participation is satisfied in the figure since
the gradient of utility has a steeper slope than the normal to F at z(−i). The sufficient
condition is satisfied at z′ since the gradient of utility is steeper than the normal to F
at z′, but this condition fails at the optimal point, z. In fact, the sufficient condition
is satisfied for any point along F between z(−i) and z∗, but nowhere left of z∗. This is
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intuitive; z′ is closer to z∗ (i’s most preferred point) than z(−i), so i will not opt out
of z′.
The Samuelson [90] condition for an interior optimum requires z to be to the left
of z∗, where the sufficient condition fails. Thus, equilibrium participation requires
that z(−i) be sufficiently to the right of z∗, causing ti to be large. As in the opening
example, large transfers are needed to incentivize participation, but feasibility may
constrain how large the transfer can be or how many agents can have these inflated
transfers. Clearly, this constraint will be more restrictive in larger economies, as will
be demonstrated in Section 3.5.
3.4.2 Quasi-Linear Preferences
The transferable utility environment is especially important in mechanism design as
the absence of wealth effects is useful in guaranteeing the ability to satisfy incentive
compatibility constraints through transfer payments. It also allows a more precise
quantification of the minimal transfer needed to satisfy equilibrium participation.
Assume agents have utility functions ui (xi, y) = vi (y)+xi, where v
′
i > 0 and v
′′ ≤
0, and let the production function be strictly increasing and concave, so c (y) is strictly
increasing and convex. Let y∗i be the unique solution to c
′ (y) = v′i (y). Equilibrium
participation at a public good level of yˆ requires that
ti ≤
∫ yˆ
y(−i)
v′i (y) dy.
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It must be that if ti is non-negative, then
∫ yˆ
y(−i)
c′ (y) dy ≤ ti,
with equality if the allocation is non-wasteful. In order for yˆ to satisfy equilibrium
participation for agent i when yˆ > y∗i , it must be the case that
∫ y∗i
y(−i)
(v′i (y)− c′ (y)) dy ≥
∫ yˆ
y∗i
(c′ (y)− v′i (y)) dy, (3.6)
both of which are non-negative quantities.
For an optimal allocation yo, equation (3.6) provides an exact requirement on how
‘far’ y(−i) must be from y∗i to guarantee equilibrium participation. This is demon-
strated in Figure 3.5, in which y(−i) is the largest value satisfying (3.6) for the optimal
point yo. The necessary and sufficient conditions from equations (3.2) and (3.3) are
also intuitive in this figure; if y(−i) > y∗i , then the necessary condition fails because
marginal costs are everywhere larger than the marginal benefit between y(−i) and yo,
and the sufficient condition is satisfied for any y ∈ [y(−i), y∗i ) since marginal costs are
less than the marginal benefit at every public good level between y and y(−i).
3.5 Equilibrium Participation in Large Economies
The analysis of finite economies indicates that the large transfers needed to guar-
antee equilibrium participation for optimal allocations conflict with the feasibility
constraints, particularly for larger economies. There is a fundamental difficulty in
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Figure 3.5: The Pareto optimal point yo exactly satisfies equilibrium participation; if
y(−i) were any larger, EP would fail.
the notion of a replica public goods economy. If each replicated agent is given the
same endowment, then the total available production input grows without bound.
Unless preferences bound the level of production, agents in large economies can find
themselves consuming an infinite ratio of public to private goods.
Muench [74], Milleron [73], and Conley [25] discuss the difficulty of replicating
public goods economies and offer various possible methods.9 Milleron [73] provides an
intriguing notion of replication; by splitting a fixed endowment among the replicates
and adjusting preferences so that agents’ concerns for the private good are relative to
the size of their endowment, the fundamental difficulties of replication are mitigated.
In essence, as the economy is replicated and agents are given a smaller share of the
endowment, their preferences adjust proportionally to become more sensitive to the
9These authors are examining the convergence of the core of the economy to the Lindahl equi-
librium. See Foley [36] for the appropriate definitions.
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private goods holding. Thus, a very small shift in the absolute holdings of the private
good is more significant to an agent with a small endowment in a big economy than
to an agent with a big endowment in a small economy.
Formally, consider a base economy e ∈ EI with I unique agents such that e =({ºi}i∈I ,Y , ω). A replica economy eR is defined by replicating R times each i ∈ I.
Each replicate of consumer type i, denoted by the pair (i, r) for r = 1, . . . , R, is
endowed with ωi/R units of the private good and a preference relation ºi,r such that
(xi,r, y) ºi,r
(
x′i,r, y
′), if and only if (Rxi, y) ºi (Rx′i, y′) because of the scaling of
endowments. This assumption on preferences of replicates mimics the approach of
Milleron [73] and guarantees that private good consumption trade-offs are significant,
even as the magnitude of those trade-offs becomes arbitrarily small. Finally, the
production technology of eR is assumed to be identical to that of e.
This intuition that equilibrium participation becomes oppressively restrictive as
an economy is replicated is confirmed by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.16 For any economy satisfying A1, A3, and A4 (continuous, monotone
preferences and increasing, continuous production technology,) the set of allocations
satisfying equilibrium participation converges to the initial endowment as the economy
is infinitely replicated.
The proof of this theorem, available in the chapter appendix (Section 3.7,) demon-
strates how the shrinking endowment restricts the amount any agent can be asked to
pay in the limit. This, in turn, limits the agent’s effect on production. Since agents in
large economies care about small changes in their private goods consumption, but not
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in the level of the public good, agents eventually prefer to opt-out as their individual
effect on production vanishes.
This result is sensitive to the definitions of a replica economy. Consider instead a
more standard notion of replication in which ωi,r = ωi for each type i and replicate
r, and assume (xi,r, y) ºi,r
(
x′i,r, y
′) if and only if (xi, y) ºi (x′i, y′). To see that the
theorem no longer holds, construct a simple base economy e ∈ EI with an agent i
for whom (0, F (ωi)) Âi (ωi, 0). Here, the allocation (x, y) where xi = 0, xj = ωj
for all j 6= i, and y = F (ωi) satisfies equilibrium participation. This economy can
be replicated arbitrarily often, but the sequence of allocations
(
xR, yR
)
such that
xRi,1 = 0, x
R
j,r = ωj for all (j, r) 6= (i, 1), yR = F (ωi) satisfies equilibrium participation
for every R , but does not converge to the endowment.10
Note that this result holds in economies where the set of Pareto optimal allocations
remains far from the endowment as the economy grows, so that notion of approximate
efficiency is of no benefit. For large economies, it is necessary that the committee or
government has the power of coercion in order to overcome the free-rider problem.
3.6 Conclusion
If a mechanism is to implement a desired social choice correspondence with public
goods when agents have available a no-trade alternative, it must select an allocation
impervious to agents withdrawing their transfers. The incompatibility between equi-
10If the limit economy is represented by a measure space of consumers, however, this example fails
because the contributions of a single individual are of measure zero and will not affect production
of the public good.
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librium participation and Pareto optimality is established through simple quasilinear
examples, indicating that optimality is unobtainable under the standard assumptions
used in mechanism design. In many economies, only the initial endowment is insuscep-
tible to agents withdrawing. Even in those economies for which non-trivial allocations
satisfy equilibrium participation, the set of equilibrium participation allocations even-
tually shrinks to the endowment as the economy is replicated.
The above analysis leaves open important questions about participation in public
goods allocations. Perhaps it is possible to characterize those economies for which
optimality is not inconsistent with equilibrium participation. If this class of such
economies is reasonable to assume as the set of possible economies, then the negative
results may be avoided with small numbers of agents. Similarly, there may exist
a wide range of economies for which Pareto optimality may be well approximated
under equilibrium participation. If such ‘approximately desirable’ outcomes could be
identified, perhaps there exists a more natural mechanism that can implement these
outcomes in Nash equilibrium. Given that the equilibrium participation constraint
can be thought of as a restriction on the size of transfers, it is conceivable that a total
transfer maximizing solution to this system of restrictions may be identified and used
to maximize the total size of the public good in a given economy.
Finally, empirical observation demonstrates that non-trivial quantities of public
goods are regularly provided in large economies. Governments and other voluntarily
established methods of coercion exist as enforcement devices to guarantee that wel-
fare improving allocations are attained. The next chapter provides a repeated-game
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justification for endogenous enforcement, even when interactions are anonymous and
individual reputations cannot be tracked. Such a process is a naturally occurring
phenomenon within the larger private ownership/competitive mechanism framework,
rather than a formally defined allocation mechanism. A larger model of how allocation
mechanisms evolve in time has yet to be developed.
3.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.13. Pick any agent i such that ti, T−i ≥ 0 and y ≥ F (T−i).
Equilibrium participation implies that
ui (ωi − ti, F (T−i + ti)) ≥ ui (ωi, F (T−i)) .
By quasi-concavity of ui,
∇ui (ωi, F (T−i)) · (−ti, F (T−i + ti)− F (T−i)) ≥ 0,
or
F (T−i + ti)− F (T−i)
ti
≥ ∂ui (ωi;F (T−i)) /∂xi
∂ui (ωi;F (T−i)) /∂y
.
Thus, by concavity of F ,
∂ui (ωi;F (T−i)) /∂xi
∂ui (ωi;F (T−i)) /∂y
≤ F ′ (T−i) .
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Inverting this inequality gives the necessary condition.
Proof of Proposition 3.14. By monotonicity, equilibrium participation is triv-
ially satisfied for all j such that tj < 0 or y < F (T−j). Equation (3.4) guarantees
equilibrium participation when T−j < 0.
Now consider some i ∈ I such that ti, T−i ≥ 0 and y ≥ F (T−i), but for whom
equilibrium participation fails. For this agent,
ui (ωi, F (T−i)) > ui (ωi − ti, F (T−i + ti)) , (3.7)
so that
∇ui (x; y) · (ti, F (T−i)− F (T−i + ti)) > 0.
This is equivalent to
∂ui (x; y) /∂xi
∂ui (x; y) /∂y
>
F (T−i + ti)− F (T−i)
ti
, (3.8)
so applying the concavity of F at T−i + ti and inverting the resulting relationship
gives
∂ui (x; y) /∂y
∂ui (x; y) /∂xi
<
1
F ′ (T−i + ti)
.
Equation (3.3) implies that (3.7) cannot hold, so by the contrapositive of this argu-
ment, (x; y) must satisfy EPi.
Proof of Proposition 3.15. For agents with T−i < 0, y(−i) = 0, but F (T−i) < 0.
By replacing F (T−i) with zero in the proof of Proposition 3.14, the argument is
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identical through equation (3.8). At this point, the subsequent relationship with
F ′ (T ) cannot be derived from F (T ) /ti when T−i < 0, so inverting (3.8) gives the
alternative sufficient condition
∂ui (x; y) /∂y
∂ui (x; y) /∂xi
≥ 1
F (T ) /ti
(3.9)
for all i such that T−i < 0. Since this is a stronger condition than (3.3), it is also
sufficient for every agent.
Proof of Theorem 3.16. By way of contradiction, assume that there exists some
economy e and some sequence
{(
xR; yˆR
)}∞
R=1
in EP (eR) for each R such that ∣∣yˆR∣∣
fails to converge to zero.
For each (i, r), let tRi,r = ω
R
i,r − xRi,r. For any
(
xR; yˆR
) ∈ EP (eR), if yˆR <
F
(∑
i,r t
R
i,r
)
, then by monotonicity,
(
xR; yR
) ∈ EP (eR), where yR = F (∑i,r tRi,r).
In other words, if a wasteful allocation (x; yˆ) satisfies equilibrium participation,
so does the transfer-equivalent non-wasteful allocation (x; y). Thus, the sequence{(
xR; yR
)}∞
R=1
satisfies equilibrium participation for each R and
{∣∣yR∣∣}∞
R=1
also fails
to converge to zero. This implies that there exists a subsequence
{(
xR(k); yR(k)
)}∞
k=1
such that
∣∣yR(k)∣∣ > ε for some ε > 0 all k ∈ N= {1, 2, . . .}. Letting c (y) represent the
minimal cost of producing y (which is the inverse of F ,) non-convergence guarantees
that c
(
yR(k)
) ≥ c (ε) > 0 for each k since c is an increasing function and Y∩R2+ = {0}.
For any k, if R (k) > maxi∈I (ωi/c (ε)), then no one agent (i, r) can unilaterally
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fund yR(k) using t
R(k)
i,r since
t
R(k)
i,r ≤ max
i∈I
ωi/R (k)
< c (ε)
≤ c (yR(k)) .
Letting
k∗ = max
{
k ∈ N : R (k) ≤ max
i∈I
(ωi/c (ε))
}
,
there exists at least one sequence of agents {(ik, rk)}∞k=1 such that
t
R(k)
ik,rk
≥ c (yR(k)) / (R (k) I)
for all k, and T−(ik,rk) > 0 for all k > k
∗. In other words, there exists a sequence of
agents such that at each k, the identified agent is paying a transfer which is more than
the average transfer of c
(
yR(k)
)
/ (R (k) I) > 0, and the sum of the others’ transfers
is eventually positive as individual (ik, rk)’s budget constraint becomes restrictive.
For example, {(ik, rk)}∞k=1 might identify the agent (i, r) in each k for whom tR(k)i,k
is maximal among all agents (this particular sequence may not have a well-defined
limit, but any selection of agents paying an above average proportion of the cost is
sufficient.)
Since each
(
xR(k); yR(k)
)
satisfies equilibrium participation for all (i, r), it must be
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the case that (
ωi,r − tR(k)ik,rk , yR(k)
)
ºik,rk
(
ωi,r,
(
yR(k)
)−(ik,rk))
,
or equivalently,
(
ωi −R (k) tR(k)ik,rk , yR(k)
)
ºik
(
ωi,
(
yR(k)
)−(ik,rk))
.
Note that for k > k∗,
(
yR(k)
)−(ik,rk)
= F
(∑
j,s
t
R(k)
j,s − tR(k)ik,rk
)
.
By continuity of the production function,
(
yR(k)
)−(ik,rk) becomes arbitrarily close to
yR(k) as k grows. However, since t
R(k)
ik,rk
> c (ε) / (R (k) I), then R (k) t
R(k)
ik,rk
is bounded
below by c (ε) /I > 0 at all k. By monotonicity of preferences, it must be the case
that
(
ωi − c (ε)
I
, yR(k)
)
ºi
(
ωi −R (k) tR(k)ik,rk , yR(k)
)
ºi
(
ωi,
(
yR(k)
)−(ik,rk))
.
By continuity of preferences, convergence of
(
yR(k)
)−(ik,rk) to yR(k) implies that for
large enough k, (
ωi − c (ε)
I
, yR(k)
)
ºik
(
ωi, y
R(k)
)
.
However, this violates monotonicity. Since there cannot be an infinite subsequence
of allocations with
∣∣yR(k)∣∣ > ε for any ε > 0, it must be the case that yR → 0 as
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R→∞. Feasibility then requires that ∥∥xR − ωR∥∥∞ → 0, completing the proof.
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Chapter 4
Group Reputations and
Stereotypes as Contract
Enforcement Devices
Incomplete contracts are frequently observed despite the well-known incentive distor-
tions they create. For example, if a product’s quality is not verifiable, sellers have a
clear incentive to deliver lower-quality goods. Rational buyers recognize this incen-
tive and adjust their demand accordingly. The resulting transaction is often Pareto
dominated by the ‘cooperative’ outcome of high quality goods sold at higher prices.
Despite these difficulties, cooperative market interactions continue to take place in
the absence of complete, verifiable contracts; buyers often trust sellers to deliver a
high quality product and sellers often respond in kind.
Economic theory has struggled to explain the success of the marketplace in the face
of enforcement difficulties. An appealing argument is that repeated interactions act as
an enforcement device when the cost of damaging a valuable long-term relationship
outweighs the immediate benefit of poor performance, as in the models of Klein
& Leffler [57] or MacLeod & Malcomson [65]. By adding a small probability of
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agents being unconditionally cooperative, Kreps et al. [59] show how false reputation-
building by selfish agents can lead to full cooperation in early periods of the finitely
repeated prisoners’ dilemma. These models implicitly require that trading partners’
identities be known in order for reputation-building to occur.
Experimental studies show, however, that cooperation can emerge even when in-
teractions are anonymous. In tests of moral hazard in the labor market by Ernst
Fehr and many others (see Fehr et al. [34] and [35], Charness [16], Fehr & Falk [32],
Charness et al. [17], Ga¨chter & Falk [39], and Hannan et al. [44], among others),
wages and effort levels are observed to be substantially higher than the stage game
equilibrium prediction even though transactions are anonymous. Furthermore, these
studies show little evidence of reversion to the equilibrium in the final periods. There-
fore, the authors conclude that fairness norms (such as a natural preference for ‘gift
exchange’) solve the moral hazard problem, not reputation-building.
Not all experimental studies confirm these results. Lynch et al. [63], Engelmann
& Ortmann [29], and Rigdon [84] find behavior consistent with, or converging to-
ward, the stage game equilibrium. Even some studies purporting the existence of
fairness preferences include some sessions with strong end-game effects, as in Fehr et
al. [35] and Riedl & Tyran [83]. These apparently contradictory results leave open
the question of what forces are at work to offset the shirking incentive.
The current chapter provides three novel results. First, in a direct replication of
Fehr et al. [34], high wages and efforts observed in early periods collapse dramati-
cally to the stage game equilibrium in the last period. Second, a group reputation
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(or ‘stereotyping’) model is developed that explains this behavior. Third, a new ex-
perimental environment is tested in which individuals have insufficient incentives to
maintain the group’s reputation. As predicted by the model, actual subjects play the
stage game equilibrium in every period. Furthermore, the results of many previous
experimental papers are consistent with the model’s predictions.
The stereotyping model works as follows:
Assume, a` la Kreps et al. [59], that some percentage of workers are unconditional
cooperators whose efforts are always positively correlated with their wage. If firms
believe that worker types are perfectly correlated – even if that belief is empirically
unsupported – then a single defection by one worker leads to the belief that all workers
are ‘selfish,’ destroying the reputation of the entire group and causing low wages in
all subsequent periods.1 Under the payoff structure used by Fehr et al. [34], selfish
workers have an incentive to maintain a group reputation until the very last period
(unless firms are very certain a priori that the workers are selfish.) By changing the
payoff structure, one can eliminate the existence of such group reputation equilibria.
Indeed, this is the phenomenon observed in a new set of experiments.
The assumption of stereotyping behavior, though irrational, is a well documented
phenomenon in the social psychology literature. People use stereotypes to economize
on cognitive resources in the processes of evaluating and recalling information about
other individuals (McGarty et al. [70, p. 3–5]). Effectively, stereotyping is an inex-
pensive internal reputation management system. By assigning attributes to groups
rather than individuals, decision makers can easily estimate the attributes of individ-
1This is similar in spirit to the contagion mechanism of Kandori [54].
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ual group members. The danger of this cognitive shortcut is, of course, potentially
harmful inaccurate beliefs about individuals.
The following section formally introduces the gift exchange market under var-
ious payoff structures and explores the equilibrium predictions of the stage game.
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe experimental sessions in which high wages and effort
are observed only under certain conditions, though all sessions show strong signs
of repeated game considerations. Section 4.4 simplifies the structure of the gift ex-
change market for game theoretic analysis and Subsection 4.4.2 formally introduces
the stereotype-reputation model, along with evidence that such a model has solid
foundations in the field of social psychology. Subsection 4.4.3 compares the predic-
tions of the stereotype-reputation model to past gift exchange market experiments,
and Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.1 The Gift-Exchange Market
A single play of a gift exchange market (GEM) has the following structure:
A finite set J of firms and a finite set I of workers participate in a two-stage
posted-price labor market. Let J = |J | and I = |I|, with I > J . In the first stage,
each firm j ∈ J posts at most one wage offer wj in the market. The set of allowable
offers is given byW∪{φ}, whereW ⊆ R is a compact set of non-negative wage offers
and φ represents no wage offer. Workers i ∈ I may accept any outstanding offers wj
in the market at any time. After wj has been accepted by some worker, firm j may
not post any further wage offers, so each firm may hire at most one worker. After
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a fixed amount of time (or after all firms have had a wage offer accepted,) the first
stage ends and unmatched agents earn zero profit.
In the second stage, each worker that accepted a wage offer selects an effort level ei
from a linearly ordered set E such that inf E ∈ E . Let χi (w) ∈ {0, 1} denote whether
or not worker i accepts the given wage offer w and let ei (w) ∈ E denote the effort
level chosen. Note that by making workers the second mover, effort choices are quite
naturally dependent on wages.
The monetary payoffs realized by each firm j and worker i are given by pi and
u, respectively, each mapping strategy pairs from (W ∪ {φ}) × ({0, 1} × E) into R
such that unmatched agents receive zero profit. The functions pi and u are identical
across agents and are common knowledge. Assume u is monotone decreasing in e and
increasing in w, and pi is monotone increasing in e and decreasing in w.
4.1.1 Stage Game Equilibrium
Define emin = inf E and w∗ = inf {w ∈ W : u (w, (1, emin)) ≥ 0}. Here, emin is the min-
imal effort choice and w∗ is the reservation wage at emin. Without loss of generality,
assume that ei (w) = emin whenever χi (w) = 0 since effort choices are irrelevant when
no wage is accepted. In the second stage of the one-shot game, consider the strategy
for each worker i given by
(χ∗i (w) , e
∗
i (w)) =

(1, emin) if w ≥ w∗
(0, emin) if w < w
∗
,
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where emin is chosen in response to any acceptable wage offer. This is the workers’
unique dominant strategy since u is decreasing in e and u (w, (1, e)) < u (w, (0, emin)) =
0 for each e ∈ E when w < w∗. Note that while the choice of whether to accept a
given wage offer is dependent upon w, the choice of emin is not.
In the current set of environments, pi (w∗, (1, emin)) > 0, so the firms have an
incentive to participate. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is for each
firm j to offer wj = w
∗ and for every worker i to accept w∗ with an effort level of
emin.
2 Since I > J , involuntary unemployment will still result.3
4.1.2 Three Specifications
Three specifications of the GEM are tested experimentally. Each varies in the func-
tional form of agent payoffs and in the information feedback conditions, although the
game forms are identical across specifications. In all three treatments, I = 9, J = 6,
E = {1, 2, . . . , 10} and W = {5, 10, 15, . . .}. Utilities are chosen such that w∗ = 30,
so the stage game equilibrium always predicts a wage of 30 and an effort choice of
emin = 1.
2There exists a Pareto-dominated ‘no-trade’ Nash equilibrium to this game in which all J firms
choose to make no wage offers (wj = φ for all j ∈ J ) and all I workers choose to reject all wage
offers (χi (w) ≡ 0 for all i ∈ I.) Unless otherwise indicated, further discussion of the stage game
equilibrium will refer only to the subgame perfect equilibrium with full employment.
3In equilibrium, workers know that w∗ will be the only wage offer in the market and will therefore
accept w∗ immediately. Allocation of firms to workers is assumed to be random in the situation of
multiple simultaneous acceptances, so that the set of unemployed workers will be randomly selected
in equilibrium.
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4.1.3 Treatment 1: High MRS Ratio, Anonymous IDs (HRA)
The first variant of this game – denoted HRA – is the original gift exchange market
studied by FKR. Here, the payoffs for matched firms and workers are given by
pi1 (w, (1, e)) = (126− w)
(
1
10
e
)
(4.1)
and
u1 (w, (1, e)) = w − 26− c (e) , (4.2)
where the cost of effort is given by
c (e) =

−1 + e if e ∈ {1, 2, 3}
−4 + 2e if e ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7}
−12 + 3e if e ∈ {8, 9, 10}
.
In the experiment, pi1 and u1 are denoted in francs which are then converted to dollars
at a rate of 12 francs per dollar.
At the equilibrium strategy profile (w∗, emin), each firm’s marginal rate of sub-
stitution is (∂pi1/∂e) / (∂pi1/∂w) = −1 and each worker’s MRS is −1/96. The ratio
of these values is quite high, indicating that each party in a transaction can have a
dramatic effect on the payoffs of the counterparty at little cost to themselves. As
strategies move farther from equilibrium, the cost of affecting the other agent’s profit
increases. This is clear from the graph of the level curves of pi1 and u1 in the space
E ×W , given in Panel (a) of Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Isoprofit lines for workers and firms in (a) HRA – the gift exchange market
used by Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Riedl, and (b) LRP, the new design with quasilinear
payoffs.
In HRA, wage offers are displayed for all agents to see, but the identity of the
firm offering each wage is known only to the firms. Similarly, the acceptance of wage
offers is public information, but the identity of the accepting worker is known only
among the workers. Finally, the effort level decision of each matched worker is made
after the market is closed and revealed only to the hiring firm. No other firms or
workers observe this decision. Thus, it is impossible for firms to develop informative
reputations about individual workers in this environment. In sessions using HRA,
subjects are paid one U.S. Dollar for every 12 ‘francs’ earned in the experiment.
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4.1.4 Treatment 2: High MRS Ratio, Public IDs (HRP)
The second variant – HRP – alters the information structure and payoff conversion
rates of HRA. First, all agents observe the player ID number associated with each
wage offer and with each worker accepting any given wage offer. Second, effort level
decisions are made immediately after a worker accepts a wage offer and this decision
is posted (along with the worker’s ID number) for all agents to observe. This not only
provides information for the formation of individual reputations across periods, but
also allows all agents to observe the realization of strategies chosen by each worker,
given the accepted wage offer before the market closes. Finally, the conversion rate
between experimental currency and actual payoffs is increased to four francs per
dollar for the workers and nine francs per dollar for the firms so that consequences of
strategy choices have increased saliency.
The payoff functions of HRP are identical to HRA, so that pi2 ≡ pi1 and u2 ≡ u1.
Thus, the high ratio of the marginal rates of substitution is maintained.
4.1.5 Treatment 3: Low MRS Ratio, Public IDs (LRP)
The third variant, LRP, alters HRP to make the payoffs of both agents quasilinear in
wages. The cost of effort function is tripled to reduce the disparity between the effect
of a change in effort on workers and firms. Finally, a linear rescaling of the ‘value
of effort’ to the firms is used to adjust payoffs for the experimental environment.
These changes serve to reduce the equilibrium MRS ratio so that workers cannot
dramatically affect the payoff of the firms without significant penalty to themselves,
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and vice-versa. The payoff functions for LRP are given by
pi3 (w, (1, e)) = 126
(
11
40
+
2.9
40
e
)
− w (4.3)
and
u3 (w, (1, e)) = w − 26− 3c (e) . (4.4)
The conversion rate of 12 francs per dollar is used for all subjects.
The ratio of marginal rates of substitution at the equilibrium is three in this de-
sign, as opposed to 96 in the previous treatments. Keeping the ratio greater than one
guarantees that there still exists wage-effort pairs that Pareto dominate the equilib-
rium so that players still have an incentive to attempt cooperation. The level curves
of the payoff functions are given in Panel (b) of Figure 4.1.
4.2 Experimental Design
The three designs were tested experimentally at the California Institute of Technology
Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science (EEPS) using Caltech
undergraduate students recruited via e-mail. Subjects were randomly divided into
two groups of six firms and nine workers, with each group separated into a different
room. The instructions did not make reference to firms, workers, wages, or effort
levels.4 To avoid a labor market framing, subjects were labelled as buyers and sellers,
4For the HRA session, the instructions provided by Fehr et al. [34] were used. For HRP and
LRP, the instructions were appropriately modified. Copies of the instructions are available upon
request.
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and their task was to post prices for a good in a market and choose a ‘conversion
rate’ (rather than an effort level) that affected payoffs. The term ‘conversion rate’ is
used in HRA and HRP to emphasize that sellers, by their choice of e, are choosing
the percentage of (126− w) that their buyer will be paid. In LRP, the effort level
choice can no longer be thought of as a conversion rate on firms’ profits, so the generic
name, ‘X’ was instead used in the instructions to identify this choice variable.
Telephone conversations between two experimenters was used as the means of
transmitting information between rooms during the market stage of each period. All
decisions were posted on the blackboard in both rooms.5 When effort levels were
not publicly viewable, the worker wrote his effort decision on an index card that
was delivered to the appropriate subject in the other room. The first session (S1)
consisted of HRA repeated over twelve periods. The second (S2) ran HRP for twelve
periods, while the third and fourth sessions (S3 and S4) ran LRP for twelve periods.
The fifth session (S5) was divided into two parts.6 First, LRP was played for six
periods. Immediately following, the same subjects read instructions and participated
in HRA for six periods.7 The treatment-switching design in S5 tests whether or not
social norms or reputations developed in LRP affect behavior in HRA which can then
be compared to behavior in S1. If behavior is substantially different between HRA
and LRP within S5, then differences in the structure of the two markets apparently
5In later sessions, the market information was projected on a screen and transmitted by computer.
This had no effect on the actual procedures of the experiment.
6Sessions were run on the following dates: S1 on 12/03/2002, S2 on 12/05/2002, S3 on
08/05/2004, S4 on 08/04/2004, and S5 on 01/14/2003.
7Although subjects were informed that they would participate in two different experiments, they
were not given specific information or instructions about the second treatment until the conclusion
of the first.
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cause differences in behavior. Each session lasted between 90 minutes and two hours.
In sessions S1 and S5, subjects earned an average of $35, while earnings in S2 were as
high as $130 due to the reduced exchange rate. In S3 and S4, average earnings were
around $25 because of the reduced cooperation in that treatment.
4.3 Experimental Results
See Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 for a complete representation of the data from the five
experimental sessions.8 These results show that effort does appear to be an increasing
function of wages. In HRA and HRP, wage-effort pairs are well above equilibrium,
but play converges to the stage game equilibrium in the final period. In LRP, players
are unable to coordinate on high wage-effort pairs and the stage game equilibrium is
observed across all periods. In HRA played after LRP, subjects are able to coordinate
on high wage-effort pairs, indicating coordination is easier in the latter environment.
These results are inconsistent with a pure fairness hypothesis, but due to the informa-
tion structure of HRA, must also be inconsistent with individual reputation building.
Thus, the results are indicative of a group reputation effect.
In previous experiments, a strong positive correlation between wages and efforts
has been observed. This key wage-effort relationship is traditionally taken as evidence
8In session S4, two subjects acting as workers had not been matched with many wage offers in
the first several periods and consequently, had accumulated very little earnings by the 7th and 8th
periods. These subjects, informed that they would not have to pay their losses to the experimenter,
began to accept the smallest possible wages and offer the highest possible effort in an attempt to
create maximal wealth for the (anonymous) firms. After 4 such actions, one worker was removed
from the experiment and the other immediately (and voluntarily) stopped participating. These four
data points are removed from analysis, but likely affected beliefs in the market for the remainder of
the session.
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Figure 4.2: Wage and effort levels across time in sessions S1 (a replication of the Fehr,
Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) experiment,) and S2 (the same design with individual
reputations added.) Solid lines represent period averages and x’s represent unaccepted
bids.
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Figure 4.3: Wage and effort levels across time in sessions S3 and S4 (with quasilinear
payoffs.) Solid lines represent period averages and x’s represent unaccepted bids. Four
data points in S4 (represented by squares) are removed from analysis. See footnote
8.
117
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Period
W
ag
e
Wage Offers − Session 5
LRP HRA
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Period
Ef
fo
rt
Effort Choices − Session 5
LRP HRA
Figure 4.4: Wage and effort levels across time in session S5, switching from LRP to
HRA after period 6. Solid lines represent period averages and x’s represent unaccepted
bids.
of reciprocal-minded subjects, but is also consistent with repeated game explanations
in which selfish subjects either mimic reciprocal agents in early periods (a repu-
tation effect) or use punishment strategies to enforce cooperation (a folk theorem
effect.) Regardless of the cause, this correlation is also observed in the current set of
experiments.
Session (Treatment) RankCorr(w, e) p-Value
S1 (HRA) 0.546 7.07× 10−7
S2 (HRP) 0.641 1.64× 10−9
S3 (LRP) 0.604 2.64× 10−7
S4 (LRP) 0.446 0.0001
S3 (LRP) 0.499 0.0023
S3 (HRA) 0.511 0.0015
Table 4.1: Spearman rank correlation coefficients between effort and wages for each
treatment
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Result 4.1 In all treatments in all sessions, wages and efforts of matched firms
and workers are positively correlated as predicted by both fairness and repeated game
explanations.
Support. Spearman rank correlation coefficients between wages and effort are calcu-
lated for each treatment. For each, the coefficient is estimated to be at or greater
than 0.446 and significantly positive at the 0.5 percent level. The estimates of the
individual coefficients are given in Table 51.
Although the wage-effort correlation is inconclusive about the strategies employed,
the following set of results provide evidence in support of a group-reputation repeated
game explanation.
Result 4.2 In the replications of the FKR gift exchange market (HRA), strategies
converge toward the stage-game equilibrium in the final period, providing evidence of
repeated game strategies.
Support. See Figures 4.2 and 4.4. In session S1, the average wage for periods 4
through 11 is 65.83. In period 11, the final wage offer of 70 was given a minimal
effort level. In the final period (period 12), all wages except one and all efforts are at
or below the equilibrium values, and the average wage was less than the equilibrium
prediction.9 In the latter half of session S5, average wages decline in the final periods
and two wage offers appear at equilibrium levels in the last period, although the
average wage offer only declines to 57.5. Similarly, average effort choices decline in
9One worker accidentally accepted a sub-equilibrium wage offer in his haste to participate in the
market.
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the final periods and two last-period effort choices are at the equilibrium prediction,
although the average declines to only 2.33.
For any model of fairness to accommodate these results, agents’ relative preference
for fairness must be time-dependent. Furthermore, subject pool effects are significant
in the last period since the HRA represents an exact replication of the Fehr et al. [34]
experiment using different subjects. The percentage of purely fair-minded agents is
apparently lower in the population used for the current study, although high wage-
effort choices are observed in early periods across subject pools.
Result 4.3 In the first 11 periods of the 12-period replication of the FKR experiment
(HRA), the average wage increases in time, while average effort does not significantly
change.
Support. Each transaction is numbered chronologically from 1 to 72, with six trans-
actions per period. The rank correlations between transaction numbers and wages
and between transaction numbers and effort are estimated for the first 66 transac-
tions (11 periods) using Spearman rank correlation coefficients. Rank correlation
between wages and transaction number is estimated at 0.6905 with a 2-sided p-value
of 1.4× 10−10, while correlation between effort and transaction number is estimated
at 0.1711 with a p-value of 0.1696. Rank correlations are also estimated using pe-
riod number as a proxy for time instead of transaction number, yielding very similar
results.
That wages increase in time is not predicted by either theory under consideration,
but it is not necessarily inconsistent with a reputation-building equilibrium. On the
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other hand, fairness explanations are time-independent, suggesting that pure fairness
concerns are inadequate to explain behavior.
The following results indicate that the ability of players to achieve outcomes that
Pareto dominate the stage game equilibrium is not robust to the payoff specifications.
Result 4.4 In LRP, the minimum effort level is played more often than all other
strategies combined, and the effort level regresses to the stage game equilibrium strat-
egy in the final two periods, suggesting that behavior is highly sensitive to the market’s
payoff structure.
Support. Of the 169 effort decisions in LRP treatments, 60.4 percent are at e = 1.
Over 91 percent of all observations are at effort levels 1, 2, or 3. Only 5 effort choices
are observed at e ≥ 5. In the penultimate period, the minimal effort is observed in
12 of the 17 transactions, with an average effort of 1.411. In the final period, every
one of the 15 sellers selects e = 1.
Result 4.5 In LRP, the firm’s stage game equilibrium strategy (w = 30) is the modal
observation and the frequency of this strategy increases with time.
Support. The subgame perfect strategy of w = 30 occurs in 32 percent of the 169
accepted wage offers in treatment LRP – more often than any other strategy is used.
Wage offers of w ≤ 40 constitute 68 percent of all observations and 86.4 percent of
accepted wage offers are no greater than 50.
If fairness considerations are independent of payoff specifications, then fair-minded
workers will always be willing to reciprocate in all gift exchange environments. This is
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not observed in the LRP experiment. The following result indicates that the difference
in environment is responsible for the differences in behavior.
Result 4.6 In the treatment-switching session (S5), average wages and effort levels
increase after switching from LRP to HRA, indicating that changing the payoff struc-
ture back to that of FKR induces the same group of subjects to choose high wages and
effort.
Support. To avoid problems with non-stationarities in the time series, each wage
and effort from LRP is compared to the wage and effort from HRA with the same
time identifier (or “transaction number”). These differences are analyzed using a
Wilcoxon signed rank sum test. For wages, the HRA values are significantly greater
than those from LRP, with an estimated z-statistic of 4.693. Similarly, HRA effort
choices are significantly greater with a z-statistic of 3.652. Thus, significance in both
cases is better than 0.015 percent.
This result is obvious from Figure 4.4. It is clear that the change in behavior
immediately follows the change of the market in the seventh period. The fact that the
same group of subjects generates two very different sets of data in two similar markets
played consecutively implies that the difference in behavior is due to differences in
the two markets. Therefore, the structure of HRA appears much more conducive to
high wage-effort pairs than that of LRP.
Result 4.7 In a replication of FKR’s experiment with full information about past
strategy choices (HRP), wages and effort are significantly greater than in the original
design (HRA).
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Support. Again, wages and effort were paired between sessions according to their
time identifier and a Wilcoxon signed rank sum test was performed in the differences.
Wages are significantly higher in HRP, with a z-statistic of 5.925. Effort is also
significantly higher in HRP, with a z-statistic of 5.401.10
Recall that the only differences between HRP and HRA are that the worker ID
numbers and effort levels are publicly displayed with each transaction and the payoffs
are increased to 4 francs/dollar for the workers and 9 francs/dollar for the firms. Thus,
individual reputations and/or increased payoffs lead to more cooperation. Comparing
HRP to LRP, however, reveals that cooperative behavior is sensitive to the payoff
specifications, and not to the information structure of the game. This is consistent
with a reputation equilibrium hypothesis in which firms are more likely to engage in
trusting behavior if the relative payoff is greater.
4.4 A Reputation Model With Stereotypes
The results of Section 4.3 indicate that the stage game equilibrium prediction obtains
in the LRP environment, but not in HRA or HRP until the final period. However, the
remarkable reversion to the stage game prediction in the final period of both HRA
and HRP indicates that a simple model of fairness is inadequate to explain the high
effort and wages observed in early periods. The final period crash is reminiscent of
a repeated game sequential equilibrium with reputations, as in Kreps et al. [59] and
Kreps & Wilson [60].
10That this difference is more significant than that documented in the previous result is also a
consequence of the larger sample size.
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As Proposition 4.1 will demonstrate, a standard sequential equilibrium cannot
explain the observed behavior since worker decisions are not linked to ID numbers.
However, the psychology literature on categorical thinking and stereotyping indicates
that it may be appropriate to assume that firms erroneously believe worker types
are correlated. Proposition 4.2 shows that under such an assumption, the observed
behavior in all three sessions is consistent with a sequential equilibrium explanation.
Furthermore, the results of many past studies are also explainable in this framework.
4.4.1 The Basic Framework
To apply more complex game theoretic arguments to the gift exchange market, a
simplified version of the GEM is developed. This ‘mini-GEM’ consists of a stage
game repeated over T periods. In each period t, let W = {w,w} with w > w, and
let E (w) = {e, e}, and E (w) = {e} with e > e, so that allowable effort choices
are a function of the wage.11 A fraction J/I of the workers are chosen with equal
probability each period and matched with a wage offer. Let j (i, t) denote the firm
matched to worker i (if any) in period t, and i (j, t) denote the worker matched to
firm j. Define wj,t and ei,t to be the wage and effort in period t of firm j and worker
i, respectively. Unmatched workers have no strategy choice and receive zero payoff.
Workers’ types (θi) are selected from the set Θ =
{
θ,θ
}
, where θ represents a
‘selfish’ worker and θ represents a ‘reciprocal’ or ‘fair’ worker. Worker payoffs for
11The restriction of E (w) = {e} is for simplicity of exposition. As will be apparent, allowing
E (w) = {e, e} does not alter the equilibrium analysis since selecting a high effort in response to a low
wage can be assumed to perfectly signal that the agent is not reciprocal, thus causing reduced current
period payoffs and reduced continuation payoffs. Furthermore, Clark & Sefton [23] experimentally
demonstrate that in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma, e is played in response to w in less than 5% of
decisions.
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type θ in each stage t are given by the function u
(
wj(i,t),t, ei,t|θ
)
whose values exactly
match the monetary payoff specifications of the game given χ = 1. Instead, type θ
workers receive payoffs given by
u
(
wj(i,t),t, ei,t|θ
)
=

−1 if (wj(i,t),t, ei,t) = (w, e)
0 otherwise
Thus, selfish workers receive utility for only their monetary payoffs and reciprocal
workers (type θ) are penalized whenever they fail to reciprocate. Time discounting is
ignored since experimental subjects are paid for all decisions at the end of the session.
Figure 4.5 shows the extensive form of one period of the mini-GEM for one
matched pair of players with W = {30, 100} and E = {1, 10}, using either the HRA
or LRP payoffs. It is clear that (w, e) is the unique Nash equilibrium profile of either
stage game when the worker is selfish (θi = θ). However, if the firm believes that e will
obtain with sufficiently high probability, then w is the best response. This depends
on the firm’s subjective probability that the worker is a reciprocating agent and the
relative payoffs for cooperation (w,e), defection (w,e), and equilibrium (w,e).12
In each period of the repeated game, a subset of J workers is randomly selected
to be paired with the J firms, while I − J workers remain ‘unemployed’ for the
period and receive zero payoff. A sequential equilibrium of this game is defined as a
pairing of a strategy profile and a system of beliefs such that each agent is playing
optimally at every information set, given the strategies of others and the system of
12The terms cooperation, defection, and equilibrium are taken from the prisoners’ dilemma liter-
ature since this game is effectively a sequential prisoners’ dilemma.
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Figure 4.5: (a) The HRA mini-game, and (b) the LRP mini-game, assuming W =
{30, 100} and E = {1, 10}.
beliefs and the beliefs at each information set are derived from previous beliefs and
action probabilities in accordance with Bayes’ Law.
For notational simplicity, let A = pi (w, e) − pi (w, e), B = pi (w, e) − pi (w, e),
C = u (w, e) − u (w, e), and D = u (w, e) − u (w, e). Here, A/B serves as a measure
of how tempted the firms may be to gamble on the worker types by offering a high
wage; if A/B is near zero, then offering a high wage is more appealing. Similarly,
C/D is a measure of the workers’ temptation to defect.
Under the assumption that worker types are independent and ei,t is only observed
by j (i, t), only the beliefs of firm j (i, t) are changed by i’s choice in period t. Let pj,t
denote firm j’s probability in period t that the randomly assigned worker will have
type θ. If pj,t+1 is not substantially lower than pj,t when ei(j,t),t = e, then firm j’s
strategy in t+1 will be the same, regardless of ei(j,t),t. If this is the case and i (j, t) is
selfish, then e will be chosen. Furthermore, tight restrictions on C and D are needed
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to guarantee that selfish workers would indeed prefer to maintain a false reputation,
giving the following result:.0
Proposition 4.1 If worker decisions are anonymous and private, worker types are
independent, and C/D > 1/I, then there does not exist a reputation equilibrium of
the T -period repeated mini-GEM in which all workers choose e with probability 1 in
all periods t < T and all firms choose w in every period.
The proof of this proposition follows from the arguments used in the proof of
Proposition 4.2 which appears in the chapter appendix (Section 4.6.) Note that
the equilibrium described in this proposition describes observed behavior in HRA.
However, letting w = 100, w = 30, e = 10, and e = 1, the weak condition on C and
D is satisfied for both HRA and LRP, so no pure strategy reputation equilibrium can
exist in these two mini-games. Thus, for the experimental data to be explained by this
model, either there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium that predicts frequent high
effort levels, or firms believe that worker types are instead, highly correlated. Mixed
strategy reputation equilibria are unlikely to exist, and if they do, are unlikely to
generate high effort levels through many periods.13 Therefore, a model of perceived
13To see this, let qi′,s be the probability that agent i′ chooses e in response to w in each period s,
and let qi′,s = 1 if i′ did not participate in period s. Note that if i′ selects e in response to w in some
period s < T − 1, then the beliefs of the firms in period T − 1 about agent i′, (denoted pi′,T−1), will
be zero. Given some worker i ∈ I, define the average belief assigned to the other workers going into
the final period to be
p¯−i,T =
1
I − 1
∑
i′∈I\{i}:
pi′,T−1>0
p1
p1 + (1− p1)
∏T−1
s=1 qi′,s
.
In period T , worker i will choose e in response to w only if
A
B
− 1
I
<
I − 1
I
p¯−i,T <
A
B
.
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type correlation is examined.
4.4.2 The Model With Stereotypes
Although there exists experimental support for reputation equilibria in repeated
games (for example, see Camerer & Weigelt [12], Neral & Ochs [76], and Andreoni
& Miller [3]), the added assumption that firms view workers’ types as highly corre-
lated is apparently irrational. For example, Fehr et al. [35] and Fehr & Falk [32]
find support for heterogenous player types in gift exchange markets, so rational, well-
informed subjects should not expect homogeneity or strong correlation. On the other
hand, McEvily et al. [69] show that subjects make inferences about the trustwor-
thiness of opponents based on whether or not different opponents were trustworthy
in early periods. Furthermore, when the group of opponents is chosen according to
some unrelated criterion, the effect becomes even more pronounced. Thus, decision
makers use past behavior to make inferences about the future behavior of others,
especially when there is any reason to think those individuals are part of a group;
subjects perceive correlation between their anonymous competitors.
The existing social psychology literature also supports the claim that people in
social situations infer more correlation than is warranted – a phenomenon known as
‘illusory correlation.’ By design, the gift exchange market separates firms and workers
into groups before the experiment begins, creating an initial identification of group
However, p¯−i,T is a random variable determined not only by the results of earlier mixed strategy play
by all other agents, but also by which agents are randomly selected to participate in each period.
Therefore, it is unlikely to expect that any agent will maintain a false reputation in later periods.
Knowing this, agents will have less incentive to develop reputations in early periods, unraveling the
equilibrium.
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membership among the subjects. A subject acting as a firm may see the group of
firms as her ‘ingroup’ and the group of workers as the ‘outgroup.’ This partitioning
leads naturally to categorical thinking (i.e., stereotyping) on the part of subjects,
even if it is common knowledge that the outgroup is heterogeneous. As Pendry &
Macrae [80, p. 926] note, “while true that outgroups are commonly perceived to
be less heterogeneous in composition than ingroups, outgroup members nonetheless
still display appreciable degrees of variability. Acknowledging the variability of social
groups, however, is no antidote to stereotypical thinking.” Thus, firms who are aware
of seller heterogeneity may not act rationally on this information.
Although experimental psychology has established that perceivers are less likely to
apply existing stereotypes when the actions of the perceived affect the outcomes of the
perceiver (see, for example, Neuberg & Fiske [77] or Erber & Fiske [30]), this result
disappears when cognitive resources are depleted by multiple task requirements. For
example, Pendry & Macrae [79] find that subjects who are first primed with a stereo-
type of an unknown group and then learn a long list of attributes describing various
group members later recall stereotype-inconsistent attributes from the list at least as
frequently as stereotype-consistent attributes. However, when subjects are also re-
quired to remember an 8-digit number while learning the list of attributes, they recall
stereotype-consistent information significantly more frequently than inconsistent in-
formation. Thus, as summarized by Macrae & Bodenhausen [66, p. 105], “judgement
becomes more stereotypic under cognitive load.”
Since firms in the gift exchange market are continually using cognitive resources
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watching the market, devising strategies, and computing payoffs, they are indeed
likely to think categorically about the group of workers even though firms’ payoffs
depend on the behavior of workers. Furthermore, Yzerbyt et al. [101] find that when
subjects are exposed to information about a group member inconsistent with a formed
stereotype, the stereotype shifts more dramatically when the subject is under a high
cognitive load. This indicates that stereotypes formed by (busy) firms are likely to
change noticeably when confronted with a sudden change in behavior by a single
worker.
Finally, a study by Ruscher et al. [88] shows that when groups are perceived to be
in competition rather than individuals (e.g., when firms see themselves as collectively
in competition with firms), then subjects tend to pay more attention to stereotype-
consistent information regarding individuals in the outgroup and stereotype-inconsistent
information for members of their ingroup. Additionally, Rothgerber [87] and Brewer
et al. [10] find that “competition has the potential to create stereotypes where none
or very few existed before,” as summarized by Corneille & Yzerbyt [26, p. 118]. This
emphasizes that there need not be existing stereotypes of the group of workers for
the firms to develop stereotypes when placed in this competitive market situation.
In total, the evidence from past experiments in economics and social psychology
provides reasonable support for the assumption that firms hold a collective repu-
tation of the workers rather than tracking individual histories, and this reputation
is particularly sensitive to reputation-inconsistent behaviors by individual workers.
Thus, a model in which firms believe workers’ types are highly correlated, though
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perhaps not rational, has an established psychological foundation. Taken to an ex-
treme, the assumption of perfectly correlated types (so that any observation of e
given w causes firms to believe that all agents are selfish) is in fact, sufficient to gen-
erate predictions highly consistent with the observed data in all three sessions. The
following proposition formalizes this claim:.1
Proposition 4.2 If the common knowledge prior p1 = Pr[θi = θ] is at least as
large as A/B, then there exists a pure strategy reputation equilibrium of the T -period
repeated mini-GEM with perfectly correlated types if and only if C/D ≤ J/I. In this
equilibrium, all firms offer w in every period, all selfish workers play e in every period
t < T and e in T , and all reciprocal workers play e in every period.
As an example, let w = 100, w = 30, e = 10, and e = 1. In the HRA mini-game,
C/D ≈ 0.257 and J/I = 2/3. Thus, a pure strategy reputation equilibrium exists in
this game. Since A/B ≈ 0.299, if firms have at least a 3/10 prior probability that
the workers are of type θ, then cooperation should be observed by the firm in every
period and by the worker in every period except the last. In the LRP mini-game,
C/D ≈ 0.771, which is greater than 2/3, so no pure strategy reputation equilibrium
will exist in this mini-game. Also note that A/B ≈ 0.855, so the restriction on beliefs
would be much tighter even if J/I were greater than C/D.
In order to apply these theoretical results to the experimental data, the mini-GEM
must be embedded back into the full GEM specification. While the appropriate values
of w and e are clearly the stage game equilibrium values w∗ and emin, the selection
of w and e is less transparent. If the existence of the reputation equilibrium is
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robust to this choice for a particular specification, then the result makes more general
predictions about behavior under that specification. By Proposition 4.2, the pure
strategy reputation equilibrium exists for some prior p1 if and only if A/B < 1 and
C/D ≤ J/I.
Figure 4.6 displays the value of 1−A/B for each of the possible high wage-effort
pairs (w, e) for which A/B < 1 and C/D ≤ 2/3 in HRA and similarly for LRP. The
value 1 − A/B represents the measure of the interval [A/B, 1] on which prior be-
liefs support the reputation equilibrium using (w, e) as the ‘high’ strategies.14 Larger
values of 1−A/B suggest that a wider range of beliefs will generate a reputation equi-
librium. Reputation equilibria cannot exist for pairs (w, e) at which the graph reports
a value of zero. These graphs demonstrate that the HRA specification has many more
wage-effort pairs capable of supporting a pure strategy reputation equilibrium than
the LRP specification, and the condition on prior beliefs is much less restrictive in
HRA. Therefore, existence of reputation equilibria in the HRA are significantly more
robust to perturbations of initial beliefs and the choice of w and e.
In generalizing the analysis of the mini-GEM to the full GEM specification, the
concept of a reciprocal worker is less concrete, given the larger strategy space. In
the previous literature, a positive correlation between effort and wages is taken as
an indication of reciprocity. This can be operationalized by assuming that reciprocal
workers play a known pure strategy that is monotone increasing in w. For example,
when E = {1, 2, . . . , 10} andW = {5, 10, 15, . . .}, assume that reciprocal workers play
14Note that the set of (w, e) that Pareto dominate (w, e) is given by
{(w, e) ∈W × E : A/B < 1 & C/D < 1}. Thus, the sets where 1 − A/B > 0 (depicted in
Figure 4.6) are strict subsets of this Pareto set.
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Figure 4.6: Size of the range of beliefs that support a pure-strategy reputation equi-
librium in (a) the HRA and HRP treatments, and (b) the LRP treatment for various
values of w and e. A zero-sized belief range implies that no pure strategy reputation
equilibrium exists.
a strategy weakly increasing in w given by
(χ˜ (w) , e˜ (w)) =

(0, 1) if w < 30(
1, w−20
10
)
if w ∈ {30, 40, . . .}(
1, w−15
10
)
if w ∈ {35, 45, . . .}
If a worker is known to be reciprocal, firms’ profits are maximized at wˆ = 75 in HRA
and at wˆ = 35 in LRP. If the firm is uncertain about the worker’s type, wˆ is weakly
increasing in his belief. For example, if the firm believes the worker is reciprocal with
probability 0.2, then wˆ is 55 in HRA and 30 in LRP. In a pure strategy reputation
equilibrium, the firms’ beliefs do not update until after the final period, so the value
of wˆ associated with the prior belief p1 can be sustained as a choice for w in the
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repeated game. Thus, w = wˆ is an appropriate choice for the mini-GEM analysis.15
For this particular example, the HRA again supports a reputation equilibrium while
the LRP does not.
4.4.3 Application to Previous Experiments
Since the original FKR experiment in 1993, a variety of tests of the gift exchange
market have been performed by various authors. Most frequently, ‘no-loss’ profit
functions of the form pi (w, e) = (v − w) e are used, where v is a fixed constant. This
results in a situation such as that depicted in panel (a) of Figure 4.6 in which many
(w, e) pairs are capable of supporting a reputation equilibrium with a wide range of
beliefs. The most common result in these experiments is high wages and effort in
every period, with little or no indication of reversion to stage game equilibrium (e.g.,
Fehr et al. [33], Charness [16], Fehr & Falk [32], Charness et al. [17], Ga¨chter and Falk
[39], and Hannan et al. [44],) indicating that most or all workers are indeed reciprocal-
minded. However, the data provided by Fehr et al. [35] show strong signs of a final-
period crash under the ‘no-loss’ payoffs. In particular, 16 out of 26 workers choose
emin in the final period after high wages and effort are observed in previous periods.
16
Interestingly, wages remain high in one session despite frequent observations of emin
throughout the game, indicating that a model of perfect correlation is in fact, not
15If e˜ (w) has a relatively steep positive slope and W is unbounded above, then wˆ may diverge to
infinity. In this case, it is necessary to bound W by some w.
16This fact is deduced from the data in the appendix of the paper.
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appropriate for this data, although a weaker degree of correlation may suffice.17
Several experiments have done away with the ‘no-loss’ condition by using linear
profits of the form pi (w, e) = ve−w. This does not necessarily imply that reputation
equilibria are eliminated. For example, panel (a) of Figure 4.7 shows the pairs and
beliefs that support reputation equilibria with the payoffs pi (w, e) = 10−w+5e and
u (w, e) = 10−e+5w whenW = E = [0, 10], as in Brandts & Charness [9]. From Figure
4.7 it is clear that the environment supports reputation equilibria with correlation
and in fact, the data show that high wages and effort move toward equilibrium on
average in the final period.18
Riedl & Tyran [83] and Rigdon [84] also use quasilinear payoffs, and the set of
wage-effort pairs sustainable as reputation equilibria with correlation is significantly
smaller and larger prior beliefs are required, as demonstrated by panels (b) and (c)
of Figure 4.7. In Riedl & Tyran, average wages are constant around 45 in all periods,
with average efforts around 6 and several sessions featuring crashes in effort in the
final period.19 At the pair (45, 6), firms’ initial probability estimate that workers
are reciprocal needs to be over 88 percent to support a reputation equilibrium. In
Rigdon’s experiment, effort decays to equilibrium early in the session, with wages
following. Here, workers and firms were either unable to coordinate on a reputation
equilibrium or beliefs were insufficient for such an equilibrium to exist.
17The fact that one worker was able to submit emin in every period without destroying the group
reputation indicates that it should not be an equilibrium for other selfish workers to submit higher
efforts in every period, unless exactly two simultaneous occurrences of emin are necessary to destroy
the group reputation.
18Individual data is not presented, so it is unclear whether the group collectively chose slightly
lower strategies or if the separation predicted by the group reputation model obtained.
19This fact is found in the data provided in the appendix of the paper.
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Figure 4.7: Size of the range of beliefs that support a pure-strategy reputation equi-
librium in (a) the ‘excess supply of labor’ treatment of Brandts & Charness (2003),
(b) Riedl & Tyran (2003), (c) Rigdon (2002), and (d) Lynch, Miller, Plott & Porter
(2001), where ‘effort’ is a binary choice.
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One previous experiment closely matches the conditions of the LRP environment.
Lynch et al. [63] use a quasilinear environment with only two effort (quality) choices.
Graphing the strategy pairs supporting a reputation equilibrium with correlation
(panel (d) of Figure 4.7) demonstrates that at the high effort level (e = 1), a rep-
utation equilibrium can only be sustained for a very small number of wages, and
only with very high prior beliefs. As predicted, wages and effort converge early to
the stage game equilibrium. Lynch et al. conclude from their data that “a seller’s
demand depends not only upon his/her own ‘reputation’ for delivering [high quality],
but also upon the market ‘reputation’ (p. 276).” Thus, the authors acknowledge that
group reputations play an important role in these settings.
4.5 Conclusion
Although fair-minded, reciprocal behavior has been suggested as a solution to prob-
lems of contractual incompleteness, the findings of this chapter and previous exper-
imental studies question the robustness and pervasiveness of reciprocal incentives.
Inefficient equilibria are observed in some, but not all, laboratory environments.
The experimental data from this study indicate that repeated game concerns
emerge in these settings despite the inability of agents to track individual reputations.
A model of reputations with stereotyping recaptures the observed behavior nicely.
Conditions are derived under which the problems of contractual incompleteness may
be mitigated. The assumption that agents use categorical thinking (stereotyping)
to assess the expected performance of others has a solid foundation in the social
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psychology literature. The game theoretic construct of player types provides a natural
way to introduce this concept in an economic domain.
This model introduces further testable hypotheses that warrant investigation.
Empirical work on consumer behavior may confirm the existence of stereotypes. For
example, do customers who have had bad experiences at one auto mechanic show
a reduced demand for all mechanics? Experimental studies could be used to more
directly isolate the stereotype-formation phenomenon. Scoring rules could be used
to elicit beliefs from subjects who purchase from a sequence of sellers under moral
hazard. Functional MRI studies may provide neurological evidence for stereotype
formation and its economic consequences. A variety of tests could be constructed to
further examine the validity and limits of the stereotyping assumption.
Although much is to be learned about the role of categorical thinking in economic
contexts, it is clear that the introduction of such a model into the environment of
incomplete contracting provides more explanatory power than either a simple model
of fairness or a model of individual reputation building. Thus, the ‘irrational’ process
of stereotype formation may indeed be a powerful force by which market failure is
averted.
4.6 Appendix
Assume p1 ≥ A/B and let pt be the firms’ shared belief that the workers are reciprocal.
Since types are correlated, if all workers play qt = Pr
[
ei,t = e|wj(i,t),t = w
]
in
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period t, then
pt+1 =
pt
pt + (1− pt) qt
when ei,t = e, which is always weakly greater than pt. If the realization of any worker’s
strategy is ei,t = e, then pt+1 = 0. Thus, firms’ beliefs weakly increase until a worker
reveals that he is perfectly rational, at which point all firms know that all workers
are selfish and play reverts to the fully selfish subgame perfect equilibrium.20 In each
period t, define Mt =
{
i ∈ I : wj(i,t),t = w
}
to be the set of workers receiving high
wages in period t and note that |Mt| = J in every period in the proposed equilibrium.
Period T
All selfish workers play ei,T = e and all reciprocal workers play ei,T = e given w.
If pT ≥ A/B, then each firm is willing to gamble on the workers by offering a high
wage since
pTpi (w, e) + (1− pT )pi (w, e) > pi (w, e) .
If pT = 0, firms offer low wages.
Period T − 1
Selfish workers prefer to choose a mixed strategy
qT−1 = Pr
[
ei,T−1 = e|wj(i,T−1),T−1 = w
]
20Note that in the HRA specification, only one firm sees that effort choice of any given worker.
However, if firm j observes e in period t, then he will offer w in period t+ 1, instantly signalling to
the other firms that pt+1 = 0. Thus, as long as firms such that pt+1 = 0 offer wages first in period
t+1, then the above result holds. If not, then other firms will update their beliefs to zero by period
t+ 2. The former assumption is used here.
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such that pT ≥ A/B whenever the realization of all J workers’ strategies in MT−1 is
ei,T−1 = e. The reader may verify that this occurs when
qT−1 ≤
(
pT−1
1− pT−1
1− (A/B)
A/B
)1/J
.
However, if pT−1 ≥ A/B, then the right-hand side of this expression is weakly greater
than 1, so the inequality is satisfied. Thus, regardless of the workers’ strategies, firms
will offer high wages in the final period whenever all workers in MT−1 provide high
effort. Each worker i ∈MT−1 has an expected payoff over the final two periods given
by
qi,T−1
u (w, e) + JI

∏
i′∈MT−1\{i} qi′,T−1u (w, e)
+
(
1−∏i′∈MT−1\{i} qi′,T−1)u (w, e)


+ (1− qi,T−1) [u (w, e) + (J/I)u (w, e)] .
Note that this payoff is increasing in qi,T−1 if and only if
u (w, e) +
J
I

∏
i′∈MT−1\{i} qi′,T−1u (w, e)
+
(
1−∏i′∈MT−1\{i} qi′,T−1)u (w, e)
− u (w, e)− JI u (w, e) ≥ 0,
which is true if and only if
 ∏
i′∈MT−1\{i}
qi′,T−1
 J
I
≥ C
D
.
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Note that if qi′,T−1 = 0 for any i′ ∈ MT−1 \ {i}, then qi,T−1 = 0 is a best response
regardless of C and D since i′ is fully revealing the workers’ type to the firms. If
C/D > J/I, then worker i’s payoff is necessarily decreasing in qi,T−1, so i will choose
low effort with certainty. Thus, when C/D > J/I, qi,T−1 = 0 for all i ∈ MT−1 must
be true in any equilibrium. If C/D ≤ J/I, then there exists an equilibrium in which
qi,T−1 = 1 for all i ∈MT−1.
Assume now that pT−1 ≥ A/B, C/D ≤ J/I, and firms know all types of workers
will offer high effort with probability 1. Suppose each firm j offers a high wage with
probability rj,T−1, giving firm j an expected profit over the last two periods of
rj,T−1pi (w, e) + (1− rj,T−1)pi (w, e) + pT−1pi (w, e) + (1− pT−1)pi (w, e) .
This is strictly increasing in rj,T−1 (regardless of the strategies of the other firms since
pT is guaranteed to equal pT−1), so every firm will choose to offer high wages with
probability 1.
Period T − k
Assume pT−k ≥ A/B for k > 1. As before, regardless of strategies chosen by
the workers, if the realization of all workers’ strategies in MT−k is high effort, then
pT−k+1 ≥ A/B, and high wages and effort will be realized in period T − k + 1 with
probability 1. Thus, the expected payoff over the last k + 1 periods to a worker
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i ∈MT−k when each i′ ∈MT−k plays qi′,T−k is
qi,T−k
u (w, e) + JI

∏
i′∈MT−k\{i} qi′,T−k [(k − 1)u (w, e) + u (w, e)]
+
(
1−∏i′∈MT−k\{i} qi′,T−k) [ku (w, e)]


+ (1− qi,T−k) [u (w, e) + (J/I) ku (w, e)] .
This is increasing in qi,T−k if and only if
u (w, e) +
J
I

∏
i′∈MT−k\{i} qi′,T−k [(k − 1)u (w, e) + u (w, e)]
+
(
1−∏i′∈MT−k\{i} qi′,T−k) [ku (w, e)]

− u (w, e)− (J/I) ku (w, e) > 0.
As in period T − 1, this expression is positive if and only if
 ∏
i′∈MT−k\{i}
qi′,T−k
 J
I
>
C
D
,
so when C/D > J/I, only qi,T−k = 0 for all i ∈MT−k can be an equilibrium strategy.
If C/D ≤ J/I, then there exist equilibria in which qi,T−k = 1 for all i ∈MT−k.
Assume now that pT−k ≥ A/B, C/D ≤ J/I, and firms know all types of workers
will offer high effort with probability 1. Suppose each firm j offers a high wage with
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probability rj,T−k, giving firm j and expected profit over the last k + 1 periods of
rj,T−kpi (w, e) + (1− rj,T−k)pi (w, e)
+ (k − 1) pi (w, e) + pT−kpi (w, e) + (e− pT−k)pi (w, e) .
This is strictly increasing in rj,T−k (regardless of the strategies of the other firms), so
every firm will choose to offer high wages with probability 1. Thus, when p1 ≥ A/B
and C/D ≤ J/I, there exists a sequential equilibrium in which high wages and high
effort obtain in every period before the last. If C/D > J/I, then there exists no such
equilibrium.
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Appendix A
Experiment Instructions
A.1 Instructions from Chapter 2
Experiment Overview
[All Treatments]
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision making.
If you listen carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount
of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
You have been paired with four other individuals in the room. In each period,
each of you will be given an amount of cash, denominated in francs. This will be
denoted by the letter E, for ”Endowment.” Your group will participate in a process
in which the level of some good Y will be chosen by the collective decisions of your
group members. Each of you has a value for Y that depends on how much Y is
chosen by your group. This will be called V (Y ). You may not have the same value
for a given level of Y as anyone else in your group. Furthermore, your decision in
the process may result in you being charged some number of francs T . This number
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T may be determined by your decision, the decisions of the others in your group, and
the level of Y chosen by your group.
At the end of each period, you will be paid for the number of francs you have
earned for the period, which is equal to your value for Y plus your initial endowment
of francs minus the amount T that you paid. Mathematically, you will be paid based
on
earnings in francs = V (Y ) + E − T
At the end of the experiment, your total earnings in francs will be converted to
dollars using a pre-specified exchange rate, which will be told to you by the experi-
menter.
The rules for the experiment are as follows. No talking or communicating with
other participants. If you are using a computer, do not use any software other than
that explicitly required by the experiment. Feel free to ask questions by raising your
hand or signalling to the experimenter.
The process will now be explained in detail.
The Process
[Voluntary Contribution Treatment]
The process through which your group will choose the level of Y is as follows.
Each of you will choose how many units of Y you would personally like to add to the
total. For example, let person 1 choose A1, person 2 choose A2, and so on. At the
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end of the period, the total level of Y will be given by
Y = A1 + A2 + A3 + A4 + A5
In each period, each person can add anywhere from 0 to 6 units of Y . You may
add “partial” units, such as 3.45 units, for example.
Each unit of Y costs 100 francs in this experiment, so you will be charged 100
frances for each unit you add to the total. For example, if you are person 1 and you
choose to add A1 = 5 units, then your payment will be 100 ∗ A1 = 500 francs. This
payment corresponds to “T” from the above instructions. Therefore, T = 500 for
person 1 in this example period.
T = 100 ∗ Addition
At the end of the period, the total level of Y will be given by Y = A1 + A2 +
A3 + A4 + A5 and you will earn V (Y ) + E − T .
This process is computerized. In each period, you will input your decision into
a computer program that will calculate Y and determine your payment and your
earnings based on the decisions of your group. The computer will also keep track
of your earnings and the results of all previous periods for your reference. The
computer interface includes a tool called the “What-If Scenario Analyzer.” This is a
special calculator adapted to help you figure out how much you would earn in certain
hypothetical scenarios. Feel free to use this tool to help you make decisions. If you
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have any questions about the computer interface at any time, please raise your hand.
Questions?
[Proportional Tax Treatment]
The process through which your group will choose the level of Y is as follows.
Each of you will choose how many units of Y you would personally like to add to the
total. For example, let person 1 choose A1, person 2 choose A2, and so on. At the
end of the period, the total level of Y will be given by
Y = A1 + A2 + A3 + A4 + A5
In each period, each person can add anywhere from 0 to 6 units of Y . You may
add “partial” units, such as 3.45 units, for example.
Each unit of Y costs 100 francs in this experiment, and the total cost of Y will be
split evenly among the 5 members of your group. For example, if the total level of Y
is 10 units, then the total cost is 1, 000 francs. Dividing this cost evenly means each
person must pay 1000/5 = 200 francs. This payment corresponds to “T” from the
above instructions. Therefore, T = 200 for each person in the group for this example
period.
T =
100 ∗ Y
5
At the end of the period, the total level of Y will be given by Y = A1 + A2 +
A3 + A4 + A5 and you will earn V (Y ) + E − T .
This process is computerized. In each period, you will input your decision into
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a computer program that will calculate Y and determine your payment and your
earnings based on the decisions of your group. The computer will also keep track
of your earnings and the results of all previous periods for your reference. The
computer interface includes a tool called the “What-If Scenario Analyzer.” This is a
special calculator adapted to help you figure out how much you would earn in certain
hypothetical scenarios. Feel free to use this tool to help you make decisions. If you
have any questions about the computer interface at any time, please raise your hand.
Questions?
[Groves-Ledyard Treatment]
The process through which your group will choose the level of Y is as follows.
Each of you will choose how many units of Y you would personally like to add to the
total. For example, let person 1 choose A1, person 2 choose A2, and so on. At the
end of the period, the total level of Y will be given by
Y = A1 + A2 + A3 + A4 + A5
In each period, each person can add anywhere from −4 to 6 units of Y . You may
add “partial” units, such as 3.45 units, for example. A negative addition implies
that you want to take units away from the total of Y .
The payment each person must make is dependent upon the average of the other
4 additions and the variance of those other 4 additions. Specifically, let S be the
average of the other 4 messages and V be the variance of the other 4 messages. For
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person 2, these would be calculated by the formulas
S2 =
A1 + A3 + A4 + A5
4
V2 =
(A1− S2)2 + (A3− S2)2 + (A4− S2)2 + (A5− S2)2
3
Roughly speaking, V measures how “spread out” the other 4 messages are.
The payment each person must make is as follows. First, we calculate the total
cost of Y per person. Each unit of Y costs 100 francs, so the total cost is 100 ∗ Y
francs. This is then divided equally among the 5 people, so the cost per person is
(100 ∗ Y ) /5. Second, we calculate the additional payment each person must make
based on their S and V . This extra payment is determined by how far away your
addition is from the average of everyone else’s and on the variance of everyone else’s
messages. Putting it all together, if a person adds A units to the level of Y , then
the payment each person must make is given by
T =
(
100 Y
5
)
+
(
40 (A− S)2 − 50 V )
Note that if V were large and (A− S) were small, then the second half of your
payment could be negative. This means that you may end up paying more or less
than 1/5 of the total cost, and this all depends on your decision and the decisions of
the others in your group.
At the end of the period, the total level of Y will be given by Y = A1 + A2 +
A3 + A4 + A5 and you will earn V (Y ) + E − T .
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This process is computerized. In each period, you will input your decision into
a computer program that will calculate Y and determine your payment and your
earnings based on the decisions of your group. The computer will also keep track
of your earnings and the results of all previous periods for your reference. The
computer interface includes a tool called the “What-If Scenario Analyzer.” This is a
special calculator adapted to help you figure out how much you would earn in certain
hypothetical scenarios. It allows you to enter values of S, V, and A just to see what
you would earn if that was the real outcome of the period. Feel free to use this tool
to help you make decisions. If you have any questions about the computer interface
at any time, please raise your hand.
Questions?
[Walker Mechanism Treatment]
The process through which your group will choose the level of Y is as follows.
Each of you will choose how many units of Y you would personally like to add to the
total. For example, let person 1 choose A1, person 2 choose A2, and so on. At the
end of the period, the total level of Y will be given by
Y = A1 + A2 + A3 + A4 + A5
In each period, each person can add anywhere from −10 to 15 units of Y . You
may add “partial” units, such as 3.45 units, for example. A negative addition implies
that you want to take units away from the total of Y .
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The payment T each person must make is dependent upon the total level of Y
chosen by the group as well as the individual proposals of two other people in the
group. This is calculated by the following procedure. First, we calculate the total
cost of Y per person. Each unit of Y costs 100 francs, so the total cost is 100 ∗ Y
francs. This is then divided equally among the 5 people, so the cost per person is
(100 ∗ Y ) /5. Second, each person pays an additional amount based on the difference
in proposals of two other players in the following way. Each of you has been given
a Player number of the form PLR#. Take for example PLR3. Since PLR4 has the
next-highest Player number, we refer to PLR4 as the player “above” PLR3 and we
refer to PLR2 as the player “below” PLR3. Similarly, PLR3 is above PLR2 and
PLR1 is below PLR2. Since there is no PLR0 or PLR6, we say that PLR5 is below
PLR1 and PLR1 is above PLR5. The additional amount that a given person must
pay is the proposal of the player below them minus the proposal of the player above
them, all multiplied by the total of the proposals Y .
Combined, the total payment T that PLR3 must make, for example, will be given
by
T =
100Y
5
+ (PLR2’s proposal− PLR4’s proposal) ∗ Y
The table at the end of these instructions gives the formula for T for all 5 players,
to avoid confusion.
Recall that at the end of the period, the total level of Y will be given by Y =
A1 + A2 + A3 + A4 + A5 and you will earn V (Y ) + E − T .
This process is computerized. In each period, you will input your decision into
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a computer program that will calculate Y and determine your payment and your
earnings based on the decisions of your group. The computer will also keep track
of your earnings and the results of all previous periods for your reference. The
computer interface includes a tool called the “What-If Scenario Analyzer.” This is a
special calculator adapted to help you figure out how much you would earn in certain
hypothetical scenarios. It allows you to enter values of S, V, and A just to see what
you would earn if that was the real outcome of the period. Feel free to use this tool
to help you make decisions. If you have any questions about the computer interface
at any time, please raise your hand.
Questions?
Player # Payment Calculation
1 100Y
5
+ (PLR5’s proposal− PLR2’s proposal) ∗ Y
2 100Y
5
+ (PLR1’s proposal− PLR3’s proposal) ∗ Y
3 100Y
5
+ (PLR2’s proposal− PLR4’s proposal) ∗ Y
4 100Y
5
+ (PLR3’s proposal− PLR5’s proposal) ∗ Y
5 100Y
5
+ (PLR4’s proposal− PLR1’s proposal) ∗ Y
[cVCG Treatment]
All five people in your group value the level of Y by the formula V (Y ) = −CY 2+
DY . However, people in your group may have different values of C and D. Check
your private information slip for your values of C and D. In each period, all players
in the group tell the central computer two non-negative numbers: A and B. The
central computer will assume that each player’s value for Y is given by −AY 2 +BY
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and will then choose the level of Y that maximizes the combined value of all five
players. Notice that if everyone submits A = C and B = D to the central computer,
then the central computer will maximize the true combined value of all five players.
On the other hand, if some players submit A 6= C or B 6= D, then the computer will
choose a different level of Y . Since A and B cannot be negative, if you enter negative
values into the central computer, it will treat them as zeros.
In addition to choosing the level of Y , the computer will also choose how much
each person must pay for the chosen level of Y . In total, every unit of Y costs 100
francs. Thus, the group must pay a total of at least 100 ∗ Y francs. Each person
will pay an equal share of the total cost plus an additional amount depending on the
values of A and B chosen by all the members of the group. The additional amount
each person must pay is given by the following process used by the computer:
1. Assume that everyone’s V (Y ) is given by −AY 2+BY (the computer does not
know the true C or D for any player.)
2. Calculate the Y that maximizes the sum of the reported values, net of costs.
This is given by Y ∗ = (B1+B2+B3+B4+B5)−100
2∗(A1+A2+A3+A4+A5) .
3. For each person, calculate the sum of everyone else’s value in the group for the
amount Y ∗, minus 4
5
∗ 100 ∗ Y ∗, which represents how much of the cost of Y ∗
the other four must pay. Call this amount U−i (Y ∗).
4. For each person, calculate the level of Y that maximizes the sum of everyone
else’s value, net of costs. We’ll call this value Z∗. For example, for player 2,
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this is given by Z∗ = (B1+B3+B4+B5)−100
2∗(A1+A3+A4+A5) .
5. For each person, calculate the sum of everyone else’s value in the group for the
amount Z∗, minus 4
5
∗ 100 ∗ Z∗, which represents how much of the cost of Z∗
the other four must pay. Call this amount U−i (Z∗).
6. Each person must pay U−i (Z∗)− U−i (Y ∗).
In words, each person must pay the difference between everyone else’s value if
that person weren’t playing the game (U−i (Z∗)) and everyone else’s value if that
person was playing the game (U−i (Y ∗)). This payment can be summarized by the
phrase, ”you must pay the change in everyone else’s value that occurred because of
your presence.” Remember that the computer makes the above calculation based on
the values of A and B that are reported and not on the actual values C and D.
In total, the amount each person must pay is T = 100∗Y
5
+ [U−i (Z∗)− U−i (Y ∗)].
This process is guaranteed to collect at least enough money to cover the cost of Y .
However, it is often the case that it collects more money than is needed to cover the
cost of Y . If an excess is collected, the extra money is not refunded or used in any
way.
At the end of the period, you receive your value for the level of Y chosen (which
is −CY 2 +DY ) plus E minus T .
This process is computerized. In each period, you will input your decision into
a computer program that will calculate Y and determine your payment and your
earnings based on the decisions of your group. The computer will also keep track
of your earnings and the results of all previous periods for your reference. The
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computer interface includes a tool called the ”What-If Scenario Analyzer”. This is a
special calculator adapted to help you figure out how much you would earn in certain
hypothetical scenarios. Feel free to use this tool to help you make decisions. If you
have any questions about the computer interface at any time, please raise your hand.
Questions?
A.2 Instructions from Chapter 4
General Instructions
[All Treatments]
The experiment you will participate in is part of a research project used to analyze
the decision behavior in markets. The instructions are simple, and if you read them
carefully and make appropriate decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of
money. At the end of the whole experiment, all the profits you have made by
your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash. The experiment you will
participate in consists of two stages. In the first stage six of you act as buyers,
and nine of you as sellers. In the second stage, the sellers will determine the value
of the goods for the buyers (for details of the second stage see below). We have
distributed two kinds of instructions – information for the buyers, and information
for the sellers, respectively. This information is for private use only – you are not
allowed to reveal this information to anyone. Furthermore, you will find at the end
of these instructions a second sheet (your record sheet) that is used to document your
decisions. Insert your buyer or seller number there, as well as your name and the
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date.
Specific Instructions for Buyers
[HRA Treatment]
At the market, a good is traded, and each seller sells the same good. A seller can
sell this good to any buyer, and a buyer can buy it from any seller. The market is
organized in the following way: we open the market for a trading period (a “trading
day”), and each trading day lasts three minutes. As a buyer you can offer a price
that must be divisible by 5, for example, prices like 15, 60, 80, 275 are allowed, but
prices like 48, 67, 124, 83 are not. These offers will be announced to the sellers by
us over the telephone. The sellers will not know your identity, that is, your buyer
number; they will only know the price offered. If a seller accepts your offer, all buyers
are informed about this acceptance. In this case, an agreement is concluded, and the
good is bought by you at the offered price. During each trading day you can buy one
unit of the good. Therefore, a trading day ends for you when your offer is accepted.
Note also that each seller can sell one unit of the good per day at most. If your
offer is not accepted, you are free to change your offer, that is, to make a new offer.
But the new price you offer must be higher than all the prices that have not been
accepted. Each seller may accept an offer or not, but he cannot make a counteroffer.
After three minutes the day ends, and you cannot buy any more of the good. Then
the second stage of thee experiment will be conducted. After this, a new trading day
is opened. On the whole, there will be twelve trading days. In the second stage of
the experiment, the seller who has sold the good to you on this day can fix the value
156
that the good will have for you. You as a buyer get a certain amount of experimental
money (reselling price) from us for each unit you have bought. This reselling price
is noted in the upper part of sheet 2. Your profit (measured in experimental money)
is the difference between the reselling price and the price at which you have bought
the good. If you bought the good for 20 and the reselling price is 30, you make a
profit of 30 − 20 = 10 (measured in experimental money). How much one unit of
experimental money is worth to you depends on “your” seller. By the choice of a
conversion rate, he decides how much real money you receive from us for one unit of
experimental money. Which conversion rates he is allowed to choose are noted on
the lower part of sheet 2. If he chooses, for example, the rate 0.5, you will get $5 for
10 units of experimental money.
Sellers have two kinds of costs: production costs and decision costs. The latter
are associated with the decision about the conversion rate. Production costs are
noted in the middle of sheet 2, and decision costs on the lower part of sheet 2. As
you can see from sheet 2, the higher the conversion rate “your” seller chooses, the
greater are his decision costs. The profit of the sellers paid in dollars is given by the
formula: profit = (price - production costs - decision costs). Suppose, for example,
that you have bought the good for 75. The production costs of the seller are 60, and
he chooses a conversion rate of 0.6 (which is associated with decision costs of 5), the
profits of “your” seller are given by 75− 60− 5 = $10. Do you have any questions?
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At the market, a good is traded, and each seller sells the same good. A seller can
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sell this good to any buyer, and a buyer can buy it from any seller. The market is
organized in the following way: we open the market for a trading period (a “trading
day”), and each trading day lasts three minutes. As a buyer you can offer a price
that must be divisible by 5, for example, prices like 15, 60, 80, 275 are allowed, but
prices like 48, 67, 124, 83 are not. These offers will be announced to the sellers by us
over the computer and displayed at the front of the room. The sellers will see your
identity, that is, your buyer number, and the price you offered. If a seller accepts
your offer, all buyers are informed about this acceptance. In this case, an agreement
is concluded, and the good is bought by you at the offered price. During each trading
day you can buy one unit of the good. Therefore, a trading day ends for you when
your offer is accepted. Note also that each seller can sell one unit of the good per
day at most. If your offer is not accepted, you are free to change your offer, that is,
to make a new offer. But the new price you offer must be higher than all the prices
that have not been accepted. Each seller may accept an offer or not, but he cannot
make a counteroffer.
After each transaction, the seller who has sold the good to you on this day can
fix the value that the good will have for you. You as a buyer get a certain amount
of experimental money (reselling price) from us for each unit you have bought. This
reselling price is noted in the upper part of your record sheet. Your profit (measured
in experimental money) is the difference between the reselling price and the price at
which you have bought the good. If you bought the good for 20 and the reselling
price is 30, you make a profit of 30 − 20 = 10 (measured in experimental money).
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How much one unit of experimental money is worth to you depends on “your” seller.
By the choice of a conversion rate, he decides how much money you receive from us
for one unit of experimental money. Which conversion rates he is allowed to choose
are noted on the lower part of the record sheet. If he chooses, for example, the rate
0.5, you will get $5 for 10 units of experimental money. Note that the conversion rate
choice and the ID number of the seller will be visible by all buyers.
Sellers have two kinds of costs: production costs and decision costs. The latter
are associated with the decision about the conversion rate. Production costs are
noted in the middle of sheet 2, and decision costs on the lower part of sheet 2. As
you can see from sheet 2, the higher the conversion rate “your” seller chooses, the
greater are his decision costs. The profit of the sellers paid in dollars is given by the
formula: profit = (price - production costs - decision costs). Suppose, for example,
that you have bought the good for 75. The production costs of the seller are 60, and
he chooses a conversion rate of 0.6 (which is associated with decision costs of 5), the
profits of “your” seller are given by 75− 60− 5 = $10.
At the end of the experiment, you (and the sellers) will be paid for your earnings
at a rate of 12-to-1, meaning every 12 dollars you earn in the experiment is worth 1
actual dollar that will be paid to you at the end of the experiment.
After three minutes the trading day ends, and you cannot buy any more of the
good. After this, a new trading day is opened. On the whole, there will be twelve
trading days. Do you have any questions?
[LRP Treatment]
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At the market, a good is traded, and each seller sells the same good. A seller can
sell this good to any buyer, and a buyer can buy it from any seller. The market is
organized in the following way: we open the market for a trading period (a “trading
day”), and each trading day lasts three minutes. As a buyer you can offer a price
that must be divisible by 5, for example, prices like 15, 60, 80, 275 are allowed, but
prices like 48, 67, 124, 83 are not. These offers will be announced to the sellers by us
over the computer and projected in their room along with the buyers’ ID numbers. If
a seller accepts your offer, all buyers are informed about this acceptance and the ID
number of the seller who accepted it. At that point, the seller then chooses a number
‘x’ that affects how valuable the good is to you. Higher values of ‘x’ make the good
more valuable, but cost the seller more money. This choice is then transmitted, along
with the seller’s ID number, back to this room and the transaction is concluded. The
good is bought by you at the offered price and your value is affected by ‘x’. You have
to note the accepted price and the seller’s choice of ‘x’ on your record sheet.
During each trading day you can buy one unit of the good. Therefore, a trading
day ends for you when your offer is accepted. Note also that each seller can sell one
unit of the good per day at most. If your offer is not accepted, you are free to change
your offer, that is, to make a new offer. But the new price you offer must be higher
than all the prices that have not been accepted. Each seller may accept an offer or
not, but he cannot make a counteroffer. After three minutes the day ends, and you
cannot buy any more of the good. After this, a new trading day is opened. On the
whole, there will be twelve trading days.
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Your profit is the fixed value of the good (which is shown on your record sheet,)
multiplied by the number ‘x’ that your seller will determine, minus the price you pay
to buy the good. Mathematically, your profit is given by the formula
buyer profit = value ∗ x− price.
The seller’s profit is the price they get for the good, minus a fixed production cost,
minus an ‘additional cost’ based on their choice of ‘x’. The formula for their profit is
seller profit = price− production cost− additional cost.
Your record sheet lists the value of the good to the buyers, the production cost to
the sellers, and what the ‘additional cost’ for the seller is for each choice of ‘x’. The
higher the choice of ‘x’, the greater are the ‘additional costs.’
If, for example, your value for the good is 400, the seller chooses ‘x’ to be 0.49,
then your value times ‘x’ equals 196. If the price you paid was 175, then your profit
is 196 − 175 = 21. If the seller’s production cost is 100 and his additional cost from
choosing x = 0.49 is 6, then the seller’s profit is 175 − 100 − 6 = 69. This example
appears on your record sheet.
At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be converted to dollars at a rate
of . Do you have any questions?
Specific Instructions for Sellers
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At the market, a good is traded, and each seller sells the same good. A seller can
sell this good to any buyer, and a buyer can buy it from any seller. The market is
organized in the following way: we open the market for a trading period (a “trading
day”), and each trading day lasts three minutes. Every buyer can offer a price that
will be relayed to us by telephone. We list these offers on the blackboard, and you
can accept one of these offers. If, e.g., a price of 50 is offered and you as seller number
5 want to accept this offer, you just say: “Number 5 sells for 50.” In this case, the
transaction is concluded. The good is sold to the buyer who made the offer of 50.
The buyer will not know your identity. He will just know that his offer is accepted.
You have to note your accepted price on sheet 2.
You can sell one unit of the good on each trading day. Therefore, the trading day
ends for you after the acceptance of an offer. Note also that each buyer can buy, at
most, one unit of the good per trading day. Each seller may accept an offer or not,
but the sellers cannot make counteroffers. After three minutes the trading day ends,
and the second stage of the experiment is conducted. After this, a new trading day
is opened. In total there will be twelve trading days. At the second stage of the
experiment, you can fix the value the good will have for the buyers. Buyers receive
a certain amount of experimental money (reselling price) from us for each unit that
they have bought. This reselling price is noted in the middle of sheet 2.
The profit of a buyer (measured in experimental money) is the difference between
the reselling price and the price at which he has bought the good from you. If
“your” buyer has bought the good for 20 and the reselling price is 30, he makes a
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profit of 30 − 20 = 10 (measured in experimental money.) How much one unit of
experimental money is worth for “your” buyer depends on you. By the choice of a
conversion rate, you decide how much real money “your” buyer gets from us for one
unit of experimental money. If you choose, e.g., the rate 0.5, your buyer gets $5 for
10 units of experimental money. Which conversion rates you are allowed to choose,
is noted on the lower part of sheet 2. You have to write down your decision on the
upper part of sheet 2. Do not announce your decision publicly.
You, as a seller, have two kinds of costs: production costs and “decision costs.”
The latter are associated with your decision about the conversion rate. Of course,
you incur costs only in the case of a deal. If you do not trade on a certain day, your
costs are zero for this day. Production costs are noted on the upper part of sheet
2. Decision costs depend on your choice of the conversion rate. The higher the
conversion rate you decide to give “your” buyer, the greater are your decision costs.
The costs, which are associated with the conversion rate, are noted in the lower part
of sheet 2.
Your profit paid in dollars is given by the formula profit = price - production costs
- decision costs. If, for example, you sell your good for 75, while your production
costs are 60, and you choose a conversion rate of 0.6 which leads to a decision cost of
5, your profit is given by 75− 60− 5 = $10. Do you have any questions?
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At the market, a good is traded, and each seller sells the same good. A seller can
sell this good to any buyer, and a buyer can buy it from any seller. The market is
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organized in the following way: we open the market for a trading period (a “trading
day”), and each trading day lasts three minutes. Every buyer can offer a price that
will be relayed to us by computer and displayed at the front of the room. We list
these offers on the screen, along with buyer ID numbers, and you can accept one of
these offers. If, e.g., a price of 50 is offered and you as seller number 5 want to accept
this offer, you just say: “5 sells for 50.” In this case, the transaction is concluded.
The good is sold to the buyer who made the offer of 50. The buyers will see your
decision and your ID number. You have to note your accepted price on the record
sheet.
You can sell one unit of the good on each trading day. Therefore, the trading day
ends for you after the acceptance of an offer. Note also that each buyer can buy, at
most, one unit of the good per trading day. Each seller may accept an offer or not,
but the sellers cannot make counteroffers.
After each transaction, you can fix the value the good will have for the buyers.
Buyers receive a certain amount of experimental money (reselling price) from us for
each unit that they have bought. This reselling price is noted in the middle of the
record sheet. The profit of a buyer (measured in experimental money) is the difference
between the reselling price and the price at which he has bought the good from you.
If “your” buyer has bought the good for 20 and the reselling price is 30, he makes
a profit of 30 − 20 = 10 (measured in experimental money.) How much one unit of
experimental money is worth for “your” buyer depends on you. By the choice of a
conversion rate, you decide how much money “your” buyer gets from us for one unit
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of experimental money. If you choose, e.g., the rate 0.5, your buyer gets $5 for 10
units of experimental money. Which conversion rates you are allowed to choose, is
noted on the lower part of the record sheet. You have to write down your decision
on the upper part of the record sheet.
You, as a seller, have two kinds of costs: production costs and “decision costs.”
The latter are associated with your decision about the conversion rate. Of course,
you incur costs only in the case of a deal. If you do not trade on a certain day, your
costs are zero for this day. Production costs are noted on the upper part of the record
sheet. Decision costs depend on your choice of the conversion rate. The higher the
conversion rate you decide to give “your” buyer, the greater are your decision costs.
The costs, which are associated with the conversion rate, are noted in the lower part
of the record sheet.
Your profit is given by the formula profit = price - production costs - decision
costs. If, for example, you sell your good for 75, while your production costs are 60,
and you choose a conversion rate of 0.6 which leads to a decision cost of 5, your profit
is given by 75− 60− 5 = $10.
At the end of the experiment, you (and the buyers) will be paid for your earnings
at a rate of 12-to-1, meaning every 12 dollars you earn in the experiment is worth 1
actual dollar that will be paid to you at the end of the experiment.
After three minutes the trading day ends, and the second stage of the experiment
is conducted. After this, a new trading day is opened. In total there will be twelve
trading days. Do you have any questions?
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At the market, a good is traded, and each seller sells the same good. A seller can
sell this good to any buyer, and a buyer can buy it from any seller. The market is
organized in the following way: we open the market for a trading period (a “trading
day”), and each trading day lasts three minutes. Every buyer can offer a price (in
multiples of 5) that will be relayed to us by computer and projected at the front of
the room, along with the ID number of the buyer. We list these offers on the screen,
and you can accept one of these offers. If, e.g., a price of 50 is offered and you as
seller number 5 want to accept this offer, you just say: “Seller 5 sells for 50.” At
that point, you then choose a number ‘x’ that affects how valuable the good is to
the buyer. Higher values of ‘x’ make the good more valuable to the buyer, but cost
you more money. This choice is then transmitted, along with the your ID number,
back to the buyers and the transaction is concluded. The good is sold by you at the
offered price and you pay an additional cost for your choice of ‘x’. You have to note
your accepted price and your choice of ‘x’ on your record sheet.
During each trading day you can sell one unit of the good. Therefore, a trading
day ends for you when you accept an offer. Note also that each buyer can buy one
unit of the good per day at most. If a buyer’s offer is not accepted, the buyer is free
to change his offer, but the new price must be higher than all the prices that have
not been accepted. Each seller may accept an offer or not, but you cannot make a
counteroffer. After three minutes the day ends, and you cannot accept any offers.
After this, a new trading day is opened. On the whole, there will be twelve trading
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days.
The profit of a buyer is the buyer’s fixed value of the good (which is shown on
your record sheet,) multiplied by the number ‘x’ that you will determine, minus the
price they pay to buy the good. Mathematically, the buyer’s profit is given by the
formula
buyer profit = value ∗ x− price.
Your profit is the price you get for the good, minus a fixed production cost, minus an
‘additional cost’ based on your choice of ‘x’. The formula for your profit is
seller profit = price− production cost− additional cost.
In the second stage of the experiment, your job is to choose the value ‘x’, and your
‘additional cost’ depends on this decision. Your record sheet lists the value of the
good to the buyers, your production cost, and what the ‘additional cost’ is for each
choice of ‘x’. The higher the choice of ‘x’, the greater are your ‘additional costs.
If, for example, you sell your good for 175, while your production costs are 100,
and you choose the value of ‘x’ as 0.49 which leads to a decision cost of 6, your profit
is given by 175− 100− 6 = 69. This example appears on your record sheet.
At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be converted to dollars at a rate
of . Do you have any questions?
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